University of Pennsylvania
Law Review
FOUNDED 1852

Formerly
American Law Register

APRIL 1996

VOL. 144

No. 4

ARTICLES

FEDERAL COMMON LAW:
A STRUCTURAL REINTERPRETATION
BRADFORD R. CLARKt

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
I.

1247

.................................

FEDERAL COMMON LAW AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE ......................

1255

t Associate Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School. This
Article benefitted significantly from comments offered byJerome A. Barron, David
B. Goroff, Philip A. Hamburger, Alfred Hill, William K. Kelley, Chip Lupu,John F.
Manning, Larry Mitchell, Henry P. Monaghan, Todd D. Peterson, RichardJ. Pierce,
Jr.,Joshua I. Schwartz, and Theodore S. Sims, and from suggestions made by several
of my colleagues at a faculty workshop. In addition, I am grateful to Stephen
Devereaux '96,Jeffrey Hessekiel '96, and Eric Leonard '97 for their excellent research
assistance in connection with this project. I would also like to thank Kevin B. Huff,
Columbia '96, for providing very helpful comments and suggestions, andJoel Millar,
Pennsylvania '96, for his extreme care and attention to detail in preparing this Article
for publication. This Article is dedicated to my mother, Dr. Anna Lydia Motto, and
to the memory of my father, Dr. John R. Clark.

(1245)

1246 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 144: 1245
A. Erie andJudicialFederalism....................

1256

B.

1264

"The New Federal Common Law". ................

II. RECONCEPTUALIZING MODERN FEDERAL
COMMON LAW ................................

1271

A. The Proposed Approach ........................

1272

B. Swift v. Tyson Revisited

1276

.....................

C. The FederalCommon Law of Foreign Relations ......
1. The Act of State Doctrine .................

1292
1292

a. Application of the First Criterion ...........

1294

b. Application of the Second Criterion .........

1300

The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon:
An Historical Example ....................

1306

III. FURTHER APPLICATION OF THE PROPOSED APPROACH ...

1311

2.

A. Cases Affecting Ambassadors ...................

1311

B. ControversiesBetween Two or More States ..........

1322

C. Cases of Admiralty and MaritimeJurisdiction ........

1332

1. Prize Cases . ...........................
2.

Private Maritime Claims ...................

1334
1341

a.

The Scope ofJurisdictionover
PrivateMaritime Claims ................

1341

b.

The HistoricalPurpose ofjurisdiction
over Private Maritime Claims .............

1347

c.

ReconceptualizingFederal Common
Law Rules Governing Private
Maritime Claims ......................

1354

D. Cases Affecting the Rights and Obligations
of the United States .........................

1361

1.

2.

Adoption of Federal Common Law Rules
Favoring the United States .................

1361

a. Application of the First Criterion ...........

1362

b. Application of the Second Criterion .........

1365

Preemption of State Law Rules Disfavoring
the United States ........................

1368

CONCLUSION ...................................

1375

19961

FEDERAL COMMON LAW

1247

The erection of a new government, whatever care or wisdom may
distinguish the work, cannotfail to originate questions of intricacy and
nicety; and these may, in a particularmanner,be expected toflowfrom the
establishmentof a constitutionfounded upon the total orpartialincorporation of a number of distinct sovereignties.'
-Alexander Hamilton
INTRODUCTION
By design, our constitutional structure is complex and often
cumbersome. The founders believed that the structural safeguards
provided by federalism and separation of powers outweighed their
costs. That calculation, however, has created numerous "questions
of intricacy and nicety." "Federal common law," in particular,
presents such questions. In every case, courts are confronted with
a threshold issue: what is the source of the applicable law? In most
cases, state law has been thought to establish background rules of
decision that apply unless preempted by positive federal law.2 In
this century, however, federal courts have found it increasingly
appropriate in many areas to disregard state law in favor of so-called
federal common law.
Federal common law is generally used to refer to "federal judgemade law"-that is, rules of decision adopted and applied by
federal courts that have the force and effect of positive federal law,
but "whose content cannot be traced by traditional methods of
4
interpretation to federal statutory or constitutional command."
1 THE FEDERALIST No. 82, at 491 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
2 See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). In this Article, I use the
phrase "positive federal law" to refer to law based on the positive acts of the people
and their representatives, that is, federal statutes, treaties, and constitutional provisions.
s Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 426 (1964).
4 PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 863 (3d ed. 1988) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER]; see also Martha
A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of FederalCommon Law, 99 HARv. L. REV. 881,890
(1986) ("'[F]ederal common law'. . . refer[s] to any rule of federal law created by a
court (usually but not invariably a federal court) when the substance of that rule is not
clearly suggested by federal enactments-constitutional or congressional." (footnotes
omitted)); Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1, 5 (1985) (defining "federal common law" as "any federal rule of decision
that is not mandated on the face of some authoritative federal text-whether or not
that rule can be described as the product of 'interpretation' in either a conventional
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Thus understood, federal common law raises serious constitutional
questions. First, federal common law, because not clearly rooted in
statutory or constitutional sources, appears to involve judicial
lawmaking-a task at least in tension with federal separation of
powers.5
To be sure, federal courts undoubtedly engage in
interstitial "lawmaking," as part of the process of interpreting
positive law.6 By hypothesis, at least, federal common lawmaking

begins where interpretation ends. 7 Such open-ended lawmaking by

or an unconventional sense").
' See Northwest Airlines v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 95 (1981)
("[Flederal lawmaking power is vested in the legislative, not the judicial, branch of
government.... ."); Martin H. Redish, Federal Common Law, PoliticalLegitimacy, and
the Interpretive Process: An "Institutionalist"Perspective, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 761, 765
(1989) (raising the "fundamental question oflegitimacy-whether it is appropriate for
the judiciary to exercise this function within the broader political context of a
carefully structured system of separation of powers").
6 This phenomenon does not raise the same constitutional concerns as federal
common law. Even strict adherents of the constitutional separation of powers
acknowledge that "no statute can be entirely precise, and that some judgments, even
somejudgments involving policy considerations, must be left to the officers executing
the law and to the judges applying it." Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 415
(1989) (ScaliaJ., dissenting); cf. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448,
477 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("Congress declares its purpose imperfectly or
partially, and compatible judicial construction completes it.").
In practice, of course, the distinction between federal common lawmaking and
statutory (or constitutional) interpretation is often difficult to discern. See Henry P.
Monaghan, The Supreme Cour4 1974 Term-Foreword: ConstitutionalCommon Law, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1, 31 (1975) ("Plainly, any distinction between constitutional exegesis
and common law cannot be analytically precise, representing, as it does, differences
of degree."). Indeed, the Supreme Court's tendency has been "to seek a statutory
rationalization forjudge-made law in this class ofcases." Alfred Hill, The Law-Making
Power of the Federal Courts: ConstitutionalPreemption, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1024, 1041
(1967). For example, in Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, after observing that the
authority of the United States to issue a check for services rendered under the
Federal Emergency Relief Act of 1935 "had its origin in the Constitution and the
statutes of the United States," the Court asserted that "[t]he duties imposed upon the
United States and the rights acquired by it as a result of the issuance find their roots
in the same federal sources." 318 U.S. 363, 366 (1943) (footnote omitted). Similarly,
in Lincoln Mills the Court construed § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act
of 1947 not only to "confer jurisdiction in the federal courts over labor organizations," but also to express "a federal policy that federal courts should enforce
[agreements to arbitrate grievance disputes] on behalf of or against labor organizations." 353 U.S. at 455. Most recently, in Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., the Court
suggested that a provision of the Federal Tort Claims Act retaining the federal
government's sovereign immunity for claims based on the performance of discretionary functions establishes a "federal policy" that "in some circumstances" also requires
immunity for federal contractors from state tort liability "for design defects in
military equipment." 487 U.S. 500, 512 (1988).
The Supreme Court's reliance on "the penumbra ofexpress statutory mandates"
or "the policy of the legislation," Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 457, only tends to
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courts raises constitutional concerns because it bears a troublesome
resemblance to the exercise of legislative power-power apparently
8
reserved by the Constitution to the political branches.
Second, because federal common law preempts state law, federal
common law also raises two related federalism concerns, at least as
applied to matters within the legislative competence of the states.
Federal common law arguably intrudes upon state authority by
departing from the Constitution and the Rules of Decision Act,9
which-as interpreted in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkinst°-appear to
requirefederal courts to apply state law "[e]xcept in matters governed
by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress."" Federal
common law further threatens the autonomy and independence of
the states by requiring state courts to apply federal judge-made law
notwithstanding contrary state law, even though the Constitution's

obfuscate the Court's lawmaking function. If construction of the relevant statute
yields the rule in question, then resort to federal common law is unnecessary. If, on
the other hand, the rule in question "is more than can be fairly asked even from the
alchemy of construction," id. at 462 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), then the Court
should followJusticeJackson's advice and acknowledge that it is making its "own law
from materials found in common-law sources." D'Oench, Duhime & Co. v. FDIC, 315
U.S. 447,468 (1942) (Jackson,J., concurring). In the end, of course, one's conception
of the scope of federal common lawmaking depends in large part on one's approach
to statutory (and constitutional) interpretation. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 4, at 7
(defining federal common law "extremely broad[ly]" to refer to legal rules that "are
not found on the face of an authoritative federal text" and thus to include "rules that
are almost never treated as federal common law (such as 'ordinary' statutory
construction and nonoriginalist judicial review)").
" See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; infra notes 106-20 and accompanying text; see also
Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("I
recognize without hesitation that judges do and must legislate, but they can do so
only interstitially; they are confined from molar to molecular motions."). The
"delicate and difficult inquiry" whether, and to what extent, Congress may delegate
lawmaking authority to the federal courts, see Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10
Wheat.) 1, 46 (1825), presents distinct considerations beyond the scope of this Article.
Cf Postum Cereal Co. v. California Fig Nut Co., 272 U.S. 693, 699-701 (1927) (stating
that Congress may not vest Article III courts "with administrative or legislative
functions which are not properly judicial"); Keller v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 261
U.S. 428, 444 (1923) (stating that the jurisdiction of Article III courts is limited to

deciding cases and controversies and "does not extend to ... administrative or
legislative issues or controversies"); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 352 (1911)
(stating that "'neither the legislative nor executive branches can constitutionally assign
to the judicial any duties but such as are properlyjudicial, and to be performed in a
judicial manner'" (quoting Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 410 (1792))).
9 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1994).
10304 U.S. 64 (1938).
" Id. at 78.
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reference to the "supreme Law of the Land" does not obviously
12
include federal judge-made law.
The Supreme Court has responded to these concerns by
purporting to limit the scope of federal common law to several wellrecognized enclaves. These include "such narrow areas as those
concerned with the rights and obligations of the United States,
interstate and international disputes implicating the conflicting
rights of States or our relations with foreign nations, and admiralty
cases."'" Although this "enclave" approach to federal common law
may mitigate the constitutional difficulties identified above, it
"simply list[s] areas of law or categories of cases in which federal
common law is permissible" without providing any "underlying
14
rationale other than grandfathering."
Commentators have suggested several alternatives. At one end
of the spectrum, Professor Martha Field has argued that "judicial
power to act is not limited to particular enclaves," 15 and that
"limits on federal common law are incoherent." 6 In her view,
"federal [common] law can apply whenever federal interests require
a federal solution."17 At the other end of the spectrum, Professor
Martin Redish has argued that federalism and separation of powers
concerns inherent in the Rules of Decision Act instruct "that there
can be no such thing as 'federal common law,' at least to the extent
it is used to provide a 'rule of decision' and to the extent that the
12See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."); cf. Hill, supra
note 7, at 1073-74 (observing that although it is unclear whether the founding fathers
intended the Supremacy Clause to embrace "federal judge-made law," the "point has
been settled in practice").
"5Texas Indus. v. RadcliffMaterials, 451 U.S. 630,641 (1981) (footnotes omitted);
see also Northwest Airlines v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 95 (1981)
(stating that federal courts have authority "to fashion federal common law in cases
raising issues of uniquely federal concern, such as the definition of rights or duties
of the United States or the resolution of interstate controversies" (footnotes
omitted)).
14 Field, supra note 4, at 911-12; see also Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 641 (listing
enclaves of federal common law); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,
426-27 (1964) (same).
1 Field, supra note 4, at 887.
Id. at 884; see also Louise Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 Nw. U. L. REV.
805,805 (1989) ("[T]here are no fundamental constraints on the fashioning of federal
rules of decision.").
"' Field, supra note 4, at 983 (emphasis omitted).
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phrase 'common law' is construed as a category of lawmaking
distinct from constitutional or statutory 'interpretation. '" 8
This Article does not propose to embrace either of these
approaches. Rather, it attempts to provide an alternative explanation for at least a portion of the rules that fall within the traditional
enclaves of federal common law identified by the Supreme Court.
This attempt rests largely upon "the [neglected] method of
inference from the structures and relationships created by the
constitution in all its parts or in some principal part."1 9 Relying on
various inferences from the constitutional structure, this Article
seeks to show that an important subset of federal common law rules
has essentially been mischaracterized by courts and commentators.
Careful analysis demonstrates that judicial adherence to these rules
is consistent with, and frequently required by, the constitutional
structure. So understood, the rules in question do not constitute
"federal judge-made law," and therefore do not raise the constitutional difficulties traditionally associated with such law.
In order to qualify under the proposed reconceptualization, a
rule must satisfy two criteria derived from the constitutional
structure. First, the transactions governed by the rule must fall
beyond the legislative competence of the states. Second, the rule
must operate to further some basic aspect of the constitutional
scheme-for example, by preventing the judiciary and the states
from interfering with matters that the Constitution assigns exclusively to the political branches of the federal government, or by
implementing the constitutional equality of the states.
Distinguishing between federal common law rules that satisfy the
proposed criteria and those that do not places the former on a
"s Redish, supra note 5, at 792; see also MARTIN H. REDISH, THE FEDERAL COURTS
IN THE POLITICAL ORDER 29-46 (1991).

Several commentators have attempted to
justify limited conceptions of federal common law that fall somewhere between these
two poles. See George D. Brown, FederalCommon Law and the Role of the FederalCourts
in Private Law Adjudication-A (New) Erie Problem?, 12 PACE L. REV. 229, 261 (1992)
(taking a "stand grounded more on federalism than separation of powers, although
[recognizing that] the two are closely intertwined"); Thomas W. Merrill, TheJudicial
Prerogative,12 PACE L. REV. 327,356 (1992) (attempting to "rescue... what has been
called federal common law without giving up on the idea that there are inherent
constraints on judicial powers"); Merrill, supra note 4, at 36 ("When a court engages
in preemptive lawmaking, it still may be said to be carryingout the original intentions
of the enacting body.., by asking what collateral or subsidiary rules are necessary

in order to effectuate or to avoid frustrating the specific intentions of the draftsmen.").
"9CHARLES L. BLACKJR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw

7 (1969).
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firmer constitutional foundation. The first criterion relies on
constitutional preemption of state authority in certain areas to
resolve federalism concerns. 2' The Constitution places certain
matters beyond the legislative competence of the states-most
21
With
notably, matters integral to the conduct of foreign affairs.
respect to such matters, states-whether acting through courts or
legislatures-generally lack authority to establish binding rules of
decision. Thus, to the extent that federal common law rules
concern matters beyond the legislative competence of the states, it
is difficult to see how the federal courts' application of such rules
could invade rights reserved by the Constitution to the states.
The second criterion alleviates separation of powers concerns.
Many of the rules that the Supreme Court today characterizes as
federal common law are merely background rules that federal and
state courts apply in order to avoid encroaching upon authority
committed by the Constitution to Congress and the President. This
is particularly true with respect to rules relating to foreign affairs.
The Constitution assigns the conduct of foreign relations exclusively
to the political branches of the federal government. On occasion,
this allocation of power requires federal courts (and states) to
adhere to traditional rules derived from the law of nations in order
to avoid usurping the political branches' power to conduct foreign
affairs. Such adherence does not constitute improper judicial
legislation. To the contrary, application of these doctrines furthers
the Constitution's allocation of powers by ensuring that Congress
and the President, rather than the courts (and the states), exercise
powers constitutionally committed to the political branches.
This Article contains three parts. Part I analyzes the Supreme
Court's landmark decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.22 This
23
analysis suggests that Erie's decision to overrule Swift v. Tyson
rests on principles of "judicial federalism"-the premise that federal
courts, acting on their own authority, have no power to displace
state law in areas over which the states possess legislative competence. Next, Part I surveys the rise of modern federal common law
"0Cf Merrill, supra note 4, at

32-46

(identifying "preemptive

lawmaking" as a

legitimate form of federal common law). See generally Hill, supra note 7, at 1030-68
(surveying "areas that are federalized by force of the Constitution itself").
21See Hill, supra note 7, at 1042-44 (asserting that an "area of federal judicial
competence by force of a preemption effected by the Constitution is one involving
questions of international law"); infra notes 237-52 and accompanying text.

304 U.S. 64 (1938).
U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).

2341
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following Erie and reviews the Supreme Court's justifications for
such law. Finally, Part I critically examines competing proposals to
reform federal common law suggested by two of the leading
academics in the field.
Part II proposes an approach, derived from the constitutional
structure, for reconceptualizing at least a portion of the rules
currently thought to be federal common law. This approach
suggests that judicial federalism concerns do not apply to "federal
common law" rules that satisfy the proposed criteria and that such
rules do not, in fact, constitute "federal judge-made law." Rather,
rules that satisfy the proposed approach are generally consistent
with, and often required by, the constitutional structure.
Next, Part II reexamines the Supreme Court's decision in Swift
v. Tyson in light of the proposed approach. It concludes that,
although Swft was constitutionally defensible at the time it was
decided, the federal courts' subsequent adherence to, and expansion
of, the Swft doctrine raised substantial federalism and separation of
powers concerns. Nonetheless, this review is useful to the proposed
reconceptualization because it illustrates that the federal courts may,
under certain circumstances, apply rules derived from customary
law without violating federalism and separation of powers principles.
Finally, Part II applies the proposed approach to reconceptualize
federal common law rules like the act of state doctrine that govern
"international disputes implicating . . . our relations with foreign
nations."24 Because such rules generally concern matters beyond
the legislative competence of the states-specifically, "our relations
with foreign nations-the constitutional structure permits federal
courts to disregard state law in applying these rules. This examination also reveals that the constitutional allocation of powers not only
permits, but frequently requires, courts to apply rules of this kind
in order to preserve the constitutional prerogatives of the political
branches to conduct foreign affairs.
Part III applies the proposed approach to several additional
enclaves of federal common law. First, it examines certain cases
affecting foreign ambassadors and concludes that, in the absence of
a controlling federal statute or treaty, both federal and state courts
must apply internationally recognized rules of diplomatic immunity,
not because such rules constitute "federal judge-made law," but
24 Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981) (footnote omitted).
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because refusal to apply them would encroach upon the exclusive
authority of the political branches over foreign relations.
Next, Part III analyzes "federal common law" rules governing
"interstate . . . disputes implicating the conflicting rights of
States." 25
Because neither the states nor Congress generally
possess unilateral legislative competence to resolve interstate
disputes, the Constitution necessarily contemplates that the
Supreme Court will resolve such disputes. The rules adopted and
applied by the Court in these cases are best understood, not as
federal common law, but as rules designed to implement the
constitutional structure-specifically, the constitutional equality of
the states.
Part III also examines what is perhaps the best-known enclave
of federal judge-made law-rules governing "Cases of admiralty and
maritime Jurisdiction." 26 Specifically, it compares and contrasts
two types of admiralty disputes, prize cases and private maritime
claims. Prize cases directly implicate foreign relations and are
therefore beyond the authority of the states to regulate. In such
cases, both federal and state courts should apply principles derived
from the law of nations and leave policymaking to the political
branches. On the other hand, under the Court's modern expansion
of admiralty jurisdiction, private maritime claims frequently concern
matters within the traditional legislative competence of the states.
Such cases are difficult to reconcile with Erie and thus remain
constitutionally suspect.
Finally, Part III briefly examines the application of the proposed
approach to one of the more troublesome enclaves of federal
common law-rules governing "the rights and obligations of the
United States." 27 Initially, this Part examines the Supreme Court's
decisions in Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States28 and O'Melveny &
Myers v. FDIC.29 Although the federal common law rules sought to
be applied in these cases arguably govern matters beyond the
legislative competence of the states, they are not readily derived
from the constitutional structure and thus cannot be reconceptualized under the proposed approach. Next, this Part examines the
Supreme Court's adoption of the military contractor defense in
25 Id.

§ 2, cI. 1.
Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 641 (footnote omitted).

26 U.S. CONST. art. III,
27

28 318
29

U.S. 363 (1943).
114 S. Ct. 2048 (1994).
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Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.30 The proposed approach suggests that recognition of this defense is simply a means of implementing the constitutional preemption of state authority to regulate
military procurement matters. Thus, Boyle's adoption of this
defense does not appear to raise significant federalism or separation
of powers concerns.
I. FEDERAL COMMON LAW AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE

Federal common law is a modern phenomenon.3 1 Prior to this
century, the Supreme Court confidently asserted that "[t]here is no
principle which pervades the Union and has the authority of law,

32
that is not embodied in the constitution or laws of the Union."
In this century, by contrast, the Court has increasingly recognized
various "enclaves of federal judge-made law." 33 The rise of federal
common law is problematic because such law is at least in tension
with important features of the constitutional structure, particularly
federalism and the separation of powers.
This Part begins with a review of the Supreme Court's decision
in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.34 A proper understanding of Erie
is necessary to any evaluation of federal common law. As discussed
below, Erie established the general rule-based on mutually reinforcing principles of federalism and separation of powers-that federal
courts must apply the substantive law of the state in which they sit
in the absence of positive federal law to the contrary. Federal
common law appears to represent a departure from this rule. Next,
this Part summarizes the rise of modern federal common law
following Erie and examines the justifications for such law offered
by the Supreme Court. Finally, this Part critically evaluates both
Professor Field's proposal for the expansion of federal common law
and Professor Redish's apparent attempt to significantly narrow the
field.

30 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
S"Federal common law is to be distinguished from the "general common law"
applied during the Swift era. See infra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
2 Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 657-58 (1834); see also id. ("It is clear,
there can be no common law of the United States.").
ss Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 426-27 (1964).
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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A. Erie andJudicialFederalism
For almost one hundred years, federal courts claimed authority
to disregard state court decisions with respect to matters governed
by "general law." This doctrine is typically associated with the
Supreme Court's decision in Swift v. Tyson, 35 which held that
federal courts exercising diversity jurisdiction need not follow state
court decisions on matters of "general commercial law.""6 Rather,
with respect to such questions, federal courts considered themselves
free "to express [their] own opinion"3 7 concerning the content of
the applicable law. The so-called Swift doctrine gradually expanded
to encompass not only commercial law, but also such historically
local matters as punitive damages, property, and torts.3 8
In Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 39 the Supreme Court instituted
something of a constitutional revolution by concluding that the Swft
doctrine represented "'an unconstitutional assumption of powers by
the courts of the United States'"4 " and should be overruled. Erie
began as a routine application of the Swift doctrine. Tompkins, a
citizen of Pennsylvania, was injured while walking alongside railroad
tracks in that state when he was struck by an object protruding from
a passing train. Tompkins sued the railroad, which was incorporated in New York, in federal court on the basis of diversity of citizenship.4 1 The case turned on the duty of care owed by a railroad to
a pedestrian walking along the right of way. The railroad argued
that under Pennsylvania law, Tompkins was a trespasser and "that
the railroad is not liable to undiscovered trespassers resulting from
its negligence, unless it be wanton or willful."42 Tompkins, by
contrast, argued that "the railroad's duty and liability is to be
determined in federal courts as a matter of general law." 43 The

35 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).

Id. at 18.
- Id. at 19.
36

38 See TONY FREYER, HARMONY & DISSONANCE: THE SWIFT & ERIE CASES IN
AMERICAN FEDERALISM 71 (1981) ("[T]he federal judiciary continued to enlarge the

body of general law so that by 1890 it included some 26 doctrines."); infra notes 21113 and accompanying text.
39 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
40
Id. at 79 (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow
Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
4, See id. at 69.
42 Id. at 70.
4S Id.
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court of appeals agreed with Tompkins, 4 4 and the railroad brought
the case to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court reversed and, although neither party asked
it to do so, overruled Swift. The Court initially noted its disagreement with Swift's interpretation of section 34 of the Judiciary Act.
According to the Court, Swift "held that federal courts exercising
[diversity] jurisdiction.., need not, in matters of general jurisprudence, apply the unwritten law of the State as declared by its highest
court."45 Although it found this construction of the Act to be
"erroneous," the Court expressly declined to rest its decision on this
ground. Rather, the Court based its decision on the Constitution:
"If only a question of statutory construction were involved, we
should not be prepared to abandon a doctrine so widely applied
throughout nearly a century. But the unconstitutionality of the
course pursued has now been made clear, and compels us to do
46

so."

The Supreme Court explained the constitutional basis for its
decision in the following brief, and somewhat cryptic, passage:
Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts
of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the
State. And whether the law of the State shall be declared by its
Legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a decision is not
a matter of federal concern. There is no federal general common
law. Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of
common law applicable in a State whether they be local in their
nature or "general," be they commercial law or a part of the law
of torts. And no clause in the Constitution purports to confer
such a power upon the federal courts.47
Upon analysis, this passage reveals three mutually reinforcing
grounds of decision. The first sentence establishes that the federal
courts have a general duty to apply "the law of the State" to matters
not governed by positive federal law and suggests that federal judgemade law does not provide a legitimate basis for displacing state

""See id. ("'[lit is well settled that the question of the responsibility of a railroad
for injuries caused by its servants is one of general law.'" (quoting Tompkins v. Erie
R.R., 90 F.2d 603, 604 (2d Cir. 1937))).
45 Id. at 71.
46 Id. at 77-78.
47
Id. at 78. Professor Field finds "[t]his discussion [to be] highly ambiguous, and
even inconsistent, in the scope it suggests for federal common law." Field, supra note
4, at 905. Professor Field's views are discussed infra notes 95-120 and accompanying
text.
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law. The second sentence makes clear that state law (unlike federal
law) may be adopted by courts as well as legislatures and that both
sources of state law are equally applicable in federal court. The
remainder of the passage asserts that neither Congress nor the
federal judiciary has power under the Constitution "to declare
substantive rules of common law applicable in a State."
The last ground is perhaps the most curious. Erie was decided
in 1938, just one year after the Supreme Court upheld the National
Labor Relations Act as a proper exercise of Congress's power to
regulate interstate commerce, 48 and just four years before the
Court would uphold Congress's regulation of wheat production "not
intended in any part for commerce but wholly for consumption on
the farm."4 9 Given these decisions, Erie's suggestion that Congress
lacks power to regulate the duty of care owed by companies like the
5 °
Erie Railroad Company seems dubious.
It does not follow, however, that Erie was wrongly decided.
Erie's statement regarding the lack of congressional power was
dictum. No federal statute prescribed a rule of decision to govern
the matters at issue in the case. Only the Court's assertion that "no
clause in the Constitution purports to confer such a power upon the
federal courts" 5 was necessary to the Court's decision. This
assertion recalls the Court's first ground of decision-federal courts
have no power to disregard state law "[e]xcept in matters governed
by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress."52 In other
words, even assuming that Congress had power to adopt a statute
to govern a given controversy, the Constitution would require
federal courts to follow applicable state law unless Congress adopted
4

See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 6 (1937) ("The National
Labor Relations Act is an exercise of the power of Congress to protect interstate
commerce from injuries caused by industrial strife.").
49Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 118 (1942).
oSee Paul J. Mishkin, Some FurtherLast Words on Erie-The Thread, 87 HARV. L.
REV. 1682, 1684 n.10 (1974) ("It would seem reasonably clear that even by then
contemporary standards, Congress would have been seen as having power to
prescribe a substantive rule of liability for the specific accident in Erie."); see also Field,
supra note 4, at 926 ("Surely Congress has power to regulate interstate railroads'
liability to trespassers, if it wishes to do so."); cf id. at 975 ("There may be an area
that Congress cannot reach, even under its expansive Commerce power, and where
state law accordingly 'operates of its own force.'" (footnote omitted)).
"1Thus, Erie clearly holds that the Constitution's conferral of diversityjurisdiction
upon the federal courts does not carry with it substantive lawmaking power.
-' Of course, federal courts may also disregard state law in favor of "Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States." See U.S.

CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
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such a statute (or the Constitution itself supplied a rule of decision).53
Reading the first and third grounds together, Erie is best
4
understood as resting on principles of judicial federalism.
Judicial federalism posits that the federal courts unconstitutionally
invade "'the autonomy and independence of the States'"5 5 whenever they unilaterally apply a rule of their own choosing in lieu of
substantive state law-that is, in the absence of a controlling federal
constitutional, statutory, or treaty provision requiring application of
that rule. 56 In this way, Erie "recognizes that federal judicial power
to displace state law is not coextensive with the scope of dormant
congressional power. Rather, the Court must point to some source,
such as a statute, treaty, or constitutional57provision, as authority for
the creation of substantive federal law."
13 Cases decided under the "dormant" Commerce Clause appear to present
a
limited exception. Whatever their legitimacy generally, these cases provide no
authority for federal judge-made law. Under the dormant commerce power, courts
exercise only the negative power to invalidate state law. They neither claim nor
exercise the affirmative power to adopt federal rules of decision. It is worth noting,
moreover, that Erie was written in 1938, the same year that the Court decided South
Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938). The latter
arguably represents the low-water mark of dormant Commerce Clausejurisprudence.
See id. at 192-93 (upholding a state's weight limit on trucks because the regulation was
not "arbitrary or unreasonable").
' See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 4, at 15 (arguing that "the federalism principle
identified by Erie still exists but has been silently transformed from a general
constraint on the powers of the federal government into an attenuated constraint that
applies principally to one branch of that government-the federal judiciary").
55
Erie, 304 U.S. at 78 (quoting Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 401
(1893)
(Field, J., dissenting)).
56
See Mishkin, supra note 50, at 1688 (stating that Erie and "the second sentence
of the Rules Enabling Act" "reflect and restate constitutional principles which restrain
the power of the federal courts to intrude upon the states' determination of
substantive policy in areas which the Constitution and Congress have left to state
competence"). Objections based on judicial federalism do not apply to the federal
courts' failure to follow state procedural rules. "Certain implied powers must
necessarily result to our Courts of justice from the nature of their institution."
United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812). Such implied powers
include the authority to adopt rules of practice and procedure, notwithstanding a
state's adoption of contrary rules to govern proceedings in state court. See Robinson
v. Campbell, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 212, 221-23 (1818) (rejecting the argument that § 34
of the Judiciary Act of 1789 required federal courts to follow state practice rather
than general equity remedies and common law procedures); cf Wayman v. Southard,
23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 42-44 (1825) (upholding Congress's delegation of rulemaking
power to courts because such power is not "strictly and exclusively legislative").
57 Monaghan, supra note 7, at 11-12 (footnotes omitted); see also Texas Indus. v.
Radcliff Materials, 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981) ("[N]or does the existence of congressional authority under Art. I mean that federal courts are free to develop a common
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Erie's conception of judicial federalism rests upon mutually
reinforcing principles of federalism and separation of powers. To
avoid what the founders regarded as a dangerous concentration of

power in the same hands, the Constitution both divides and
separates governmental power."

In creating a federal system, the

Constitution assigns limited powers to the federal government and
reserves the balance to the states and to the people.

9

The Consti-

tution further ensures "the preservation of liberty" by "requir[ing]
that the three great departments of power should be separate and

distinct."6

In these ways, the Constitution not only limits the

powers available to the federal government, but also restricts the
6
manner in which that government may exercise them. '

law to govern those areas until Congress acts.").
58 See THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison).
"9This division of power is both inherent in the constitutional structure and
explicit in the constitutional text. See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
60 THE FEDERALIST No. 47, supra note 58, at 301 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
61 For example, Article I provides that "[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall
be vested in a Congress of the United States," U.S. CONT. art. I, § 1, and establishes
an intricate system of checks and balances with respect to the enactment of federal
law. Under § 7 of Article I, every proposed federal law, "before it [shall] become a
Law," must pass both houses of Congress and meet with the approval of the
President. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. If the President disapproves, he generally
must return the proposal to the house in which it originated for reconsideration. The
proposal will then become law only if two thirds of the members of each house vote
to override the President's veto. See id.
Significantly, the founders rejected the practice employed by several states,
during both the colonial and Confederation eras, of combining legislative andjudicial
authority in the same hands. See generally THE FEDERALIST Nos. 47, 48 (James
Madison) (describing the Framers' conception of the separation of powers); MJ.C.
VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 119-75 (1967) (describing
various influences on the development of separation of powers); GORDON S. WOOD,
THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: 1776-1787, at 154, 549-50 (1969)
(contrasting the views ofseparation of powers duringvarious stages of the eighteenth
century). Specifically, the Constitutional Convention considered and rejected
Edmund Randolph's proposal to establish a council of revision consisting of "the
Executive and a convenient number of the National Judiciary," with authority "to
examine every act of the National Legislature before it shall operate." James
Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (May 29, 1787), in I THE RECORDS
OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 21 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter
Farrand] (recounting Randolph's proposed resolutions). Disapproval by the council
would have "amount[ed] to a rejection" of the proposed legislation unless a
supermajority in each house reenacted it. See id. The Convention rejected
Randolph's proposal on the ground that it made "the Expositors of the Laws, the
Legislators which ought never to be done." James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (July 21, 1787), in 2 Farrand, supra, at 75 (recounting statements
of Gerry); see also id. ("MR. STRONG thought with MR. GERRY that the power of
making ought to be kept distinct from that of expounding, the laws. No maxim was
better established.").
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Both constraints are designed to protect the states and the
people from unwarranted federal action. Thus, it is commonplace
to characterize federal action that exceeds delegated authority as
violating constitutional principles of federalism. As Erie demonstrates, however, federal action that violates the Constitution's
separation of powers may also "invade[] rights which ...

are

reserved by the Constitution to the several states."62 The founders
did not establish a federal government, comprised of distinct
branches exercising separate powers, and subject to numerous
checks and balances, merely to create an interesting system of
government. Rather, the founders incorporated these features in
order to make the exercise of governmental authority-specifically,
ftderal governmental authority-more difficult.6" The Constitution
thus reserves substantive lawmaking power to the states and the
people both by limiting the powers assigned to the federal government and by rendering that government frequently incapable of
exercising them.

64

Thus, even if the Constitution authorizes the federal government
to adopt rules of decision to govern matters like those involved in
Swift and Erie, judicial federalism prohibits federal courts from
adopting such rules on their own.65 An essential premise of the
62 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 80 (1938). This conclusion draws support

from the negative implication of what Professor Wechsler described as the "political
safeguards of federalism." See Herbert Wechsler, The PoliticalSafeguards of Federalism:
The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54
COLUM. L. REv. 543 (1954); infra notes 127-34 and accompanying text.
65 See Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983)
("The choices we discern as having been made in the Constitutional Convention
impose burdens on governmental processes that often seem clumsy, inefficient, even
unworkable, but those hard choices were consciously made by men who had lived
under a form of government that permitted arbitrary government acts to go
unchecked.").
"4 Cf United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 395 (1990) ("Provisions for
separation of powers within the Legislative Branch are.., not different in kind from
provisions concerning relations between the branches; both sets of provisions
safeguard liberty.").
' The Court confronted a similar question in United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S.
(7 Cranch) 32 (1812). The issue before the Court was "whether the Circuit Courts
of the United States can exercise a common-law jurisdiction in criminal cases." Id.
at 32. The Court held that they could not. See id. at 34. Proponents of such
jurisdiction contended "that, upon the formation of any political body, an implied
power to preserve its own existence and promote the end and object of its creation,
necessarily results to it." Id. at 33. The Court's response to this argument is
instructive:
If it may communicate certain implied powers to the general government,
it would not follow that the Courts of that government are vested with
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Court's decision in Erie, therefore, appears to be that unilateral
lawmaking by federal courts in this context violates the Constitution's separation of powers.66 Such a violation, in turn, "invade[s]
rights which ... are reserved by the Constitution to the several
states, " 67 specifically, the right to have state law govern matters
within the legislative competence of the states unless and until the
federal government-acting pursuant to the various and often
cumbersome means prescribed by the Constitution-adopts
"supreme Law of the Land" to displace state law. 68 This suggests,
as Erie held, that "[e]xcept in matters governed by the Federal
Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any
69
case is the law of the State."
This holding required the Supreme Court to define "the law of
the state" with precision. In so doing, Erie adopted two important
principles of legal positivism. First, quoting Justice Holmes, the
Court asserted that law is comprised exclusively of sovereign
commands: "'[L]aw in the sense in which courts speak of it today
does not exist without some definite authority behind it.'" 7 0 Thus,

jurisdiction over any particular act done by an individual in supposed
violation of the peace and dignity of the sovereign power. The legislative
authority of the Union must first make an act a crime, affix a punishment
to it, and declare the court that shall have jurisdiction of the offence.
Id. at 34.
6 The federal courts' unilateral adoption of rules of decision under the expanded
Swift doctrine thus raises much greater separation of powers concerns than did the
Supreme Court's application of the law merchant in the Swift case itself. To be sure,
the Swift Court undoubtedly engaged in some degree of interstitial lawmaking. But
some degree of lawmaking necessarily inheres in thejudicial function. See infra notes
196-98 and accompanying text.
67 Erie, 304 U.S. at 80.
63 U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2. Erie may not sweep as broadly as its language
suggests. As discussed in Part II, the principles ofjudicial federalism recognized in
Erie should not be interpreted to apply to matters beyond the legislative competence
of the states. See infra notes 127-36 and accompanying text. This limitation
represents
an important qualification of Erie's otherwise sweeping pronouncements.
69
Erie, 304 U.S. at 78; see also U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and
the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall
be the supreme Law of the Land ... ."). Thus, Erie appears to foreclose any
argument that "the Laws of the United States" as used in the Supremacy Clause
encompasses judge-made law of the sort adopted under Swift. To the contrary, Erie
necessarily limits such laws to "Acts of Congress." 304 U.S. at 78. This view is
consistent with historical practice. Even under Swift, the general common law rules
adopted by federal courts were binding only in federal court; state courts remained
free to disregard them in subsequent cases. If the Supremacy Clause were meant to
encompass federal judge-made law, it is odd that neither federal nor state courts
noticed this fact for most of our constitutional history.
SErie, 304 U.S. at 79 (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown
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Erie rejected the "fallacy" underlying Swift that "there is 'a transcendental body of law outside of any particular State but obligatory
within it unless and until changed by statute.'"71 This meant that
"'[t]he common law so far as it is enforced in a State... is not the
common law generally but the law of that State existing by the
authority of that State.'" 72
Second, the Erie Court recognized that state courts, no less than
73
state legislatures, can and do make law on behalf of the states.
Traditionally, judges and legal commentators believed that common
law judges did not make law in any significant sense. Such judges
were simply thought to "discover" rules inherent within the
common law itself.7 4 By the end of the nineteenth century,
however, the legal positivists' conception of law as the creation of
human will had transformed the common law. Under this view,
judges did not merely discover common law rules, but rather
affirmatively created them. 5
Erie applied these principles to state law. According to the
Court, "[W]hether the law of the state shall be declared by its
Legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a decision is not a
matter of federal concern." 76 Rather, in the absence of a contrary
& Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518,533 (1928) (Holmes,.., dissenting)).
71 Id. (same).
' Id. (same).
' Both tenets embraced by the Court derive from notions of legal positivism
advanced byJohn Austin. See William R. Casto, The Erie Doctrine and the Structure of
ConstitutionalRevolutions, 62 TUL. L. REV. 907,921-22 (1988) (describingAustin's view
that "the common law is a system of positive law set by the sovereign using the
medium ofjudicial opinions"); infra note 75.
74 See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *68 ("[T]he only method of
proving, that this or that maxim is a rule of the common law, is by shewing that it
hath been always the custom to observe it."); see also GRANT GILMORE, THE ACES OF
AMERICAN LAW 14 (1977) ("Courts decided cases in the light of preexisting common
law or statutory rules. Only the legislature could change the rules."); MATTHEW
HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAw OF ENGLAND 17, 45 (Charles M. Gray ed.,
Univ. of Chicago 1971) (1713) (noting that common law rules "acquire[] their binding
Power and the Force of Laws by a long and immemorial Usage").
7
5 SeeJOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OFJURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 30-33 (Isaiah
Berlin ed., Noonday Press 1954) (1832) (positing that "judge-made law" is the law of
the sovereign); Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 465
(1897) ("You may assume, with Hobbes and Bentham and Austin, that all law
emanates from the sovereign, even when the first human beings to enunciate it are
the judges.").
7
6 Erie, 304 U.S. at 78. The only potential federal restriction on the way in which
the states adopt state law appears to be the Guarantee Clause. See U.S. CONST. art.
IV, § 4 (guaranteeing that each state shall have a "Republican Form of Government").
The Supreme Court, however, has long held the Guarantee Clause to be nonjustici-
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rule supplied by positive federal law (such as "the Federal Constitution or... Acts of Congress"77 ), each source of state law is equally
binding upon the federal courts under principles of judicial
federalism.
78
B. "The New FederalCommon Law"

Notwithstanding
oft-quoted assertion
law," 79 the Supreme
"enclaves of federal

Erie's embrace of judicial federalism, and its
that "[t]here is no federal general common
Court has subsequently recognized numerous
judge-made law which bind the States.""0 In
Erie, of course, the Court refused to interpret the constitutional and
statutory provisions conferring jurisdiction over controversies
"between Citizens of different States"81 to imply federal common
lawmaking authority as well. Since 1917, however, the federal
courts have claimed just such authority in cases falling within their
"admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction." 2
In addition, on the very day that Erie was decided, the Supreme
Court applied "federal common law" to apportion the water of an
interstate stream between states,8 3 and has since routinely applied
such law to resolve disputes within its jurisdiction over "Controversies between two or more States." 4 The Court has also recognized the existence of federal common law governing areas
concerned with "international disputes implicating.., our relations
with foreign nations."s
Finally the Court has applied federal

able. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 209 (1962) (discussing cases).
77 Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
7'

The phrase isJudge Friendly's. See HenryJ. Friendly, In Praiseof Erie-And the

New7 FederalCommon Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383 (1964).
9 Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
o Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 426-27 (1964).
81 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
1 Id.; see also Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 215 (1917) ("[I]n the
absence of some controlling statute the general maritime law as accepted by the
federal courts constitutes part of our national law applicable to matters within the
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction."); American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 114 S. Ct.
981, 989 (1994) ("[T]here is an established and continuing tradition of federal
common lawmaking in admiralty.").
" See Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110

(1938).
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see also infra part III.B.
" Texas Indus. v. RadcliffMaterials, 451 U.S. 630,641 (1981) (footnote omitted);
see also infra notes 220-308 and accompanying text.
84
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common law to adjudicate cases involving "the rights and obliga86
tions of the United States."
Contrary to the approach suggested in Erie,17 modern conceptions of federal common law posit that "[iln [the] absence of an
applicable Act of Congress it is for the federal courts to fashion the
governing rule of law according to their own standards."88 As
discussed below, such conceptions of the federal judicial power raise
substantial federalism and separation of powers concerns.
The Supreme Court has responded to these concerns in two
ways. First, the Court has attempted to restrict the application of
federal common law to several well-established enclaves, such as
those described above. Representative of this approach is the
Court's assertion that,
absent some congressional authorization to formulate substantive
rules of decision, federal common law exists only in such narrow
areas as those concerned with the rights and obligations of the
United States, interstate and international disputes implicating the
conflicting rights of States or our relations with foreign nations,
and admiralty cases.8 9
To be sure, limiting federal common law to these areas mitigates the
constitutional difficulties associated with such law. This approach,
however, provides "no underlying rationale other than grandfathering"9 because it "simply list[s] areas of law or categories of cases
in which federal common law is permissible.., without supplying
"
any overriding principle or test. 91
Second, the Supreme Court has suggested that the federal
courts' authority to fashion federal common law is limited to "cases
raising issues of uniquely federal concern."9 2 Although the Court
sometimes describes the enclaves listed above as examples of areas
that satisfy this standard,9 3 the precise scope of this restriction
s Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 641;seealso infra notes 569-635 and accompanying text.
87 See Erie, 304 U.S. at 78 ("Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the
State.").
8' Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943); cf. supra note
4 and accompanying text (defining "federal common law").
89 Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 641 (footnotes omitted).
o Field, supra note 4, at 912.
9' Id. at 911.

' Northwest Airlines v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 95 (1981)
(footnotes omitted).
9
See id. (stating that federal courts have authority "to fashion federal common
law in cases raising issues of uniquely federal concern, such as the definition of rights
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remains unclear. For example, the Court has recently gone so far
as to hold that this requirement permits the adoption of federal
common law to govern disputes between private parties when "the
94
interests of the United States will be directly affected."
Professor Martha Field has criticized the Supreme Court's
approach on the ground that "limits on federal common law are
incoherent"9 5 and has asserted that "judicial power to act is not
limited to particular enclaves."" In Professor Field's view, "federal
law can apply whenever federal interests require a federal solution."'
Under "this broad formulation of judicial power," the judiciary is
generally free "to choose between state and federal law," and state
law "operat[es] of its own force" only with respect to "a very small
amount of state law."9 8 In all other cases, the judiciary possesses
"[t]otal flexibility... in the choice of governing law."99
Professor Field's broad conception of judicial power to adopt
federal common law raises substantial federalism and separation of
powers concerns.
In analyzing these concerns, it is useful to
identify three distinct allocations of power created by the Constitution's complex division of governmental authority between the
federal government and the states.
First, because the federal
government is one of enumerated powers, the states retain exclusive
authority (at least in theory) to govern certain matters.'00 Thus,
at least in this sphere, the imposition of any federal rule of decision-whether adopted by Congress or the courts-would invade the

or duties of the United States or the resolution of interstate controversies" (footnotes
omitted)).
"' Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 507 (1988), discussed infra
notes 603-35 and accompanying text. The Court has also stated that the application
of federal common law is appropriate only when there is a "significant conflict
between some federal policy or interest and the use of state law." Wallis v. Pan Am.
Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1963); see also Boyle, 487 U.S. at 507 (quoting
Wallis, 384 U.S. at 68). Whether the Court will find the conflict sufficient depends
on the nature of the competing federal and state interests.
" Field, supra note 4, at 884.
9 Id. at 887.
97
Id.at 983.
9
1Id.at 888.
9 Id. at 930. Professor Field, however, would guide the exercise of judicial
discretion by adopting a presumption that "state law should apply when it is not
inconsistentwith federal interests for it to do so." Id. at 983.
" See United States v. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 1626 (1995) (reciting the "first
principles" that "'[t]he powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal
government are few and defined'" and that "'[t]hose which are to remain in the State
governments are numerous and indefinite'" (first alteration in original) (quoting THE
FEDERALIsT No. 45, at 292 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961))).
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constitutional prerogatives of the states.' ° Second, and conversely,
the Constitution vests exclusive authority over at least some matters
in the federal government.10 2 Because the states are completely
without authority to govern matters of this kind, judicial creation of
federal common law rules to govern matters within this sphere
raises only negligible federalism concerns, if any.
Finally, with respect to a broad array of matters, the Constitution recognizes overlapping state and federal sovereignty to
establish governing rules of decision. The matters at issue in Swift
and Erie, for example, appear to fall within this category because
Congress, at least, appears to have power to regulate such matters
under the Commerce Clause, and nothing in the Constitution
appears to oust state authority." 3 As discussed in the preceding
section, despite the existence of federal power, the judiciary's
unilateral adoption of federal common law rules to govern matters
that fall within this broad category gives rise to federalism and
separation of powers concerns.
In other words, to the extent that the various enclaves of federal
common law recognized by the Supreme Court, or the even broader
conception of federal common law proposed by Professor Field,
govern matters within the legislative competence of the states, such
law appears to contradict the principles of judicial federalism
recognized in Erie. The federal courts' application of federal
common law appears to threaten legitimate state authority no less
than the application of "general common law" under Swift. In both
instances, federal courts disregard state law in favor of unwritten
law of their choosing. Erie condemned this practice in sweeping
terms: "Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or
"' Madison's arguments against the proposition that "the common law is
established by the Constitution" are worth noting in this context. As Madison
explained, acceptance of this proposition would imply congressional power
"coextensive with the objects of the common law" and "would confer on the judicial
department a discretion little short of a legislative power." Madison's Report on the
Virginia Resolutions (1800), in 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS
ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 546, 565-66 (Jonathan Elliot ed.,
New York, Burt Franklin 2d ed. n.d.) (1st ed. 1888) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S DEBATES];
cf Henry M. Hart,Jr., The Relations Between State and FederalLaw, 54 COLUM. L. REV.
489, 498 (1954) (stating that, unlike state law, federal law is necessarily interstitial in
character).
'o See infra notes 237-52 and accompanying text.
103 The Supremacy Clause, of course, was designed to mediate the conflicts
between federal and state law that were sure to arise following the states' adoption
of the Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of
the state." ° 4 At least with respect to matters within the legislative
competence of the states, the federaljudiciary's unilateral disregard
of state law-whether in favor of federal common law or general
common law-appears to "invade[] rights which ... are reserved by
05
the Constitution to the several States."'
If anything, federal common law appears to raise even greater
federalism concerns then general common law. Although the Swift
doctrine permitted federal courts to apply general law in place of
state law, the doctrine applied only in federal court. Thus, for most
of our constitutional history, state courts remained free to apply
10 6
Federal
state judge-made law in any case brought before them.
common law, by contrast, "is truly uniform because, under the
107
supremacy clause, it is binding in every forum."
Modern conceptions of federal common law have undoubtedly
been influenced by the principles of legal positivism embraced in
Erie. Just as state courts are recognized to make state law on behalf
of their respective state sovereigns,'0 8 federal courts are thought to
make federal law on behalf of the federal sovereign.0 9 But the
analogy is inapt, and thus does nothing to resolve the constitutional
difficulties associated with federal judge-made law.
"[Flederal
courts, unlike their state counterparts, are courts of limited
jurisdiction that have not been vested with open-ended lawmaking
powers.""' The Constitution carefully separates legislative power
from judicial power by vesting the former in Congress 1 ' and the

I Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.

5
'O
Id. at 80.

" See infra note 217.
107 Friendly, supra note 78, at 405; see also Field, supra note 4, at 897 ("Although

at one point there was some doubt, it is now established that a federal common law
rule, once made, has precisely the same force and effect as any other federal rule.
It is binding on state judges through the supremacy clause." (footnote omitted)).
See supra notes 70-77 and accompanying text.
'0 As Judge Friendly stated:
The complementary concepts-that federal courts must follow state decisions
on matters of substantive law appropriately cognizable by the states whereas
state courts must follow federal decisions on subjects within national
legislative power where Congress has so directed-seem so beautifully
simple, and so simply beautiful, that we must wonder why a century and a
half were needed to discover them, and must wonder even more why
anyone should want to shy away once the discovery was made.
Friendly, supra note 78, at 422.
"' Northwest Airlines v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 95 (1981).
...
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 ("All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested
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latter in the federal judiciary.'
Given this separation of powers,
whether the law of the United States shall be declared by its legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a decision surely is "a
3
matter of federal concern.""
The Constitution establishes intricate procedures for the
adoption of the various forms of positive federal law. Significantly,
these procedures neither require nor permit participation by the
federal judiciary." 4 For example, the Constitution may be amended only in accordance with Article V, which envisions action by
Congress and the states." 5
Likewise, every federal legislative
proposal, "before it [shall] become a Law," must either meet with
the approval of both houses of Congress and the President or be
approved by two-thirds of both houses." 6 Finally, all treaties must
be made by the President "by and with the Advice and Consent of
117
the Senate."
Open-ended federal common lawmaking by courts enables the
judiciary to evade the safeguards inherent in this carefully wrought
scheme. Such evasion is at least in tension with the constitutional
separation of powers."' This tension, moreover, triggers federal-

in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives.").
112See U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 1 ("The judicial Power of the United States, shall be

vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish."). For an excellent discussion of the founders'
fundamental decision to separate lawmaking from law-exposition, see generallyJohn
F. Manning, ConstitutionalStructure andJudicial Deference to Agency Interpretationsof
Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming April 1996).
U3 Erie, 304 U.S. at 78. Certainly, in this respect, there is a constitutionally
significant disparity between federal and state courts. Cf Erwin Chemerinsky, Ending
the ParityDebate, 71 B.U. L. REV. 593, 594 (1991) ("[T]he Court has used federalism
as the basis for restricting federal judicial authority and for deferring to state
courts."); Susan N. Herman, Why Parity Matters, 71 B.U. L. REV. 651, 652 (1991)
(agreeing that strong parity does not exist); Michael Wells, Behind the ParityDebate:
The Decline of the Legal Process Tradition in the Law of FederalCourts, 71 B.U. L. REV.
609,610-11 (1991) (noting that "strong" parity, meaning"the fungible nature of state
and federal courts," does not exist).
n4 Indeed, the founders specifically considered, and repeatedly rejected, proposals
in the Constitutional Convention to include the judiciary in federal lawmaking by
permitting it to exercise the veto powerjointly with the President. See supra note 61.
"5 See U.S. CONST. art. V. But see BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 45, 69-70 (1991) (characterizing certain historical events as attempts to
amend the Constitution by means other than those prescribed in Article V).
11 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2; see alsosupra note 61. These requirements are
often referred to as "bicameralism" and "presentment."
" U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
...
Significantly, the Constitution invariably requires the participation of multiple
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ism concerns because, as Erie held, the states have a legitimate
expectation under the constitutional scheme that state law will
govern all matters subject to state authority unless and until positive
federal law is adopted to preempt such law."' As discussed, the
constitutional scheme renders adoption of positive federal law
cumbersome and often difficult. These constitutional impediments
necessarily serve to safeguard state authority. Thus, the federal
courts' application of federal common law, no less than their
application of general common law under Swift, appears to
constitute an unconstitutional "'invasion of the authority of the
20
state.'"1
Thus, there appears to be much substance to Professor Redish's
assertion that "there can be no such thing as 'federal common law,'
at least to the extent it is used to provide a 'rule of decision' and to
the extent the phrase 'common law' is construed as a category of
lawmaking distinct from constitutional or statutory 'interpretation.'" 121 The difficulty with Professor Redish's approach, however,
is that his conception of "constitutional interpretation" is too
narrow in that it appears to exclude "the method of inference from
122
the structures and relationships created by the constitution."
For example, he regards the Supreme Court's adoption of rules of
decision that implicate foreign relations or that govern disputes
between states as the creation of "discrete areas of purely judgemade substantive federal law," 123 in disregard of "the overriding
institutional questions posed by fundamental principles of American

actors in order to create federal law. The establishment of such "checks and
balances" reflects the founders' view that "the greater the diversity in the situations
of those who are to examine it, the less must be the danger of those errors which flow
from want of due deliberation, or of those missteps which proceed from the
contagion of some common passion or interest." THE FEDERALIST No. 73, at 443
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
119See supra notes 54-69 and accompanying text. Professor Field attempts to blunt
these constitutional concerns by suggesting several alternative interpretations of Erie.
See Field,supranote 4, at 915-24. In the end, however, Professor Field concludes that
"[t]he Erie Court's constitutional holding is fundamentally unclear." Id. at 924. Thus,
even Professor Field acknowledges that "[c]onsiderations of federalism and separation
of powers combine to make us skeptical about courts formulating very broad federal
common law." Id. at 931.
' ' Erie, 304 U.S. at 79 (quoting Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 401

(1893) (Field, J, dissenting)).
12
122

Redish, supra note 5, at 792.
BLACK, supra note 19, at 7.

Ss Redish, supra note 5, at 761; see also id. at 761 n.2 (citing cases).
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political and constitutional theory."124 As the next 'Part of this
Article suggests, however, many of these areas can be reconceptualized as rules of decision implied by, or otherwise necessary to
implement, the constitutional structure.
II.

RECONCEPTUALIZING MODERN FEDERAL COMMON LAW

Notwithstanding the federalism and separation of powers
concerns identified above, not all of the rules currently thought to
be "federal judge-made law" in fact raise these concerns. Some
federal common law rules govern matters beyond the legislative
competence of the states.125 By definition, application of federal
common law in this context raises few, if any, federalism concerns.
Similarly, some federal common law rules are not, in fact, "federal
judge-made law." Rather, such rules frequently represent the
application of various customary rules that federal courts apply to
further some basic aspect of the constitutional scheme. As discussed below, judicial adherence to rules of this kind does not
constitute improper judicial lawmaking. Rather, such adherence is
generally consistent with, and may sometimes be required by, the
constitutional structure.
This Part contains three sections. The first section identifies
criteria for reconceptualizing at least a portion of the rules regarded
today as federal common law. To qualify for the proposed
reconceptualization, a federal common law rule must satisfy two
criteria. First, the rule in question must concern matters that fall
beyond the legislative competence of the states. Second, the rule
must be necessary to further some aspect of the constitutional
scheme. The proposed criteria provide useful tools for evaluating
the legitimacy of various federal common law rules. Rules that
satisfy these criteria do not raise the federalism and separation of
powers concerns traditionally associated with federal judge-made
law, and thus should not be regarded as "federal common law."
124 Id.

at 762.

" "Legislative competence" refers to the areas subject to governmental regulation
under the federal Constitution. For example, the Constitution leaves the states
substantially free to regulate vast areas of human behavior, subject only to specific
constitutional prohibitions and to preemption under statutes enacted by Congress
pursuant to constitutional authority. At least at the state level, it "is not a matter of
federal concern" whether the legislative competence of a state is exercised by its
legislature in a statute or its highest court in a decision. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938); supra text accompanying notes 73-77.
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Rules that fail to satisfy the proposed criteria, by contrast, remain
constitutionally suspect.
The second section reexamines the Supreme Court's landmark
decision in Swift v. Tyson 1 26 in light of the proposed criteria. This
reexamination reveals, contrary to modern accounts, that Swift was
constitutionally defensible at the time it was decided. The subsequent development of the Swift doctrine, as well as changing
conceptions of state law, combined to render judicial application of
general common law in this context unconstitutional under the
principles ofjudicial federalism recognized in Erie. Nonetheless, a
proper understanding of the Swift paradigm is useful to the
proposed reconceptualization, because it provides an example of
judicial application of customary law that was arguably consistent
with both federalism and separation of powers constraints at the
time it was decided.
Finally, the third section applies the proposed criteria to several
rules of decision derived from traditional principles of the law of
nations, including the so-called act of state doctrine-a rule of
decision currently thought to constitute federal common law.
Application of the proposed approach reveals that rules like the act
of state doctrine are not, in fact, "federal judge-made law." These
rules concern matters beyond the legislative competence of the
states and thus raise few, if any, federalism concerns. In addition,
rules like the act of state doctrine are based on traditional principles
of the law of nations, and thus judicial application of such rules
does not appear to require the federal courts to engage in improper
judicial lawmaking. Indeed, judicial adherence to rules of this
nature is arguably necessary to ensure that the judiciary does not
encroach on the exclusive constitutional authority of the political
branches to conduct foreign relations. Under these circumstances,
judicial application of rules like the act of state doctrine further,
rather than impede, the constitutional structure.
A. The ProposedApproach
The constitutional impediments to the federal courts' exercise
of broad federal common lawmaking authority derive from two
primary features of the constitutional structure-federalism 27 and
126 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
1" Federalism refers to the Constitution's division of governmental power between

the federal government and the states.
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the separation of powers. 28 As Erie reveals, both features of the
constitutional scheme serve to insulate the states and the people

from unwarranted federal intervention. By enumerating the powers
delegated to the federal government, the Constitution reserves the
remaining powers to the states and the people. In the modern era,
the judiciary has been reluctant to enforce strict limits on federal
power.129 This reluctance has left the boundaries of federal power
to be worked out largely by the political branches, and the states'

interests to be protected by what Professor Herbert
Wechsler
130
referred to as "the political safeguards of federalism."

Professor Wechsler's thesis is that the states' participation in
choosing the members of the political branches of the federal

government ensures that the states' interests will be adequately
represented in the national political arena, and that strict judicial
review of the boundary between federal and state power is therefore
unnecessary.1 31
The Supreme Court's embrace of Professor
Wechsler's thesis underscores the importance of strict adherence to
the doctrine of judicial federalism recognized in Erie. Because "the
states, and their interests as such, are represented in the Congress
but not in the federal courts,""3 2 the displacement of state law by
the federal judiciary raises greater federalism concerns than
displacement of state law by Congress. 3 For the political safeguards of federalism to function effectively, the federal government
must adhere closely to the detailed procedures required for the
28

The separation of powers refers to the Constitution's allocation, and general
separation, of federal powers among three separate and distinct branches of
government.
" See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 528-29
(1985) ("The States' continued role in the federal system is primarily guaranteed not
by any externally imposed limits [on federal power], but by the structure of the
Federal Government itself."). But cf. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1634
(1995) (invalidating the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 rather than "proceed[ing]
any further" "down that road [toward] giving great deference to congressional
action").
'" Wechsler, supra note 62, at 543; see also Garcia,469 U.S. at 551 (embracing
Professor Wechsler's theory).
S See Wechsler, supra note 62, at 544.
132 Mishkin, supra note 50, at 1685.
..See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 317 n.9 (1981) (noting that "the
States are represented in Congress but not in the federal courts"); cf. Merrill, supra
'

note 4, at 17 (arguing that because Professor Wechsler's thesis applies only to action
by the political branches and not to action by the unelected federal judiciary, "the
'political safeguards' that have been invoked to rationalize the elimination of
constraints on congressional power do not justify abolition of all constraints on
judicial power").
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adoption of positive federal law-most notably, the requirements of
bicameralism and presentment. 3 4 At least with respect to matters

over which the states retain substantive lawmaking authority,
adoption of federal common law by the unelected and politically
unaccountable federal judiciary would circumvent "the political
safeguards of federalism."
Thus, Erie's conception ofjudicial federalism-supported by the
negative implication of the political safeguards of federalism-suggests the first criterion for reconceptualizing at least a
portion of modern federal common law rules. This criterion asks
whether the matters governed by the rule in question fall within, or
beyond, the legislative competence of the states.135 If the matters
fall beyond the legislative competence of the states, then the

principles ofjudicial federalism recognized in Erie do not function
as a serious constraint on the federal courts' application of "federal

judge-made law." By hypothesis, the states retain few, if any, rights
to invade in this context.13 6 If, on the other hand, the matters in
question fall within the legislative competence of the states, then
judicial application of a federal common law rule in derogation of
state law would suffer from the same constitutional infirmities as

did the lower court's application of "general common law" in Erie.
Even if a federal common law rule governs matters beyond the
legislative competence of the states and thus satisfies the first
criterion, it remains subject to more conventional separation of
powers concerns-specifically, the concern that federal common
lawmaking appears to be inconsistent with the founders' fundamental decision to separate the legislative power from the judicial power

15

See supra notes 114-17 and accompanying text.

Matters beyond the legislative competence of the states necessarily fall within the
exclusive authority of the federal government.
Matters within the legislative
competence of the states, by contrast, fall either within the exclusive power of the
states or the concurrent power of the federal government and the states. See supra
notes 100-03 and accompanying text. Practically speaking, given the expansive
interpretation of federal power in the modern era, very few matters fall within the
exclusive power of the states. For this reason, this Article's use of the phrase "matters
within the legislative competence of the states" generally refers to matters subject to
the authority of both the federal government and the states.
1" Of course, federal common law rules that govern matters beyond the legislative
competence of the states remain subject to other potential constitutional constraints,
including the constitutional separation of powers. It adds little, if anything, to the
analysis, however, to suggest that a potential separation of powers violation also gives
rise to a federalism violation in areas over which the states retain no substantive
authority.
'
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at the federal level.13 7 This concern suggests the second criterion
for reconceptualizing federal common law. This criterion asks
whether judicial application of the rule in question constitutes
either the application of rules implied directly from the constitutional structure, or adherence to customary rules of decision
necessary to implement a basic feature of the constitutional
scheme."13
In either case, the rule in question does not in fact
constitute improper judicial lawmaking, and furthers, rather than
impedes, the constitutional structure.
Application of the proposed criteria suggests that many of the
rules currently thought to be "federal common law" have been
mischaracterized. Strictly speaking, rules that satisfy the proposed
criteria are not, in fact, "federal judge-made law."' 3 9 Rather, as
shown below, judicial application of such rules has a strong basis in
the constitutional structure. Identifying the structural foundations
of "federal common law" places a number of these rules on a firmer
constitutional footing by dispelling the federalism and separation of
powers concerns traditionally associated with such law. Federal
common law rules that do not satisfy the proposed criteria remain
constitutionally suspect.140

1s7 See supra notes 108-18 and accompanying text.
"sExamples of "federal common law" rules that satisfy this criterion include rules
like the act of state doctrine that prevent the judiciary from encroaching upon
authority vested exclusively in the political branches of the federal government, see
infra notes 257-82 and accompanying text, and rules necessary to maintain the
constitutional equality of the states, see infra notes 393-408 and accompanying text.
...
Although I use the phrases "federal judge-made law" and "federal common
law" interchangeably throughout this Article, see supra notes 3-4 and accompanying
text, there is at least an arguable distinction to be drawn in this context. Rules that
satisfy the criteria set forth in the text are not "federal judge-made law" in the sense
that their content is supplied at least in part by external sources. Whether such rules
are "federal common law" in the sense that their "content cannot be traced by
traditional methods of interpretation to federal statutory or constitutional command,"
HART & WECHSLER, supranote 4, at 863, is debatable. Strictly speaking, the Constitution itself does not supply the customary rules applied by federal courts in a number
of these contexts. See infra notes 451-61 and accompanying text. By hypothesis,
however, application of such rules is necessary to implement some aspect of the
constitutional scheme. Under these circumstances, it is probably inaccurate to
characterize such rules as "federal common law."
140 This Article does not attempt to establish that federal common law rules that
fail to satisfy the proposed criteria are necessarily unconstitutional. Such an attempt
is beyond the scope of this Article. Rather, the Article seeks to show only that
"federal common law" rules that satisfy the proposed criteria do not raise the
constitutional concerns traditionally associated with federal judge-made law.
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B. Swift v. Tyson Revisited
Swift v. Tyson provides an example of the federal courts' application of unwritten law that appears to have been consistent with both
federalism and separation of powers principles. Understanding the
Swift paradigm points the way towards reconceptualizing at least a
portion of modern federal common law, by demonstrating that
federal courts may sometimes apply unwritten law without raising
substantial constitutional concerns. For most of this century,
courts and commentators generally have regarded the Supreme
Court's decision in Swift as an unconstitutional invasion of rights
"reserved by the Constitution to the several states." 4 '
This
account, however, fails adequately to distinguish between the
Court's decision in Swift and the subsequent development of the socalled "Swift doctrine."
At the time Swift was decided, the states did not clearly conceive
of "general commercial law" as state law. Rather, state and federal
courts appeared to be jointly administering a customary body of
rules common to many jurisdictions. Thus, because the states had
not yet clearly established binding principles of commercial law as
a matter of state law, the Supreme Court's exercise of independent
judgment with respect to such questions did not raise significant
federalism concerns. In the decades following Swift, however, states
increasingly understood such unwritten law as a creation of their
sovereign will. At the same time, federal courts expanded the Swift
doctrine to permit federal courts to disregard statejudicial decisions
on an ever-expanding range of issues. By the time Erie was decided,
the Court recognized that state courts can, and do, make law on
behalf of the states. These developments led the Court to abandon
the Swift doctrine as "'an unconstitutional assumption of powers by
142
courts of the United States.'"
Nor did Swift raise significant separation of powers concerns at
the time it was decided. The law applied by the Supreme Court-the
law merchant-was a customary body of rules derived from the law
of nations. Such rules provide the judiciary with substantial
guidance, and thus do not leave courts free to formulate rules of
decision according to their own standards. Moreover, as discussed
below in connection with the act of state doctrine, in some instances
"'

Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 80 (1938).
at 79 (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow

142Id.

Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
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the constitutional structure may require courts to apply rules
derived from the law of nations in order to avoid usurping powers
given exclusively to the political branches of government."'
Swift involved a suit between citizens of different states brought
in federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. 44 The case
presented an unsettled question of commercial law-whether
acceptance of a negotiable instrument in satisfaction of a preexisting debt rested upon sufficient consideration to confer upon the
recipient the status of "a bona fide holder."14 5 Although past
decisions by New York courts suggested that such consideration was
not sufficient, 4 6 the Supreme Court did not consider itself bound
by these decisions, and ruled to the contrary. 147 The Court
148
characterized the question as one of "general commercial law,"
1 49
upon which the Court was free "to express our own opinion."
' See infra notes 265-73 and accompanying text.
144See Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 3 (1842). The suit was authorized under
the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 1332 (1994)) (granting the circuit courts original jurisdiction over suits
"between a citizen of the State where the suit is brought, and a citizen of another
State").
145See Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 16.
1' In Coddington v. Bay, 20Johns. 637

(N.Y. 1822), the New York Supreme Court
for the Correction of Errors recognized "[t]he general rule ... that where negotiable
paper is transferred for valuable consideration, and without notice of any fraud, the
right of the holder shall prevail against the true owner." Id. at 644-45 (Woodworth,
J.). The court, however, concluded that the defendants in Coddington were not
entitled to the benefit of the rule because they had not given "valuable consideration"
for the notes. Strictly speaking, the question whether the release of a preexisting
debt constitutes valuable consideration was not presented in Coddingtonbecause the
defendants admitted that at the time they received the notes, the persons from whom
they received them "were no4 in a strictlegalsense, indebted to [tile defendants] in any
amount whatever." Id. at 644 (Woodworth,J.). Nonetheless, several of the opinions
suggested that an antecedent debt is not a valuable consideration under the rule. See
id. at 648 (Woodworth, J.); id. at 651 (Spencer, C.J.); id. at 655 (Viele, Sen.).
Although the Supreme Court for the Correction of Errors had not "pronounced any
positive opinion upon" tle question when Swift was decided, see Swift, 41 U.S. (16
Pet.) at 18, several lower court decisions had ruled in accordance with Coddington's
dicta. See e.g., Payne v. Cutler, 13 Wend. 605 (1835); Rosa v. Brotherson, 10 Wend.
85 (1833); Wardell v. Howell, 9 Wend. 170 (1832). The Court in Swift noted that "the
more recent [New York] cases ... have greatly shaken, if they have not entirely
overthrown [the earlier] decisions," 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 17, but the Court was willing
to assume arguendo that "the doctrine [was] fully settled in New York" that "a preexisting debt was not a sufficient consideration to shut out the equities of the original
parties
in favor of the holders," id. at 17-18.
1
See Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 19-22.
4Id.
149

at 18.

Id. at 19.
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The modern view, established in Erie, dismisses Swift on the
grounds that the Court's approach was not only inconsistent with
section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789,15° but also unconstitutional. 5 ' Section 34 provided "[t]hat the laws of the several states,
except where the constitution, treaties or statutes of the United
States shall otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules
of decision in trials at common law in the courts of the United
States in cases where they apply." 5 2 According to modern accounts, Swft misinterpreted the phrase "the laws of the several
states" to apply only to written law (such as state statutes) and not
to unwritten law (such as state common law decisions)., 55 Erie is
thought to have corrected this mistake by reinterpreting section 34,
in light of newly discovered historical evidence, to require "federal
courts exercising jurisdiction in diversity of citizenship cases [to]
apply as their rules of decision the law of the State, unwritten as
1 54
well as written."
In addition, modern accounts embrace Erie's assertion that Swift
rested on the fallacy "that there is 'a transcendental body of law
outside of any particular State but obligatory within it unless and
until changed by statute."''155 According to Erie, the better view
is that "[t]he common law so far as it is enforced in a State . . . is
not the common law generally but the law" as declared by the courts
of that state. 5 6 Thus, Erie suggests that the Swft Court's failure
to follow state common law decisions not only violated the Rules of
Decision Act, but also unconstitutionally invaded "'the autonomy
5 7
and independence of the States.''

'50 See Erie, 304 U.S. at 72 (stating that "the construction given § 34 .... by the
Court [in Swift] was erroneous").
...
See id. at 79 (concluding that "the doctrine of Swft v. Tyson is ... 'an
unconstitutional assumption of powers by courts of the United States which no lapse
of time or respectable array of opinion should make us hesitate to correct'" (quoting
Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co.,
276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting))).
152 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 1652 (1994)).
SsSee, e.g.,JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 4.1, at 192 (2d ed.

1993) ("As a result of Swift, the laws of the states that would be regarded as rules of
decision in the federal courts under Section 34 of the Judiciary Act were limited to
state constitutions, statutes, and state judicial opinions interpreting them.").
" Erie, 304 U.S. at 73 (citing Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the
FederalJudiciaryAct of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49, 51-52, 81-88, 108 (1923)).
" Id. at 79 (quoting Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 370-72 (1910)
(Holmes, J., dissenting)).
156Id.
7
"1 Id. at 78 (quoting Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 401 (1893)
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Neither critique of Swift is historically accurate. Contrary to
modern assumptions, Swift did not interpret section 34 to encompass only written state law. The Court's opinion expressly acknowledged that section 34's command applied not only to "local
statutes," but also to "long-established local customs having the
force of laws."158 The opinion leaves no doubt that the Court
understood such "local customs" to be a form of unwritten state law
binding in federal court. Thus, Swift's interpretation of section 34
did not rest on a simple distinction between written and unwritten
law, but rather on the more complex dichotomy between local
statutes and customs, on the one hand, and "questions of a more
general nature, . . . especially ... questions of general commercial
law," on the other. 5 9 Although this dichotomy is unfamiliar to us
today, it was well known in 1842.
Justice Story's dichotomy reflected the well-established distinction between lex loci, or local law, and jus gentium, or the law of nations. The lex loci comprehended "rights and titles to things having
a permanent locality, such as the rights and titles to real estate, and
other matters immovable and intra-territorial in their nature and
character." 6 ' The jus gentium, by contrast, encompassed "questions of a more general nature, not at all dependent upon local
" t6 t
statutes or local usages of a fixed and permanent operation.
It is difficult for modern lawyers fully to appreciate the nature
and significance of the law of nations at the time Swift was decided.
In order to understand why the Swft Court applied general law, we
must examine the way in which late-eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century lawyers and judges perceived such law. The law of
nations was not "law" as we usually think of it today-that is, a
sovereign command. But neither was it a "brooding omnipresence
in the sky." 62 Rather, as Swift suggests, the law of nations was an
identifiable body of rules and customs developed and refined by a
variety of nations over hundreds and, in some cases, thousands of
years.163 Indeed, many of the basic concepts of the law of nations
(Field, J., dissenting)).
' Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 18.
159 Id. at 18-19.
" Id. at 18; see also William A. Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34
of theJudiciaryAct of 1789: The Example of MarineInsurance, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1513,
1532 (1984) (stating that federal courts "regularly found that a law was local when the
subject matter was of peculiarly local concern, such as title to real estate").
161Swtift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 18-19.
162 Southern Pac. Co. v.Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes,J, dissenting).
163See Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 19. The Court stated:
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were recognized during Roman times. 6 4 Nations (and states)
adhered voluntarily to these customary rules, to foster peaceful
coexistence and to facilitate mutually beneficial transactions among
their citizens.1 6
In essence, the law of nations operated as a set
of background rules that courts applied in the absence of any
binding sovereign command to the contrary. Because of the
character of such law, federal and state courts had no occasion to
characterize the various branches of the law of nations as either
federal or state law.' 66 At the time, it was thought to be neither.
The law of nations had three principal branches16 7 -the law
merchant, the law maritime, 16 8 and the law governing the rights

Id.

The law respecting negotiable instruments may be truly declared in the
languages of Cicero ... to be in a great measure, not the law of a single
country only, but of the commercial world. Non erit alia lex Romae, alia
Athenis; alia nunc alia posthac;sed et apud omnes gentes, et omni tempore una
eademque lex obtinebit [There will not be one law in Rome, another in Athens;
one now, another later; but both among all nations, and at all times, one
and the same law will obtain].
Today, the law of nations is known as customary international law. See

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OFTHE UNITED STATES § 102

(1986).
"8See, e.g., Nebraska v. Iowa, 143 U.S. 359, 362, 364 (1892) (stating that "the
received rule[s] of the law of nations" respecting accretion and avulsion are
"transmitted to us from the laws of Rome"). See generally FREDERIC R. SANBORN,
ORIGINS OF THE EARLY ENGLISH MARITIME AND COMMERCIAL LAW 200 (1930) ("Just

as we find the Roman law responsible for certain legal principles in the sister field of
maritime law, . . . so too do we find that the Roman law was the general basis of
commercial contracts, and, consequently, of much of commercial law."); Edwin D.
Dickinson, The Law of Nations As Part of the NationalLaw of the United States (pt. 1),
101 U. PA. L. REv. 26, 29 (1952) (stating that "the law of states," a branch of the law
of nations that developed into public international law, "denote[s] the amorphous but
considerable body ofusage and agreement with respect to international matters which
had come into being with the rise of a European state system, [and] which had been
enriched by borrowings and adaptations from the Roman Law").
165 Vattel, the leading treatise writer in the field, described the law of nations as
consisting of "[c]ertain maxims and customs, consecrated by long use, and observed
by nations in their mutual intercourse with each other." VATTEL, THE LAW OF
NATIONS at lxv (Joseph Chitty ed., Phila., T. &J.W.Johnson & Co. 1859) (1758).
16 Courts did not attempt to characterize the law of nations as either federal or
state law because, by definition, such law was not considered to be the command of
either sovereign. See Fletcher, supranote 160, at 1517 ("The underlying premise was
that the general law was not attached to any particular sovereign; rather, it existed by
common practice and consent among a number of sovereigns.").
"6In addition, the law of conflicts of laws is sometimes cited as a branch of the
law of nations. See StewartJay, The Status of the Law of Nations in Early American Law,
42 VAND. L. REV. 819, 821-22 (1989); Max Rheinstein, The Constitutional Bases of
Jurisdiction,22 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 805 (1955).
" The law maritime was a body of rules and customs governing the rights and
duties of nations and their citizens with respect to maritime activity. Many nations
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and duties of sovereign states.'
As Blackstone explained, the law
merchant-the branch at issue in Swift-was "a particular system of
customs... which, however different from... the common law, is
...
allowed, for the benefit of trade," and "which all nations agree
in and take notice of."'
At the time Swift was decided, both
federal and state courts confronted with commercial cases "considered themselves to be deciding questions under a general law
merchant that was neither distinctively state nor federal."'
Historically, such law was based on the commercial customs and
practices of merchants and was applied by all "civilized" nations to
72
resolve disputes among merchants from different countries.
The law merchant facilitated trade and commerce among nations by
establishing uniform rules to govern transactions among citizens of
73
different nations.
By the eighteenth century, the law of nations was well established. It was the subject of scholarly treatises in a variety of
languages and was adhered to in one form or another by the entire
community of civilized nations.17 4 The newly formed United

maintained specialized courts comprised of individuals with special expertise to hear
and resolve maritime disputes. See W. MITCHELL, ESSAY ON THE EARLY HISTORY OF
THE LAW MERCHANT 39-78 (1904). Like the law merchant, the law maritime fostered
trade among nations. But the law maritime also served to maintain peace and
harmony among nations. Failure to resolve admiralty and maritime disputes
satisfactorily could create tensions among nations and even lead to war. Thus,
nations had a strong incentive to adhere to accepted rules and customs. See infra
notes 424-50 and accompanying text.
"" This branch of the law of nations deals with matters touching on the rights and
duties of nations themselves, such as diplomatic immunity, captures, war, and
neutrality. See Dickinson, supra note 164, at 29-34; see also Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar
v. Boyle, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 191, 198 (1815) ("The law of nations is the great source
from which we derive those rules, respecting belligerent and neutral rights, which are
recognized by all civilized and commercial states throughout Europe and America.").
170 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 74, at *75, *264.
171 Fletcher, supra note 160, at 1554.
172 See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 74, at *75 ("[A] particular system of customs...
called the custom of merchants, or lex mercatoria... is... allowed, for the benefit
of trade, to be of the utmost validity in all commercial transactions . . ").
'7 See 1 id. at *264 ("[A]s these are transactions carried on between the subjects
of independent states, the municipal laws of one will not be regarded by the other.
For which reason the affairs of commerce are regulated by... the law merchant or
lex mercatoria,which all nations agree in and take notice of."); ZEPHANIAH SWIFT, A
Digest of the Law of Evidence, in CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES. AND A TREATISE ON BILLS
OF EXCHANGE, AND PROMISSORY NOTES at ix (Hartford, Oliver D. Cooke 1810) ("In
questions of commercial law, the decisions of Courts, in all civilized, and commercial
nations, are to be regarded, for the purpose of establishing uniform principles in the
commercial world."). See generally Francis M. Burdick, What Is the Law Merchant?,2
COLUM. L. REV. 470 (1902).
174 According to Blackstone:
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States was no exception. Thus, from the beginning, both the federal
judiciary and the political branches recognized the importance of
adhering to the law of nations, especially the law governing the
rights and duties of sovereign states. 17 5 In the late eighteenth
century, for example, "[c]abinet meetings and memoranda to the
President from the Cabinet officers ...

involved detailed discus-

sions of issues concerning the law of nations." 17 6 During the same
era, the federal courts regularly resolved cases according to the law
of nations. 177 The states, too, generally followed the law of

[I]n mercantile questions, such as bills of exchange and the like; in all

marine causes, relating to freight, average, demurrage, insurances, bottomry, and others of a similar nature; the law merchant, which is a branch
of the law of nations, is regularly and constantly adhered to. So too in all
disputes relating to prizes, shipwrecks, to hostages, and ransom bills, there
is no other rule of decision but this great universal law, collected from
history and usage, and such writers of all nations and languages as are
generally approved and allowed of.
4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 74, at *67.
175 See THE FEDERALIST No. 3, at 43 (johnJay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (noting
the "high importance to the peace of America that she observe the laws of nations
towards all these powers"). For example, concern for adherence to the law of nations
led to the famous attempt by the Washington Administration to obtain an advisory
opinion from the Supreme Court. In 1793, Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson
wrote to Chief Justice John Jay and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court
seeking their advice concerning various questions arising under "the laws of nature
and nations." Letter from Thomas Jefferson, Secretary of State, to ChiefJustice Jay
and Associate Justices (July 18, 1793), in 3 THE CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS
OFJOHNJAY 486, 486 (Henry P.Johnston ed., Burt Franklin 1970) (1890). Jefferson
stated that President Washington sought their advice to "secure us against errors
dangerous to the peace of the United States." Id. at 486-87. Although recognizing
the importance of these questions "to the preservation of the rights, peace, and
dignity of the United States," the Justices declined to decide these questions
extrajudicially in light of"the lines of separation drawn by the Constitution between
the three departments of the government." Letter from Chief Justice Jay and
AssociateJustices to President Washington (Aug. 8, 1793), in 3 THE CORRESPONDENCE
AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY, supra, at 488, 488-89.
76

1 Jay, supra note 167, at 839. In 1792, for example, Attorney General Edmund
Randolph advised the Secretary of State as follows:
The law of nations, although not specially adopted by the constitution or
any municipal act, is essentially a part of the law of the land. Its obligation
commences and runs with the existence of a nation, subject to modifications
on some points of indifference. Indeed a people may regulate it so as to be
binding upon the departments of their own government, in any form
whatever; but with regard to foreigners, every change is at the peril of the
nation which makes it.

1 Op. Att'y Gen. 9, 9 (1792).
'7 Many of these cases concerned the law maritime. See, e.g., Reed v. Hussey, 20
F. Cas. 440, 445 (S.D.N.Y. 1836) (No. 11,646) (applying the law maritime to
determine whether a seaman can recover either wages or an allowance for salvage
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nations, even in areas in which they possessed unquestioned
authority to adopt local law. In commercial matters especially, the
states tended to follow the law merchant, because adherence to such
law fostered interstate and international trade with their citizens.17 Thus, during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries, federal and state courts jointly administered the various
branches of the law of nations-including the law merchant-in cases
where they applied.
Because the law of nations did not appear to consist of sovereign commands, the courts of one sovereign had no authority to
bind those of another as to the proper content of that law. Rather,
the courts of each sovereign considered themselves free to exercise
179
independent judgment in cases arising under the law of nations.
services from the owner of a ship that wrecked prior to completion of its voyage); The
Phebe, 19 F. Cas. 418, 420 (D. Me. 1834) (No. 11,064) (looking to "the maritime
usages and customs of the middle ages" to determine the scope of a master's
authority to bind a vessel); Granon v. Hartshorne, 10 F. Cas. 965, 968 (S.D.N.Y. 1834)
(No. 5689) (applying the law maritime to determine whether a seaman forfeited
certain wages by leaving his ship one day after it reached its berth); The Elizabeth
Frith, 8 F. Cas. 481, 484 (S.D.N.Y. 1831) (No. 4361) (interpreting the law maritime
concerning desertion). Others concerned the law merchant. See, e.g., Burrows v.
Hannegan, 4 F. Cas. 843, 843 (C.C.D. Ind. 1838) (No. 2205) (stating that promissory
note is governed by the law merchant whether "considered as having been made at
the city of Washington, or at Cincinnati"); Maisonnaire v. Keating, 16 F. Cas. 513,516
(C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No. 8978) (referring to the law merchant to determine whether
the capture of a vessel was legal); Bank of Columbia v. French, 2 F. Cas. 631, 632
(C.C.D.D.C. 1804) (No. 867) (referring to the law merchant to determine the
requirements of a bill of exchange); Thurston v. Koch, 23 F. Cas. 1183 (C.C.D. Pa.
1800) (No. 14,016) (referring to the principles of the law merchant, as articulated by
English courts, to determine a case of double insurance), rev'd, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 141
(1807).
8 Professor Fletcher points out that "[t]he concept of a uniform law merchant
was quite naturally imported into the treatment of commercial law by American
courts," Fletcher, supra note 160, at 1518, because the general common law was
regarded at the time as a "great universal law," "regularly and constantly adhered to."
4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 74, at *67; cf. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 281
(1796) (Wilson,J.) ("When the United States declared their independence, they were
bound to receive the law of nations, in its modern state of purity and refinement."
(emphasis added)).
179As Blackstone explained in his famous Commentaries:
However, as it is impossible for the whole race of mankind to be united in
one great society, they must necessarily divide into many, and form separate
states, commonwealths, and nations; entirely independent of each other, and
yet liable to a mutual intercourse. Hence arises a third kind of law to
regulate this mutual intercourse, called 'the law of nations,' which, as none
of these states will acknowledge a superiority in the other, cannot be
dictated by either ....
1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 74, at *43.
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The federal and state judiciaries were no exception. In applying the
various branches of the law of nations, neither considered itself
bound by the decisions of the other.18 0 For example, in deciding
a question of general commercial law in 1822, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court declared that "[t]he decisions of the Supreme Court
of the United States have no obligatory authority over this court,
except in cases growing out of the constitution, of which this is not
one."18 ' Conversely, in Swift, the Supreme Court looked to "the
principles established in the general commercial law," rather than
to the decisions of New York state courts, in deciding a dispute

'80 See Fletcher, supranote 160, at 1561 ("State courts generally followed common
law decisions by the United States Supreme Court, but they were quite explicit in
stating that they did not do so because of any legal compulsion.").
181Waln v. Thompson, 9 Serg. & Rawle 115, 122 (Pa. 1822) (emphasis added).
While asserting the right to exercise independentjudgment, the court recognized the
"importance of preserving the uniformity of commercial law throughout the United
States." Id. (emphasis added). Accordingly, Justice Tilghman stated, "I shall always
be inclined to adopt [the] opinions [of the Supreme Court], rather than those of any
foreign court, unless when I am well satisfied, it is in the wrong." Id.
Seven years earlier, Chief Justice Marshall hoped to foster such deference by
supporting a bill to create a permanent court reporter:
It is a minor consideration, but not perhaps to be entirely overlooked, that,
even in cases where the decisions of the Supreme Court are not to be
considered as authority except in the courts of the United States, some
advantage may be derived from their being known. It is certainly to be
wished that independent tribunals having concurrent jurisdiction over the
same subject should concur in the principles on which they determine the
causes coming before them. This concurrence can be obtained only by
communicating to each the judgments of the other, and by that mutual
respect which will probably be inspired by a knowledge of the grounds on
which their judgments respectively stand. On great commercial questions,
especially, it is desirablethat thejudicial opinionsof all parts of the Union should
be the same.
Letter from ChiefJustice Marshall to U.S. Senator Dudley Chase (Feb. 7, 1817), in 2

WILLIAM W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES 1246 (1953) (emphasis added). The state courts' view that they were

entitled to exercise independent judgment on questions arising under the law of
nations-including the law respecting sovereign states-persisted well into this century.
See, e.g., Dougherty v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 266 N.Y. 71, 84-91 (1934)
(applying the law of nations to determine the effect to be given to the Soviet Union's
decree creating a state monopoly over insurance); M. Salimoff & Co. v. Standard Oil
Co., 262 N.Y.S. 693, 697-700 (App. Div. 1933) (applying "well-established principles
of international law" to decide whether the Soviet Union's nationalization decrees
were open to challenge in New York courts); Fritz Schulz, Jr., Co. v. Raimes & Co.,
164 N.Y.S. 454 (N.Y. City Ct. 1917) (applying the law ofnations to determine whether
an "alien enemy" could sue to recover debts); cf. infra notes 332-55 and accompanying
text (discussing whether New York law governs the rights of foreign ambassadors in
transit).

FEDERAL COMMON LAW

1996]

1285

between citizens of different states arising under the law merchant. 2 The Swift Court considered the decisions of New York
18 3
courts as "at most, only evidence" of such law.
In light of the foregoing, it is difficult to conclude that the
Supreme Court's exercise of independent judgment in Swift either
"invaded rights which ... are reserved by the Constitution to the
several States""" or violated the constitutional separation of
powers. At the time, both federal and state courts regarded the
question at issue in Swift-whether a preexisting debt constitutes
adequate consideration to confer the status of "a bona fide holder"as arising under the general law merchant rather than under
distinctively state (or federal) law.' 8 5 Thus, in deciding this
question, the Swift Court did nothing more than a New York court
would have done at the time-exercise independent judgment to
ascertain the applicable rule of decision supplied by the law of
86

nations. 1

Swift made this point explicitly: "It is observable, that the courts
of New York do not found their decisions [regarding the adequacy

" See Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842). Just as the Supreme Court
did not consider itself bound to follow New York decisions, New York courts
considered themselves free to disregard the Supreme Court's decisions on questions
of general commercial law. For example, two years after Swft, New York's highest
court was urged to conform its decision "to the opinion of Mr. Justice Story in the
recent case of Swrt v. Tyson." Stalker v. M'Donald, 6 Hill 93, 95 (N.Y. 1843). The
court recognized that,
[o]n a question of commercial law.... it is desirable that there should be,
as far as practicable, uniformity of decision, not only between the courts of
the several states and of the United States, but also between our courts and
those of England, from whence our commercial law is principally derived,
and with which country our commercial intercourse is so extensive.
Id. The court nonetheless declined to follow the rule announced by the Supreme
Court in Swift. See id. at 112. The court described the Supreme Court as a "tribunal,
whose decisions are not of paramount authority." Id.
" Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 18.
' Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 80 (1938).
' See Fletcher, supra note 160, at 1521 (noting that throughout the first half of
the nineteenth century "there had always been, and still remained, a substantial core
of uniform law that was administered by the federal and state courts as a general
American common law"); id. at 1554 (stating that federal and state courts "considered
themselves to be deciding questions under a general law merchant that was neither
distinctively state nor federal").
18 Presumably for this reason, "Swift appears to have been regarded when it was
decided as little more than a decision on the law of negotiable instruments." Id. at
1514; see also Casto, supranote 73, at 922 n.103 ("During the ninety-six years between
Swift and Erie,only three lower federal courts published opinions criticizing the Swift
doctrine.").
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of consideration], upon any local statute, or positive, fixed or
ancient local usage; but they deduce the doctrine from the general
principles of commercial law." 1 7 On questions of'this kind, "the
state tribunals are called upon to perform the like functions as
ourselves, that is, to ascertain, upon general reasoning and legal
analogies, ... what is the just rule furnished by the principles of
18 8
commercial law to govern the case."
If Swift was correct that New York courts decided interstate
commercial disputes according to "general principles of commercial
law" rather than "local usage, " 189 then the Court's approach in
Swift was quite defensible, when taken in historical context, against
the charge that it violated rights reserved to the states. At the time,
New York courts did not clearly conceive of themselves as establishing binding principles of state law distinct from the general law
merchant. Rather, these courts appeared to be applying the law of
nations directly. 9 Thus, it is not surprising that Swift concluded
that such decisions did not, "of themselves," constitute "the laws of
the several states" under section 34, but were "at most, only
191
evidence of what the laws are."
-

In fact, the Swift Court itself acknowledged that had New York
adopted "local statutes or local usages of a fixed and permanent
operation," the federal courts would have been bound to apply
them.'9 2 This is not a concession of a Court bent on usurping
187

Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 18.

18 Id. at 19.
189Id.

at 18.

190 In Coddington v. Bay, 20 Johns. 637 (N.Y. 1822), for example, the New York

Court for the Correction of Errors recognized "[t]he general rule ... that where
negotiable paper is transferred for a valuable consideration, and without notice of any
fraud, the right of the holder shall prevail against the true owner." Id. at 644-45
(Woodworth, J.). The court considered the rule to be "well established," id. at 647
(Woodworth,J.), and consistent with "the usual course of trade." Id. at 651 (Spencer,
CJ.). That the court recognized this rule as part of the general law merchant is
suggested by Chief Judge Spencer's observation that the rule "is not only right in
itself, but the contrary doctrine would destroy the circulation of notes, and would
justly alarm the mercantile world." Id.
191Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 18-19. The Court's characterization was also in
accord with prevailing conceptions of unwritten law. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note
74, at *71 (stating that "the law, and the opinion of the judge, are not always convertible
terms," but "we may take it as a general rule, 'that the decisions of courts ofjustice
are the evidence of what is common law'").
192 See Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 18-19; see also Jackson v. Chew, 25 U.S. (12
Wheat.) 153, 162 (1827) ("[W]here any principle of law, establishing a rule of real
property, has been settled in the state courts, the same rule will be applied by this
court, that would be applied by the state tribunals."); Mandeville &Jameson v.Joseph
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state authority. 9
So long as the New York courts themselves
decided commercial cases under the general law merchant rather
than local law, federal courts were free to act as a state court would
in deciding cases brought before them-that is, to look to "the
19 4
general principles and doctrines of commercial jurisprudence."
Nor did the Swift Court's application of the general law
merchant raise significant separation of powers concerns. Because
courts applying the law merchant were attempting to discern a
preexisting body of law, they were not engaged in unrestrained
judicial lawmaking."9 5 Although the application of rules derived
from the law of nations may require courts to engage in limited
norm elaboration at the margins, 9 6 this task is inherent in the
adjudication of cases arising under customary law. So long as courts
remain "confined from molar to molecular motions"9 7 in performing this task, any interstitial lawmaking incident to the
application of the law of nations is plausibly regarded as a proper
198
exercise of "[t]hejudicial Power."
Riddle & Co., 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 290, 298 (1803) (invoking a rule, which had "at
length been settled in Virginia," on the liability of an assignor to an assignee);
Fletcher, supranote 160, at 1534 ("State deviation from the general common law was
most frequently accomplished by statute, but on those occasions when a state had
clearly established its own judicial variation on the common law, the federal courts
also followed that local law."). Of course, "it was sometimes unclear whether a state
had established its own local version of the common law or had merely entertained
a different idea of what the general common law required," id. at 1537, but "once a
local rule was clearly established, the federal courts were compelled to follow it," id.
at 1538.
'" In fact,Justice Story, sitting on circuit, previously acknowledged his obligation
to apply Massachusetts decisions establishing a local rule with respect to a question
otherwise subject to general commercial law. See Omaly v. Swan, 18 F. Gas. 689, 690
(C.C.D. Mass. 1824) (No. 10,508) (noting that the question whether a creditor who
forecloses on a mortgage can later sue a mortgagee for any deficiency "has been long
since settled by the local law" and stating that "[ilt is too late now to controvert it").
"9Suift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 19; cf.Note, Swift v. Tyson Exhumed, 79 YALE L.J. 284,
296 (1969) ("Though on its face Swift appears to be an expansion of federal power
tout court, it need not be so treated. In 1842, it could not be predicted with certainty
that the federal common law which was to be developed in the future would conflict
with the common law of any state.").
...
SeeJay, supra note 167, at 832 ("Courts and others seeking to apply the law of
nations assumed without hesitation that they were referring to an objectively
identifiable body of law .... ").
1" See Henry P. Monaghan, ConstitutionalFact Review, 85 COLuM. L. REV. 229,235-

37 (1985) (identifying "law declaration," "fact identification," and "law application"
as distinctjudicial functions and concluding that "law application frequently entails
some attempt to elaborate the governing norm").
197 Southern Pac. Co. v.Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes,J., dissenting).
19"U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
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Both the text and history of Article III confirm this understand-

ing. Many of the cases and controversies to which "[t]he judicial
Power shall extend " 9 ' were included in Article III of the Constitution precisely because they were likely to require application of the
law of nations. In drafting Article III, the founders sought to
extend the federal judicial power to cases and controversies that
"involve the national Peace and Harmony"20 --that is, cases implicating the United States's relations with other nations (the national
"peace") 20 ' and the states' relations with one another (the national
"harmony"). 2 12 By their nature, cases falling within these categories were likely to be governed by the various branches of the law of
Because the founders believed that failure to
nations. 20 3
resolve such cases satisfactorily threatened the national peace and
harmony, they regarded the availability of federal jurisdiction over
such cases as essential. Thus, it should come as no surprise that
1

99 Id.

200 Committee of Detail, Proceedings of the Convention (June 19-July 23, 1787),

in 2 Farrand, supra note 61, at 133.
201 These include "[c]ases affecting Ambassadors," "[c]ases of admiralty and
maritime Jurisdiction," and "[c]ontroversies . . . between a State, or the Citizens
thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects." U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. The
founders regarded federal jurisdiction over these cases "essential to ... the security
of the public tranquillity" because "the denial or perversion ofjustice by the sentences
of courts, as well as in any other manner, is with reason classed among thejust causes
of war." THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 476 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
202 "Controversies between two or more States," U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 1,
posed the greatest threat to national "harmony" because they had the potential to
destroy the Union. See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 7, at 60-66 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (describing the major disputes between the
states that threatened the Union during the Confederation period); infra note 414
(noting that the founders established the Supreme Court in part to resolve potentially
disruptive disputes between the states). In addition, the founders regarded
jurisdiction over controversies "between a State and Citizens of another State[, and]
between Citizens of different States," U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1, as no less
"essential to the peace of the Union," TIlE FEDERALIST No. 80, supra note 201, at 477,
because "the State tribunals cannot be supposed to be impartial" in such cases, id. at
475.
" The cases selected by the Committee of Detail as involving the national "peace
and harmony" implicated all three primary branches of the law of nations. Cases
affecting ambassadors, controversies between two or more states, and controversies
involving foreign states were generally governed by the law respecting sovereign
states. See infra notes 311-414 and accompanying text. Cases of admiralty and
maritimejurisdiction generally required the application of the law maritime. See infra
notes 415-539 and accompanying text. Controversies between citizens of different
states and those involving foreign citizens were most often commercial in nature and
thus generally governed by the law merchant. See infra notes 506-09 and accompanying text.
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federal courts are frequently called upon to ascertain and apply the
law of nations in adjudicating the various cases and controversies set
forth in Article III.
For example, as Hamilton explained in The Federalist,"[a]ll questions in which [ambassadors] are concerned are ... directly connected with the public peace." 2 4 Under the law of nations, one
nation's failure to accord an ambassador traditional diplomatic privileges and immunities was considered an affront to the other
nation's sovereign and thus a potential cause of war. 215 Similarly,
according to Hamilton, admiralty and maritime causes "so generally
depend on the laws of nations, and so commonly affect the rights of
foreigners, that they fall within the considerations which are relative
to the public peace." 2 6 In sum, the founders concluded that federal jurisdiction was necessary in cases like these because "the peace
27
of the WHOLE ought not to be left at the disposal of a PART." 1
Because Article III specifically contemplated that federal courts
would adjudicate cases and controversies governed by the law of
nations, it is difficult to conclude that such adjudication-including
any interstitial lawmaking inherent in the enterprise-violates Article
III or is otherwise inconsistent with the separation of powers. This
is not to say that federal courts may engage in unlimited judicial
lawmaking in the guise of adjudication. As Justice Holmes suggest20 8
ed, when the federal courts move beyond "molecular" motions,
they risk intruding upon authority committed to the states, the
political branches, or both. 2 °9 The subsequent expansion and
204THE

FEDERALIST No. 81, at 487 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,

1961).
" See infra notes 318-27 and accompanying text. Indeed, the Convention considered cases affecting ambassadors so important that it not only subjected such cases
to federaljurisdiction, but also provided "that such questions should be submitted in
the first instance to the highest judicatory of the nation," THE FEDERALIST No. 81,
supra note 204, at 487. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 ("In all Cases affecting
Ambassadors .... the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction.").
206 THE FEDERALIST No. 80, supra note 201, at 478; see also infra notes 424-50 and
accompanying text (discussing prize cases).
207 THE FEDERALIST No. 80, supra note 201, at 467.
ut Southern Pac. Co. v.Jensen, 244 U.S. 205,221 (1917) (Holmes,J, dissenting).
2 1 readily acknowledge that the line between "adjudication" and "lawmaking"
often will be difficult to draw with precision in practice. See supra note 7.
Nonetheless, recognition that there is such a line in theory is essential if the Article
I "legislative Power" is to remain distinct from the Article III "judicial Power." See
Northwest Airlines v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 97 (1981) ("[T]Ihe
authority to construe a statute is fundamentally different from the authority to
fashion a new rule or to provide a new remedy which Congress has decided not to
adopt.").
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ultimate repudiation of the Swift doctrine illustrate Holmes's point.
Although Swift was defensible at the time it was decided, two
subsequent developments seriously undermined its continued
legitimacy. First, state courts increasingly abandoned reliance on
the general law merchant in favor of truly localized commercial
doctrines.
State courts no longer conceived of their task in
commercial cases as applying a general body of law common to
many jurisdictions. Rather, they increasingly claimed or exercised
authority to formulate commercial doctrines as a matter of state law.
By the end of the nineteenth century, commercial law varied widely
from state to state. 210 Nevertheless, invoking Swift, federal courts
frequently failed to apply state judge-made law. Rather, they
continued to adhere to their own conception of a general law
merchant in commercial cases they adjudicated.
Second, not content merely to apply "general law" in commercial cases, the federal courts vastly expanded the range of legal questions subject to the Swift doctrine. 211 By the time Erie was decided,
federal courts claimed the right to exercise independent judgment
with respect to such historically local matters as punitive damages,
property, and torts. 212 Unlike commercial disputes, such matters
210 See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 355 (1973) ("[E]ach

state from Maine to the Pacific was a petty sovereignty, with its own brand of law.");
Lyman D. Brewster, The Promotion of Uniform Legislation, 6 YALE L.J. 132, 140 (1897)
(arguing for "statutory unity rather than diversity, in matters of common interest").
Not all of the changes in commercial law were attributable to the courts. Many were
due to the enactment of specialized statutes by state legislatures. See E. ALLAN
FARNSWORTH & JOHN HONNOLD, COMMERCIAL LAW 5 (4th ed. 1985) (noting that
"[b]y 1890 every state had at least one statute on negotiable instruments"). The
resulting disuniformity gave rise to efforts around the turn of the century to have the
states adopt uniform commercial laws. See FRIEDMAN, supra, at 355, 471 ("By 1900,
[the uniform Negotiable Instruments Law] had been widely enacted.... ."). Such laws
were designed to perform the function historically performed by the law merchantthat is, to encourage trade by subjecting commercial transactions to uniform rules of
commercial law. See Brewster, supra, at 134 ("[G]reat care is taken to preserve the use
of words which have had repeated legal constructions and become recognized terms
in the Law Merchant.").
2" See generally FREYER, supra note 38, at 45-75.
212 See id. at 71 ("[Tlhe federaljudiciary continued to enlarge the body of general
law so that by 1890 it included some 26 doctrines."). Under this expanded Swift
doctrine,
"general law" was held to include the obligations under contracts entered
into and to be performed within the State, the extent to which a carrier
operating within a State may stipulate for exemption from liability for his
own negligence or that of his employee; the liability for torts committed
within the State upon persons resident or property located there, even
where the question of liability depended upon the scope of a property right
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were never thought to be subject to213the law of nations, but had
always been governed by the lex loci.
These two developments created an ever-widening legitimacy
gap. Under Swift's original conception of section 34, federal courts
were required to follow "long-established local customs having the
force of laws."21 Under the expanded Swift doctrine, by contrast,
federal courts disregarded even the most well-established local
customs in favor of so-called "general" law. In light of these
developments, the Supreme Court eventually overruled Swift on the
ground "that in applying the [Swift] doctrine this Court and the
lower courts have invaded rights which ...

are reserved by the

Constitution to the several States." 215 As discussed in Part I,
federal courts violated principles of judicial federalism by disregarding state law in areas over which the states possessed undoubted legislative competence 216 and over which Congress either
lacked constitutional power or at least had failed to exercise such
power.

217

Unless Erie is to be read as placing substantial limits on the
scope of federal power generally, the Court's decision must rest on
the premise that the federal courts' application of "general common
law" was inconsistent with the separation of powers, and thus with
principles of judicial federalism. 218 In the case of tort law, the
federal courts' disregard of state court decisions in favor of "general
law" was illegitimate from the start. Unlike commercial law, tort law
was always considered part of the lex loci rather than the jus
gentium. 219
Even with respect to commercial law, the states'

conferred by the State; and the right to exemplary or punitive damages.
Furthermore, state decisions construing local deeds, mineral conveyances,
and even devises of real estate were disregarded.
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 75-76 (1938) (footnotes omitted).
"'s See Edwin D. Dickinson, The Law of Nations As Part of the National Law of the
United States (pt. 2), 101 U. PA. L. REV. 792, 799 (1953) ("[W]ithin two decades, the
Court's formula descriptive of the federal law, assumed to be controlling in the
federal courts in diversity cases, had metamorphosed from 'general commercial law'
into 'general law' into 'common law.'").
2" Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842).
215
Eie, 304 U.S. at 80.
216 See supra notes 54-69 and accompanying text.
2" Because the general law applied by federal courts was not binding in state
courts, the Swift doctrine also created serious practical problems of forum shopping
and inequitable administration of the law. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 74-78 (noting the
political
and social defects of the Swift doctrine).
21
1 See supra notes 58-69 and accompanying text.
2" The Supreme Court did not treat tort law as part of the "general law" until its
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decision to abandon general law in favor of state judge-made law
transformed the federal courts' defensible application of customary
law into improper judicial lawmaking.
C. The Federal Common Law of Foreign Relations
One of the more prominent modern enclaves of federal
common law consists of rules of decision that govern "international
disputes implicating ...

220
our relations with foreign nations."

Rules of this kind are typically derived from traditional principles
of the law of nations, particularly the branch concerning the rights
and duties of sovereign states, known today as public international
law. 221 Specifically, this section examines the contemporary act of
state doctrine and the historical immunity of foreign warships from
judicial process. Although other rules derived from the law of
nations could be characterized as part of the federal common law
of foreign relations, 22 2 the rules in this section suffice to illustrate
the capacity of the proposed approach to reconceptualize various
rules currently thought to constitute "federal judge-made law."
1. The Act of State Doctrine
The Supreme Court's landmark decision in Banco Nacional de
2 23
Cuba v. Sabbatino
purported to adopt the so-called "act of state
doctrine in its traditional formulation" 22 4 as a matter of "federal
judge-made law." Notwithstanding this characterization, the Court's
decision is readily reconceptualized using the criteria proposed in
this Article. The case developed out of the deteriorating relations
between the United States and Cuba following Fidel Castro's
takeover of the island. In response to the United States's reduction
of the Cuban sugar quota, Cuba nationalized various sugar companies in which Americans held an interest, including Compania

decision in Chicago v. Robbins, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 418, 428-29 (1862) (stating in a case
concerning liability for negligently inflicted injuries that "where private rights are to
be determined by the application of common law rules alone, this Court, although
entertaining for State tribunals the highest respect, does not feel bound by their
decisions").
'20 Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981).
See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
22 These include rules of decision that implement the rights of foreign
ambassadors or that govern prize cases. Because these rules implicate specific
jurisdictional grants under Article III, they are discussed separately in Part III.
223 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
24 Id. at 401.
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Azucarera Vertientes-Camaguey de Cuba ("C.A.V."), and prevented
all export of their products without government consent. Before
these events, C.A.V. had contracted with an American commodities
broker for the sale of Cuban sugar. In order to obtain the sugar
after the expropriation, the broker entered into identical contracts
with the Cuban government. The broker obtained the sugar, but
subsequently refused to pay after being notified of C.A.V.'s claim
that it was entitled to the proceeds of the sale as the rightful owner
225
of the sugar.
Banco Nacional de Cuba, an instrumentality of the Cuban
government, sued the broker in federal court on the basis of
diversity of citizenship. The complaint sought recovery of the
proceeds for conversion of the sugar. The broker's defense was that
Cuba never obtained valid title to the sugar. The district court and
the court of appeals agreed, holding that the act of state doctrine is
inapplicable when the act itself violates international law-in this
case, "those principles of international law which have long been
accepted by the free countries of the West" against confiscation of
22 6
private property.
The Supreme Court reversed, upholding the "act of state
doctrine in its traditional formulation." 227 Rather than follow
Erie's admonition to apply state law except in matters governed by
positive law,228 Sabbatino characterized the act of state doctrine as
one of several "enclaves of federal judge-made law," 229 and
reached the seemingly inconsistent conclusion that both federal and
state courts are required to disregard state law and apply the socalled "act of state doctrine in its traditional formulation." 230 That
formulation "precludes the courts of this country from inquiring
into the validity of the public acts a recognized foreign sovereign
power committed within its own territory." 23' According to the

225

See id. at 401-06.

26 See id. at 402-03.
' 7 Id. at 401. According to the Court:
[T]he Judicial Branch will not examine the validity of a taking of property
within its own territory by a foreign sovereign government, extant and
recognized by this country at the time of suit, in the absence of a treaty or
other unambiguous agreement regarding controlling legal principles, even
if the complaint alleges that the taking violates customary international law.
Id. at 428.
a See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 426.
230 Id. at 401.
231 Id.
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Court, neither federal nor state courts have authority to "narrow[]
... the apparent scope of the rule," notwithstanding "various
232
considerations of policy" favoring its restriction.
a. Application of the First Criterion
Sabbatino's attempt to distinguish Erie consisted of little more
of
than the assertion that "the Court did not have rules like the act 23
3
state doctrine in mind when it decided Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins."
Nonetheless, there is an important distinction between Sabbatino
and Erie, which illustrates the application of the first criterion to the
act of state doctrine. The matter at issue in Erie-the duty of care
required of railroads operating within a state's territory--was
undoubtedly within the legislative competence of the states.
Whether Congress in fact lacks constitutional power over such
matters, as Erie suggested, or merely failed to exercise such power,
does not affect the analysis. In either case, because positive federal
law did not govern the matter in question, and because the states
possessed at least concurrent legislative competence over such
matters, principles ofjudicial federalism required the federal courts
23 4
to apply state law.
By contrast, the question at issue in Sabbatino-whether "the
courts of this country" are free to reject "the validity of the public
acts a recognized foreign sovereign power committed within its own
territory" 23 -- is a matter beyond the legislative competence of the
states.236 The resolution of this question directly implicates the

232 Id. at 424.
233 Id. at 425.
234 See supra text accompanying notes 54-69.

For this reason, "constitutional

common law'-a collection of "substantive, procedural, and remedial rules drawing
their inspiration and authority from, but not required by, various constitutional
provisions"-remains constitutionally problematic to the extent that it purports to
bind the states in areas over which the states retain legislative competence. See
Monaghan, supra note 7, at 2-3; see also id. at 18, 35. Examples of such rules include
the exclusionary rule and the requirement that police give Miranda warnings. See id.
at 3, 20. Because rules like these do not establish constitutional imperatives, but
merely provide examples of "a reasonably safe course of conduct for public officials
to follow," id. at 22, both Congress and the states arguably remain free to establish
alternative means of satisfying whatever minimum constitutional requirements exist.
But cf id. at 18-19, 26-30, 35-38 (suggesting that Congress, but not the states, may
supplant constitutional common law rules with constitutionally adequate alternatives).
...Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 401.
" Cf Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257, 266-67 (1880) ("[W]hen the national
government was formed, some of the attributes of State sovereignty were partially,
and others wholly, surrendered and vested in the United States. Over the subjects
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foreign relations of the United States, and is therefore committed
by the Constitution to the exclusive authority of the federal
government.
Exclusive federal authority over the conduct of foreign affairs is
well established."' The Constitution contains no single clause
vesting exclusive authority over this area in the federal government.
But the sum of its parts, considered in light of the constitutional
structure, leaves little doubt in this regard."' With the exception
of the powers vested in the President by Article II,239 "the enumeration of Article I covered the whole area of external affairs as
comprehensively in its time as exceptional foresight and superior
craftsmanship could cover it." 24 °

Taken together, Articles I and

II vest virtually complete authority over foreign relations in
Congress and the President. At the same time, the Constitution
disables the states from conducting foreign relations of their
thus surrendered the sovereignty of the States ceased to extend.").
2
. See United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937) ("Governmental power
over internal affairs is distributed between the national government and the several
states. Governmental power over external affairs is not distributed, but is vested
exclusively in the national government."); see also United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315 (1936) (noting that there are "fundamental"
differences "between the powers of the federal government in respect of foreign or
external affairs and those in respect of domestic or internal affairs").
23
See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 427 n.25 ("Various constitutional and statutory
provisions ... reflect[] a concern for uniformity in this country's dealings with
foreign nations and indicat[e] a desire to give matters of international significance to
the jurisdiction of federal institutions.").
2"9 Article II provides that "[t]he President shall be Commander in Chief of the
Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when
called into the actual Service of the United States," U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1, and
that "[h]e shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to
make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls," id. cl. 2, and "he shall receive
Ambassadors and other public Ministers," id. § 3, cl. 1.
240 Dickinson, supra note 164, at 42. Specifically, § 8 of Article I grants Congress
power "to ...

pr6vide for the common Defence ...

of the United States," U.S.

CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, "[to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations," id. cl. 3, "[t]o
establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization," id. cl. 4, "[t]o... regulate the Value...
of foreign Coin," id. cl. 5, "[t]o define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed
on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations," id. cl. 10, "[t]o declare
War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on
Land and Water," id. cl. 11, "[t]o raise and support Armies," id. cl. 12, "[t]o provide
and maintain a Navy," id. cl. 13, "[t]o make Rules for the Government and Regulation
of the land and naval Forces," id. cl. 14, and "[t]o make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any
Department or Officer thereof," id. cl. 18.
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own. 24 1
By simultaneously granting authority to the political
branches and denying power to the states, the Constitution appears
to vest exclusive and plenary control over foreign relations in the
242
federal government.
Ordinarily, one might expect that the Constitution's enumeration of specific federal powers would preclude the exercise of any
others and that its enumeration of specific prohibitions on state
power would be exhaustive.2 43
Such an argument, however, is
unpersuasive in this context. As the Supreme Court has long
recognized, "[t]he broad statement that the federal government
can exercise no powers except those specifically enumerated in
the Constitution, and such implied powers as are necessary and
proper to carry into effect the enumerated powers, is categorically
true only in respect of our internal affairs."244
Whereas the
federal government's authority over internal affairs is derived
exclusively from the Constitution, "the powers of external sovereignty [do] not depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution."

24 5

.4.
Section 10 of Article I provides that "[n]o State shall enter into any Treaty,
Alliance, or Confederation; [or] grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal," U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 10, c. 1, that "[n]o State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any
Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary
for executing its inspection Laws: ... and all such Laws shall be subject to the
Revision and Controul of the Congress," id. c. 2, and that "[n]o State shall, without
the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in
time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a
foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent
Danger as will not admit of delay," id. c. 3.
242See THE FEDERALST No. 42, at 264 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) ("If we are to be one nation in any respect, it clearly ought to be in respect to
other nations."); Jay, supra note 167, at 829 ("Given the importance of the law of
nations to national affairs, the Framers assumed as a matter of course that the federal
government should have the ability to dominate most of the decisionmaking related
to that law.... [T]he persistent idea was to provide a national monopoly of authority
in order to assure respect for international obligations."). Even antifederalists like
Thomas Jefferson considered "'it indispensably necessary that with respect to
everything external we be one nation firmly hooped together.'" Letter from Thomas
Jefferson to James Madison (Oct. 8, 1786), in CHARLES WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE
CONsTrrUTION 46 (1937).

24 See U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.").
244 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315-16 (1936).
21S Id. at 318.
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Rather, such powers are "vested in the federal government as
necessary concomitants of nationality."24 6
For example, the
Supreme Court has long recognized that the United States possesses
all powers of external sovereignty recognized under the law of
nations, including "[t]he power to acquire territory by discovery and
occupation, the power to expel undesirable aliens, [and] the power
to make such international agreements as do not constitute treaties
in the constitutional sense." 247 These powers are not to be found
"in the provisions of the Constitution, but in the law of nations" and
24
are "inherently inseparable from the conception of nationality."
The constitutional structure strongly suggests that the states
conferred all rights of external sovereignty on the federal government and retained none for themselves.
Unlike power over
domestic matters, power over foreign affairs cannot be shared
without substantially impairing its effective exercise. 249
The
founders were aware that the states' exercise of concurrent
authority over matters touching on "external sovereignty" would
be incompatible with the conduct of foreign relations. As Hamilton wrote in The Federalist, "[t]he Union will undoubtedly be
250
answerable to foreign powers for the conduct of its members."
For this reason, the Constitution appears to preclude the states
from exercising direct authority over foreign relations, even in
the absence of specific prohibitions. 251 Thus, few would argue
24

6Id.

Id. at 318 (citations omitted).
Id. After declaring their independence from Great Britain, the states acquired
the status of "Free and Independent States," with "full Power to levy War, conclude
Peace, contract Alliances, establish Commerce, and to do all other Acts and Things
247

24

1

which Independent States may of right do." THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE

para. 32 (U.S. 1776). This residual category was an obvious reference to the law of
nations, which defined the "Things which Independent States may of right do." See
Dickinson, supra note 164, at 35 ("'Full power to levy war, conclude peace, contract
alliances, establish commerce, and to do all other acts and things which Independent
States may of right do' came straight from that universal jurisprudence which had
been elaborated in the treatises of Grotius, Pufendorf, Burlamaqui, Vattel and
others.").
249
See THE FEDERALIST No. 32, at 198 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossitered.,
1961) (stating that the Constitution conferred exclusive federal power and alienated
state sovereignty "where it granted an authority to the Union to which a similar
authority in the States would be absolutely and totally contradictoty and repugnant");
THE FEDERALIST No. 82, supra note 1, at 492 (stating that "where an authority is
granted to the Union with which a similar authority in the States would be utterly

incompatible,"
such authority is "exclusively delegated to the federal head").
2
THE FEDERALIST No. 80, supra note 201, at 476; see also infra notes 552-54 and
accompanying text.
251 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
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that states possess authority to send and receive ambassadors,
even though the Constitution does not explicitly deny this power
to the states. The reason is simple. Florida's decision to establish diplomatic relations with Cuba, for example, would necessar-

ily undermine the foreign relations of the United States as a
whole. 252
Given the Constitution's allocation of exclusive authority over
foreign affairs to the federal government (and the corresponding

lack of legislative competence in the states), it is not surprising that
the Sabbatino Court found that Erie was inapposite and that the
federal courts were under no obligation to apply state law regarding
"the validity of the public acts [of] a recognized foreign sovereign
power committed within its own territory. "253 Whether the United
States recognizes the validity of foreign acts of state has obvious and
important foreign policy implications. 25 4 As Sabbatino recognized,

STATES § 1 reporter's note 5 (1986) ("A state of the United States is not a 'state'

under international law, since by its constitutional status it does not have capacity to
conduct foreign relations." (citation omitted)); cf. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 316
("[S]ince the states severally never possessed international powers, such powers could
not have been carved from the mass of state powers but obviously were transmitted
to the United States from some other source."); 2JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 626 (photo. reprint 1991) (Boston,

Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833) ("[T]he states can exercise no powers whatsoever, which
exclusively spring out of the existence of the national government, which the
No state can say, that it has reserved,
constitution does not delegate to them ....
what it never possessed.")
2152See Hill, supra note 7, at 1048 (stating that "some kinds of governmental action
affect our relations with foreign nations so intimately and sensitively that they must
be deemed to be within the exclusive competence of the federal government"). The
precise scope of this structural preemption of state law is unclear, but the Supreme
Court has on occasion even invalidated state action that indirectly interferes with
foreign relations. See, e.g., Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432-34 (1968)
(invalidating an Oregon probate statute requiring inquiry "into the type of
governments that obtain in particular foreign nations" as "an intrusion by the State
into the field of foreign affairs which the Constitution entrusts to the President and
the Congress"). Professor Hill has observed that "by force of the Constitution there
is a general ouster of state competence respecting issues which international custom
deems not properly the subject of unilateral action by a sovereign nation," Hill, supra
note 7, at 1060, and has suggested "the possibility that the ouster of state competence
may extend as well to certain issues in respect ofwhich unilateral action is acceptable
to the international community," id.
253 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,401 (1964); see also United
States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 307 (1947) (stating that Erie "had no effect,
and was intended to have none, to bring within the governance of state law matters
exclusively federal, because made so by constitutional or valid congressional
command, or others so vitally affecting interests, powers and relations of the Federal
Government as to require uniform national disposition rather than diversified state
rulings").
254 THE FEDERALIST No. 3, supra note 175, at 43 ("It is of high importance to the
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the act of state doctrine "'rests at last upon the highest considerations of international comity and expediency. To permit the
validity of the acts of one sovereign to be reExamined and perhaps
condemned by the courts of another would very certainly imperil
the amicable relations between governments and vex the peace of
nations."'2 55 The federal government's exclusive constitutional
power over foreign affairs suggests that states simply lack authority
to prescribe rules of decision on questions of this nature. 256 Thus,
an essential predicate for the operation of judicial federalism-the
existence of state legislative competence-is lacking in this context.

peace of America that she observe the laws of nations towards all these powers, and
to me it appears evident that this will be more perfectly and punctually done by one
national government than it could be either by thirteen separate States or by three
or four distinct confederacies.").
" Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 417-18 (quoting Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S.
297, 303-04 (1918) (internal quotation marks omitted).
256 See id. at 424-25 (stating that "rules of international law should not be left to
divergent and perhaps parochial state interpretations," because "the problems
involved are uniquely federal in nature"); Hill, supra note 7, at 1041-42 ("State law
does not apply of its own force in such cases not because state interests are
necessarily lacking but because they are constitutionally irrelevant in the face of the
overriding federal interest. .. ."). Professor Monaghan finds difficulty with Hill's
"zone of preemption" on the ground that "the usual mode of preemption analysis is
not to carve out a priori zones of preemption but to consider the specific impact of
state law upon federal policy." Monaghan, supra note 7, at 14 n.75. Professor Hill's
approach, however, seems more appropriate in this context. For reasons previously
discussed, seesupranotes 237-252 and accompanying text, there is a strong argument
that federal authority over foreign relations "occupies the field," thus obviating the
need "to consider the specific impact of state law upon federal policy." Cf Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (stating that an "[a]ct of Congress
may touch a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system
will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject"). In
addition, it is difficult, if not impossible, for courts to ascertain the precise content
of a controlling "federal policy" in the context of foreign relations. At the time of
adjudication, federal officials may not yet have formulated U.S. policy on the question
at hand. In any event, even if a federal policy exists, the means by which such policy
may be implemented is itselfa question reserved to the political branches rather than
the courts. See Williams v. Armroyd, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 423,433-34 (1813) (Marshall,
CJ.) (refusing to invalidate foreign condemnations of American ships and cargo
pursuant to an edict Congress had declared to be "a direct and flagrant violation of
national law" because "the legislature has not chosen to declare sentences of
condemnation, pronounced under this unjustifiable decree, absolutely void"); see also
The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 422 (1815) ("The degree and the kind of
retaliation [against a foreign sovereign for its unjust proceedings toward our citizens]
depend entirely on considerations foreign to this tribunal."); infra notes 280-82 and
accompanying text.
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b. Application of the Second Criterion
Sabbatino also illustrates the application of the second criterion
proposed in this Article. The initial conclusion under the first
criterion-that the act of state doctrine governs matters beyond the
legislative competence of the states-establishes that federal courts
need not apply state law in adjudicating such matters. It does not
speak, however, to the precise content of the rule that federal courts
should adopt in these cases. The Supreme Court's characterization
of the act of state doctrine as "federal judge-made law" might be
read to suggest that federal courts are free "to fashion [the
doctrine] according to their own standards."25 This characterization thus raises substantial separation of powers concerns about
potential judicial lawmaking in this context.
Elsewhere in its opinion, however, the Sabbatino Court made
clear that the judiciary is not, in fact, free to adopt its own conception of the act of state doctrine but must adhere to the doctrine "in
its traditional formulation."258
Although the Sabbatino Court
asserted that "international law does not require application of the
[act of state] doctrine," in the sense that most countries "fail to
follow the rule rigidly,"259 the Court acknowledged that the
doctrine reflects "deep seated" "concept[s] of territorial sovereignty"
shared by many nations. 211 In other words, the act of state doctrine derives from well-established principles of the law of nations,
particularly the principle that "[t]he jurisdiction of [every] nation,
26 1
within its own territory, is necessarily exclusive and absolute."
257 Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943).
25 Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 401.
29

5 Id. at 421. But see Hill, supra note 7, at 1063 n.193 ("The authorities cited by
the Court as excluding act of state from the compass of international law can also be
viewed as tending to establish the contrary of this proposition. For they seem to
show that the basic rule of act of state is universally recognized-that the disagreement
concerns only the exceptions." (citation omitted)).
261 Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 432.

261 The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812).

That principle stems from "the equality and absolute independence of sovereign
states" under the law of nations. See L'Invincible, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 238, 254 (1816).
As the Supreme Court explained in an early case, for the courts of one country to
inquire into the means by which another acquired title to property "would be to exert
the right of examining into the validity of the acts of the foreign sovereign, and to sit
in judgment upon them, in cases where he has not conceded the jurisdiction, and
where it would be inconsistent with his own supremacy." The Santissima Trinidad,
20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283, 336 (1822).
"The classic American statement of the act of state doctrine... began to emerge
in the jurisprudence of this country in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
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Application of these principles does not require the courts to
engage in constitutionally questionable lawmaking activities, but
merely to ascertain and apply a preexisting practice suggested by
traditional and verifiable principles of the law of nations. 262 In
this sense, judicial application of the act of state doctrine is much
like application of the rule derived from the law merchant in Swift.
In neither case did the federal courts create the governing rule of
decision according to their own standards. Rather, they ascertained
the applicable rule by reference to a preexisting body of customary
law.26
That countries may no longer "follow the [act of state
doctrine] rigidly" 26 does not alter the nature and source of the
"traditional formulation" of the doctrine. Accordingly, judicial
application of the doctrine is well insulated from the charge that it
constitutes improper judicial lawmaking.
In fact, judicial application of the act of state doctrine appears
to be not only consistent with, but affirmatively required by, the
constitutional structure. The act of state doctrine does not result
from interpretation of a specific constitutional provision. Rather,
as the Court has recognized, the doctrine is "a consequence of
domestic separation of powers"265 because it ensures that "the

centuries." Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 416 (citing cases). Thus, by the time Sabbatino was
decided, the traditional formulation of the doctrine was well-established. See id.

("None of this Court's subsequent cases in which the act of state doctrine was directly
or peripherally involved manifest any retreat from [the classic American statement of
the doctrine found in Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1857)].").
262 By "verifiable" principles of the law of nations, I mean those that judges
attempted to find as a matter of historical fact and custom, rather than those that
they prescribed as a matter of policy or divined as a matter of natural order. As
Professor Jay has recounted:
In ascertaining principles of the law of nations, lawyers and judges of [the
eighteenth century] relied heavily on continental treatise writers, Vattel
being the most often consulted by Americans. An essential part of a sound
legal education consisted of reading Vattel, Grotius, Pufendorf, and Burlamaqui, among others. Quotations from these sources appeared not only in
briefs and opinions, but also in discussions of critical foreign policy matters
by the President's Cabinet and in the popular press. Implicit in this
widespread usage was acceptance of the validity of the law of nations as
knowable doctrine.
Jay, supra note 167, at 823 (footnote omitted); see also Dickinson, supra note 164, at
35 ("[T]he treatises of Grotius, Pufendorf, Burlamaqui, Vattel and others .... were
an essential and significant part of the minimal equipment of any lawyer of erudition
in the eighteenth century.");Jay, supra note 167, at 832 ("Courts and others seeking
to apply the law of nations assumed without hesitation that they were referring to an
objectively identifiable body of law .... ).
2s See supra notes 195-209 and accompanying text.
264Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 421.
26 W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., Int'l, 493 U.S. 400,
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political departments of our Government,"26 6 rather than the
courts, exercise the sovereign prerogative to invalidate foreign acts
of state. In this way, the doctrine maintains "the proper distribution of functions between the judicial and political branches of the
267
Government on matters bearing on foreign affairs."
The Constitution vests
The Court's approach has merit.
exclusive authority over foreign affairs in the federal government
As
generally, 268 and in the political branches specifically. 26 9
discussed above, the act of state doctrine is based on traditional
principles of the law of nations, specifically those governing the
rights and duties of sovereign states. Because nations generally
expect one another to follow such principles, 271 judicial adherence
to rules like the act of state doctrine may be necessary to avoid
interfering with the political branches' conduct of foreign relations.2 7 1 Given the constitutional separation of powers, even if

404 (1990); see also Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 423 (suggesting that the judicial obligation
to apply the act of state doctrine flows from "the basic relationships between branches
of government in a system of separation of powers").
266 Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304, 310 (1918).
26
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 427-28; see also id. ("If the act of state doctrine is a
principle of decision binding on federal and state courts alike but compelled by
neither international law nor the Constitution, its continuing vitality depends on its
capacity to reflect the proper distribution of functions between the judicial and
political branches of the Government on matters bearing upon foreign affairs.").
21 See supra notes 235-52 and accompanying text.
269 See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 427-37. The Supreme Court's prior opinions have
been even more explicit on this point. See, e.g., Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246
U.S. 297, 302 (1918) ("The conduct of the foreign relations of our Government is
committed by the Constitution to the Executive and Legislative-'the political'Departments of the Government, and the propriety of what may be done in the
exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision."); see also
The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 147 (1812) (stating
that "the questions to which [wrongs committed by a foreign sovereign] give birth are
rather questions of policy than law" and accordingly "are for diplomatic, rather than
legal discussion").
211 See supra notes 162-78 and accompanying text.
27 See La Amistad de Rues, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 385, 390-91 (1820). In La Amistad
de Rues, the Supreme Court acknowledged the traditional rule "ofthe general law of
nations" "that whenever a capture is made by any belligerent, in violation of our
neutrality, if the prize come voluntarily within ourjurisdiction, it shall be restored to
the original owners." Id. at 389. The Court, however, refused to go "beyond the
authority to decree restitution," "consider[ing] it no part of the duty of a neutral
nation to interpose, upon the mere footing of the law of nations, to settle all the
rights and wrongs which may grow out of a capture between belligerents." Id. at 38990.
The Court's rationale essentially rested upon the separation of powers. Given
the risk that judicial action would jeopardize our peaceful relations with foreign
nations, the Court held that Congress, rather than the courts, must authorize any
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other countries no longer strictly follow the act of state doctrine,
judicial adherence to that doctrine "in its traditional formulation"
appears necessary to preserve the political branches' power over
foreign relations.
As the Court itself explained in Sabbatino, judicial decisions
declaring foreign acts of state invalid would
often be likely to give offense to the expropriating country; since
the concept of territorial sovereignty is so deep seated, any state
may resent the refusal of the courts of another sovereign to accord
validity to acts within its territorial borders. Piecemeal dispositions of this sort involving the probability of affront to another
state could seriously interfere with negotiations being carried on
by the Executive Branch and might prevent or render less
favorable the terms of an agreement that could otherwise be
reached. Relations with third countries which have engaged in
similar expropriations would not be immune from effect." 2
Because failure to give effect to foreign acts of state could seriously
undermine foreign relations, the Sabbatino Court concluded that
neither federal nor state courts have authority to "narrow[] . . . the
apparent scope of the rule," notwithstanding "various considerations
273
of policy" favoring its restriction.

proceedings beyond those contemplated by the law of nations:
Such a course of things would necessarily create irritations and animosities,
and very soon embark neutral nations in all the controversies and hostilities
of the conflicting parties. Considerations of public policy come, therefore,
in aid of what we consider the law of nations on this subject; and we may
add, that congress, in its legislation, has never passed the limit which is here
marked out. Until congress shall choose to prescribe a different rule, this
Court will, in cases of this nature, confine itself to the exercise of the simple
authority to decree restitution, and decline all inquiries into questions of
damages for asserted wrongs.
Id. at 391.
As this case suggests, the Court has long recognized that Congress has power to
enact laws that depart from the law of nations. To be sure, such departures may
adversely affect foreign relations, but "whatever may be the responsibility incurred
by the nation to foreign powers, in executing such laws, there can be no doubt, that
courts ofjustice are bound to obey and administer them." The Marianna Flora, 24
U.S. (11 Wheat.) 1, 40 (1826).
27 Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 432.
275
Id. at 424; see also id. at 427 (stating that "the act of state doctrine is a principle
of decision binding on federal and state courts alike"). As discussed in the text, the
requirement that federal courts adhere to the act of state doctrine stems from the
constitutional separationof powers-specifically, the Constitution's exclusive allocation
of power over foreign affairs to the political branches of government rather than the
courts. The requirement that state courts comply with the doctrine, by contrast,
derives from the constitutional division of power between the federal government and
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To be sure, the United States may depart from traditional
principles of the law of nations 274-including the act of state

doctrine 27 5 -even

though

such

departures

amicable relations between governments

nations.'" 276

may

"'imperil

the

and vex the peace of

Sabbatino holds only that, in light of the Constitu-

tion's allocation of power over foreign affairs, the decision to do so

2 77
should be made by the political branches rather than the courts.

the states, under which the former is given exclusive power to conduct foreign
relations. See supra notes 237-52 and accompanying text. Departures from the act
of state doctrine by either federal or state courts would be inconsistent with the
constitutional structure because departure by either has the potential to "'imperil the
amicable relations between governments and vex the peace of nations.'" Sabbatino,
376 U.S. at 417-18 (quoting Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 303-04
(1918)) (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. id. at 424 (stating that if "the state
courts are left free to formulate their own rules, the purposes behind the doctrine
could be... effectively undermined"). Under the constitutional scheme, the decision
to depart from the act of state doctrine must be made by the political branches of the
federalgovernment,which possess exclusive constitutional authority over foreign affairs.
274 See, e.g., The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 146
(1812) (stating that "[w]ithout doubt, the sovereign of the place is capable of
destroying [the] implication" that under the law of nations, foreign ships of war are
exempt from the sovereign's jurisdiction). Professor Henkin has reached the same
conclusion with respect to the modern law of nations:
For every State has the power-I do not say the legal right-to denounce or
breach its treaties, or to violate obligations of customary international law.
The Constitution does not allude to such power, but it is inconceivable that
the Constitution intended to make it impossible or impermissibleunconstitutional-for the United States to violate a treaty or other international obligation.
Louis Henkin, InternationalLaw As Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1555,
1568 (1984). But seeJay, supra note 167, at 833-34 ("[Ilt is hard to imagine how or
why the Framers might have resolved a putative question of who in the government
could violate the law of nations since the dogma was that no one could.").
27"The leading act of state cases expressly acknowledge that although "the courts
of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another
done within its own territory," Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1857)
(emphasis added), the sovereign itself is free to redress grievances arising from such
acts "through the means open to be availed of by sovereign powers as between
themselves." Id. In the United States, the political branches, rather than the
judiciary, are ordinarily thought to possess "the sovereign power of the nation." See
The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 146, discussed infra notes 283-308 and
accompanying text.
276 Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 418 (quoting Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297,
304 (1918) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
277 In United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610 (1818), the Supreme Court
suggested, in an analogous context, that
such questions are generally rather political than legal in their character.
They belong more properly to those who can declare what the law shall be;
who can place the nation in such a position with respect to foreign powers
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One might think Sabbatino a poor case by which to demonstrate
the perils of thejudiciary's departure from the act of state doctrine.
After all, the political branches had already expressed their
displeasure with Cuba by reducing its sugar quota and condemning
its confiscation of American-owned companies. 7
In addition,
following the Supreme Court's decision in Sabbatino, Congress
enacted the second Hickenlooper amendment, which both limited
the general availability of the act of state doctrine and applied
retroactively to defeat Cuba's claim on remand.27 9 In hindsight,
then, the federal courts' failure to adhere to the act of state
doctrine might have offended Cuba, but it would not have been
obviously inconsistent with subsequent expressions of United States
foreign policy.
Hindsight, however, cannot be the measure of judicial interference with foreign relations. It is difficult, if not impossible, for
courts to predict with precision whether a decision to invalidate a
foreign act of state will ultimately further or impede the conduct of
foreign affairs. More fundamentally, however, the decision is not
theirs to make. The Supreme Court has long recognized that
whether and how to retaliate against a foreign sovereign for "its
unjust proceedings towards our citizens, is a political not a legal
measure.""' As Chief Justice Marshall explained in The Nereide:
It is for the consideration of the government not of its Courts.
The degree and the kind of retaliation depend entirely on
considerations foreign to this tribunal. It may be the policy of the

nation to avenge its wrongs in a manner having no affinity to the
injury sustained, or it may be its policy to recede from its full
rights, and not to avenge them at all. It is not for its Courts to
interfere with the proceedings of the nation and to thwart its
28

views.

1

as to their own judgment shall appear wise; to whom are entrusted all its
foreign relations; than to that tribunal whose power as well as duty is confined to the application of the rule which the legislature may prescribe for it.
Id. at 634 (discussing "the conduct which must be observed by the courts of the
Union towards the subjects" "of a part of a foreign empire, which asserts, and is
contending
for its independence").
278
See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 402-03.
279 See Foreign Assistance Act of 1964 (Hickenlooper Amendment), Pub. L. No.
88-633, sec. 301(d)(4), § 620(e)(2), 78 Stat. 1009, 1013 (1964) (codified as amended
at 22 U.S.C. § 23 7 0(e) (1994)); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166 (2d Cir.
1967).
2' The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 422 (1815).
281Id.
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In short, the constitutional structure precludes both federal and
state courts from invalidating acts taken by foreign sovereigns
within their own territory because the Constitution commits to the
political branches alone the decision whether and how to respond
282
to such acts.
2. The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon:
An Historical Example
The Supreme Court's decision in The Schooner Exchange v.
McFaddon28 3 provides another opportunity to reconceptualize a
rule of decision based on traditional principles of the law of nations.
This case involved the rule that "a public armed ship, in the service
of a foreign sovereign ....

[is generally] exempt from the jurisdic-

tion of the country."2 4 Although The SchoonerExchange was decided
well before the rise of modern federal common law, the rule it
applied would undoubtedly be regarded today-like the act of state
doctrine following Sabbatino-as "federal judge-made law."
The case began on August 24, 1811, when McFaddon filed a
libel against the Schooner Exchange in the United States District
Court for the District of Pennsylvania, seeking judicial restoration
285
of the ship on the ground that he was its rightful owner.
McFaddon alleged that, while sailing from Baltimore to Spain, the
ship was "violently and forcibly taken by certain persons, acting
under the decrees and orders of NAPOLEON, Emperor of the
French," in violation of the law of nations. 286 Following its capture, the ship was refitted as an armed public vessel of France, and
"having encountered great stress of weather upon the high seas, was
compelled to enter the port of Philadelphia, for refreshment and re1
pairs."287
McFaddon attached the vessel and sought its return.
France registered a protest through diplomatic channels, and the
United States Attorney for the District of Pennsylvania, "at the
instance of the executive department of the government of the
United States," denied the substance of the allegations on behalf of
282 See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 436 ("If the political branches are unwilling to

exercise their ample powers to effect compensation, this reflects ajudgment of the
national interest which thejudiciary would be ill-advised to undermine indirectly.").

" 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
28 Id. at 147.
28 See id. at 117.
286 Id.
28

1 Id. at 118.
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France.8 8 Although the district court dismissed the suit, the
circuit court reversed, and the United States Attorney took an
immediate appeal to the Supreme Court.8 9
It is difficult to overstate the importance of this case at the time.
The question presented was "the very delicate and important
inquiry, whether an American citizen can assert, in an American
court, a title to an armed national vessel [of a foreign sovereign],
found within the waters of the United States."29 The circuit court
permitted such a claim, which prompted the United States Attorney
to argue that "[i]f the courts of the United States should exercise
such a jurisdiction, it will amount to a judicial declaration of
war."291 At the time of the circuit court's decision, the United
States was on the brink of war with England and could hardly afford
war with France as well. For this reason, the Attorney General
requested, and the Supreme Court ordered, that this case be heard
"in preference to other causes which stood before it on the
292
docket."
On the merits, the Supreme Court reversed and held that
a public armed ship, in the service of a foreign sovereign, with
whom the government of the United States is at peace ....must
be considered as having come into the American territory, under
an implied promise, that while necessarily within it, and demeaning herself in a friendly manner, she should be exempt from the
293
jurisdiction of the country.
Chief Justice Marshall's opinion relied heavily on traditional
principles of the law of nations. Reasoning from "the usages and
received obligations of the civilized world," 294 the Court concluded that a public armed ship possesses an "implied license" to
enter a friendly port "exempt[] from the jurisdiction of the
sovereign, within whose territory she claims the rites of hospitali29 5
ty."
2
88 Id.
289

See id. at 119-20.

290Id. at 135.
291Id. at 126.
' Id. at 116. The circuit court ruled in favor of the libellants on October 28,
1811. The Supreme Court heard oral argument on February 24, 1812 and handed
down its opinion a week later on March 3, 1812. See id. at 120.

11 Id. at 147.
29'
29

Id. at 137.
Id. at 144.
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The Court did not hold, however, that the mere existence of this
implied "principle of public law" prevented the United States from
denying immunity to such vessels. 29 6 To the contrary, the Court
expressly acknowledged that "[w]ithout doubt, the sovereign of the
place is capable of destroying this implication . .. [by] claim[ing]
and exercis[ing] jurisdiction." 29 7 The question to be decided,
therefore, was whether "the sovereign" of the United States had
claimed or exercised jurisdiction "either by employing force, or by
subjecting such vessels to the ordinary tribunals."2 M The Court
found that "the sovereign power of the nation" had not done so, or,
more precisely, that it had not done so "in a manner not to be
misunderstood."2 9 9 Thus, the Court held that the circuit court
erred in subjecting the Exchange to jurisdiction.
The application of the proposed criteria to the rule of decision
used in The Schooner Exchange is similar to the application of these
criteria to the act of state doctrine. The first criterion is satisfied
because the matter in question-whether a public armed ship, in the
service of a foreign sovereign, is subject to judicial process-appears
to fall beyond the legislative competence of the states. This
question is intimately bound up with the conduct of foreign

'9 Rules derived from the law of nations were not considered to be binding of
their own force. Rather, the nations of "the civilized world" were assumed to have
agreed implicitly to adhere to such law because of the "common interest impelling
them to mutual intercourse, and an interchange of good offices with each other." Id.
at 137.
17 Id. at 146. Under first principles of the law of nations, each sovereign "possess[ed] equal rights and equal independence" and thus remained free to adhere to,
or depart from, the law of nations as it saw fit. See id. at 136. To be sure, a nation's
departure from the law of nations might adversely affect its relations with other
nations, but such consequences did not affect its ability to do so.
2 Id. at 146.
Id. In effect, the Court adopted a plain statement requirement. Although
acknowledging "[t]hose general statutory provisions ... which give an individual
whose property has been wrested from him, a right to claim that property in the
courts of the country in which it is found," the Court concluded that such provisions
"ought not.., to be so construed, as to give [the judicial tribunals] jurisdiction in a
case, in which the sovereign power has impliedly consented to waive itsjurisdiction."
Id.; see also Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 120 (1804)
("The American citizen who goes into a foreign country, although he owes local and
temporary allegiance to that country, is yet, if he performs no other act changing his

condition, entitled to the protection of his own government . .

. .");

Ralph G.

Steinhardt, The Role of InternationalLaw As a Canonof Domestic Statutory Construction,
43 VAND. L. REV. 1103, 1143 (1990) (stating that The Schooner CharmingBetsy "limits
the application of domestic statutes in extraterritorial concerns").
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relations, an area committed under the constitutional structure to
exclusive federal control. 30 0
The second criterion is also satisfied. Given the nature and
source of the rule, its application does not require courts to engage
01
in improper judicial lawmaking."
Moreover, as in the case of the
act of state doctrine, judicial application of the rule appears to be
required to implement the Constitution's allocation of exclusive
authority over foreign affairs to the political branches of the federal
government. Under these circumstances, neither federal nor state
courts possessed constitutional authority to depart from the
30 2
rule.
In establishing the structural allocation of power required by the
second criterion, The Schooner Exchange raises the rather complex
question of which branch of government exercises the sovereign
power of the United States in the context of this case. Although the
Court did not attempt to resolve all facets of this question, it did
make clear that the Constitution assigns exclusively to the political
branches the sovereign power to "avenge wrongs committed by a
sovereign. " ' °3 "[T]he questions to which such wrongs give birth,
" See supra notes 237-52 and accompanying text.
"0'See supra notes 195-209 and'accompanying text.
" The Schooner Exchange well illustrates Professor Jay's observation that the
Constitution's allocation of power over foreign affairs "must be interpreted in light
of America's status in the world" at the time the Constitution was drafted and
ratified. Jay, supra note 167, at 821. "America was, after all, a weak power with an
unproven government, operating in a world in which warfare was a common form of
dispute resolution and a principal element of the international aspirations motivating
many nations." Id. The founders were keenly aware of these facts. A principal
defect of the Articles of Confederation was the lack of any centralized authority over
foreign affairs, and the ability of the states "by their conduct [to] provoke war without
controul." James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (May 29, 1787),
in I Farrand, supra note 61, at 19; see also James McHenry, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (May 29, 1787), in 1 Farrand, supra note 61, at 24-25 (noting that the
confederation "cannot punish" "a State [for] acts against a foreign power contrary to
the laws of nations" and "therefore cannot prevent a war");Jay, supra note 167, at 825
("One of the main reasons for convening the Philadelphia Convention in 1787 was
the transgression of [the law of nations] by various states."). The founders sought to
remedy that defect by vesting complete control over foreign relations in the hands of
the federal government generally, and in Congress and the president specifically.
Their rationale was simple. Neither the states nor the unelected federal judiciary
should be in a position to "'imperil the amicable relations between governments and
vex the peace of nations,'" Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 418 (quoting Oetjen v. Central
Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 304 (1918) (internal quotation marks omitted)). See THE
FEDERALIST No. 80, supra note 201, at 476 (stating that "[t]he Union will undoubtedly
be answerable to foreign powers for the conduct of its members," and that some
departures from the law of nations are "classed among the just causes of war").
"1 The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 146. The Court drew a sharp
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are rather questions of policy than of law," and accordingly "are for
diplomatic, rather than legal discussion."304 Should diplomatic
efforts fail, the sovereign remains free to "claim and exercise
jurisdiction, either by employing force, or by subjecting such vessels
to the ordinary tribunals."3 05 Significantly, all of these means
contemplate action by the political branches rather than the
0
judiciary."
' Because the political branches had taken neither step
in this case, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's assertion
of jurisdiction over the Exchange in contravention of the law of
nations,3 0 7 and agreed, at least in principle, with the United States
Attorney's argument that the judiciary's "exercise [of] jurisdiction
upon subjects of this nature... [would] absorb all the functions of
government, and leave nothing for the legislative or executive
departments to perform.""0 '

distinction between "thejudicial power"-which cannot"enforce its decisions in cases
of this description"-and "the sovereign power of the nation"-which "is alone
competent to avenge wrongs committed by a sovereign." Id.
"4 Id.
305 Id.

" Putting the judiciary aside, "no provision of the Constitution conclusively
resolves any question about the extent of powers given by the Constitution to
Congress or the executive over matters touching on the law of nations." Jay, supra
note 167, at 834. In The Schooner Exchange, the Court appears to have rejected
Attorney General Pinkney's position that "the executive department . . . alone
represents the sovereignty of the nation in its intercourse with other nations." 11
U.S. (7 Cranch) at 132. Indeed, two years later, the Court suggested that the exercise
of sovereign prerogatives "is proper for the consideration of the legislature, not of
the executive or judiciary." Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 129
(1814). For purposes of this Article, the important point is that neither case suggests
that the judiciary may unilaterally exercise "the sovereign power of the nation." The
Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 146.
7
..
See The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 147; see also The Nereide, 13
U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 423 (1815) ("If it be the will of the government to apply to Spain
any rule respecting captures, which Spain is supposed to apply to us, the government
will manifest that will by passing an act for the purpose. Until such an act be passed,
the court is bound by the law of nations, which is a part of the law of land.").
"s' The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 126. There was no suggestion in
The SchoonerExchange that the federal courts were obligated to apply state law to the
case. To the contrary, state law was inapplicable because the matter in question was
intimately tied to the conduct of foreign relations-an area beyond the legislative
competence of the states. Similarly, had this case arisen in state court-an impossibility given the federal courts' exclusivejurisdiction over prize cases, see infra notes 51630 and accompanying text-a state court would have been required to apply the
immunities conferred by the law of nations notwithstanding contrary state law.
Failure to do so would have encroached upon exclusive federal power over foreign
affairs.
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In sum, rules of decision like those applied in Sabbatino and The
Schooner Exchange are binding in both federal and state courts, not
because they are "federal judge-made law" and thus constitute "the
supreme Law of the Land," but because the judiciary's failure to
apply them would interfere with powers assigned by the Constitution exclusively to the political branches of the federal government.
Classifying these rules as "federal common law" not only is
inaccurate, but also serves to obfuscate the constitutional basis for
judicial adherence to such rules. Worse, such characterizations cast
doubt on the constitutional legitimacy of the rules themselves by
raising federalism and separation of powers concerns that more
appropriately apply to federal common law rules that either concern
matters within the legislative competence of the states or are
unnecessary to implement a basic feature of the constitutional
scheme, such as the political branches' exclusive authority, to
conduct foreign affairs.
III. FURTHER APPLICATION OF THE PROPOSED APPROACH

This Part attempts to reinterpret what are currently thought to
be several additional enclaves of federal judge-made law in light of
the proposed approach. The enclaves considered here roughly
correspond to several of the jurisdictional grants set forth in Article
III. These enclaves consist of rules governing "Cases affecting
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls," "Controversies
between two or more States," "Cases of admiralty and maritime
Jurisdiction,"309 and cases concerning "the rights and obligations
3 10
of the United States."
A. Cases Affecting Ambassadors
Before turning to the jurisdictional grants that traditionally have
been associated with the creation of federal common law, this
section briefly examines one Article III grant that has not been
thought to implicate such law. Strictly speaking, "Cases affecting
Ambassadors," within the meaning of Article III, are not governed
by federal comnhion law. Rather, such cases are governed by positive
federal law adopted to comply with the United States's obligations
under the law of nations. Yet, historically, such law has not

309 U.S. CONST. art. III,

§ 2.

...
Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981).
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encompassed all questions relating to foreign diplomats. In some
cases, courts have had to look to the law of nations directly to
ascertain the governing rules of decision. In such cases, the law of
nations applied not as a matter of federal common law, but as a
means of implementing the constitutional allocation of power
between the federal government and the states, on the one hand,
and between the political branches and the courts, on the other.
Article III extends the judicial power "to all Cases affecting
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls" and specifies that
"the Supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction" in such
cases."' This provision is limited to cases affecting "diplomatic
and consular representatives accredited to the United States by
foreign powers";"'2 it does not encompass cases affecting diplomats
accredited from one foreign country to another traveling through
the United States.
The Supreme Court has had no occasion to develop a "federal
common law" of diplomatic immunity in the course of deciding
"Cases affecting Ambassadors" under Article III because the First
Congress acted swiftly to confer broad statutory immunity from suit
on diplomats accredited to the United States."13 Diplomats in
transit, by contrast, were accorded no special privileges or immunities by positive federal law until the enactment of the Diplomatic
Relations Act of 1978.314 Nevertheless, diplomats in transit were
not without protection. Their treatment by the courts provides
insight into the application of the proposed reinterpretation of
federal common law. As discussed below, the law of nations
required the United States (and therefore its courts) to accord all
foreign ambassadors diplomatic immunity. Had Congress failed to
establish this immunity by statute, the Constitution's allocation of
s1 U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2.
Exparte Gruber, 269 U.S. 302, 303 (1925); see also Bergman v. De Sieyes, 71 F.
Supp. 334, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 1946), affid, 170 F.2d 360 (2d Cir. 1948).
313 See infra notes 315-29 and accompanying text.
s..
By enacting the Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-393, 92 Stat.
808 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 254a-254e (1994)), Congress adopted in its
entirety the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. Article 40 of the
Convention extends immunity to diplomatic agents and their families in transit. See
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, art. 40, 23 U.S.T. 3227,
500 U.N.T.S. 95, 118; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES § 461 (1987) ("A state is not immune from the jurisdiction to
prescribe of another state, except to the extent provided in respect of diplomatic and
consular activities .... ").
312
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power over foreign affairs would have required federal and state
courts to recognize the full scope of such immunity.
Congress implemented jurisdiction over "Cases affecting
Ambassadors," within the meaning of Article III, by enacting the
Judiciary Act of 1789.'
Section 13 of the Act provides that the
Supreme Court
shall have exclusively all such jurisdiction of suits or proceedings
against ambassadors, or other public ministers, or their domestics,
or domestic servants, as a court of law can have or exercise
consistently with the law of nations; and original, but not exclusive
jurisdiction of all suits brought by ambassadors, or other public
3 6
ministers, or in which a consul, or vice consul, shall be a party. ,
The relevant portions of Article III (and presumably of the Judiciary
Act) were adopted "in view of the important and sometimes delicate
nature of our relations and intercourse with foreign govern3 17

ments."

The law of nations conferred broad immunity from suit upon
ambassadors as the official representatives of foreign sovereigns in
the United States. According to Blackstone:
The rights, the powers, the duties, and the privileges of ambassadors are determined by the law of nature and nations, and not by
any municipal constitutions. For, as they represent the persons of
their respective masters, who owe no subjection to any laws but
those of their own country, their actions are not subject to the
control of the private law of that state wherein they are appointed
to reside." 8
The Judiciary Act attempted to ensure that the United States would
adhere to this immunity by drawing a distinction between suits
against ambassadors and suits by ambassadors.3 19 This distinction
31-Ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
$16 § 13, 1 Stat. at 80-81 (emphasis added).
317 Ex parte Gruber, 269 U.S. 302, 303 (1925).
318 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 74, at *253; see also Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14
U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304,335 (1816) ("[A]mbassadors, other public ministers, and consuls
... are emphatically placed under the guardianship of the law of nations .... ").
319 The Act also drew a distinction between ambassadors and other public
ministers, on the one hand, and consuls and vice consuls, on the other. Suits against
the former were committed to the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, whereas suits brought by or against the latter were left to the original, but not
exclusive,jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. See § 13, 1 Stat. at 80. This dichotomy

was likewise drawn from the law of nations:
A consul is not entitled, by the law of nations, to the immunities and
privileges of an ambassador or public minister. He is liable to civil suits,
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was necessary because the law of nations regarded even the
assertion of jurisdiction over a foreign ambassador as an affront to
his sovereign.. 20 The Judiciary Act specifically sought to avoid
such transgressions by both excluding the lower federal courts and
the state courts from exercising jurisdiction over "suits or proceedings against ambassadors," and conferring upon the Supreme Court
only "such jurisdiction ... as a court21of law can have or exercise
consistently with the law of nations."
In addition to these jurisdictional restrictions, Congress passed
the Crimes Act of 1790, which provided in pertinent part:
That if any writ or process shall at any time hereafter be sued

forth or prosecuted by any person or persons, in any of the courts
of the United States, or in any of the courts of a particular state,
... whereby the person of any ambassador or other public
minister of any foreign prince or state, authorized and received as
such by the President of the United States.... may be arrested or
imprisoned, or his or their goods or chattels be distrained, seized

or attached, such writ or process shall be deemed and adjudged to
be utterly null and void .... 322
The Act further provided that those who prosecute, solicit, or
execute any such writ or process, "being thereof convicted, shall be
deemed violaters of the laws of nations, and disturbers of the public
repose, and imprisoned not exceeding three years and fined at the
323
discretion of the court."
These provisions "were drawn from the statute 7 Anne, c. 12,
which was declaratory simply of the law of nations," and which "was
passed in consequence of the arrest of an ambassador of Peter the

like any other individual, in the tribunals of the country in which he resides;
and may be punished in its courts for any offence he may commit against
its laws.
Gittings v. Crawford, 10 F. Cas. 447, 451 (C.C.D. Md. 1838) (No. 5465) (Taney, C.J.);
see also The Anne, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 435, 445 (1818) ("A consul, though a public
agent, is supposed to be clothed with authority only for commercial purposes.").
-2o See Dickinson, supra note 164, at 30; see also Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S.
(1 Wheat.) at 335 (noting that cases affecting ambassadors "affect not only our
internal policy, but our foreign relations").
321§ 13, 1 Stat. at 80.
32 Crimes Act of 1790, ch. 9, § 25, 1 Stat. 112, 117-18.
323§ 26, 1 Stat. at 118 (emphasis added). The Act also provided "[t]hat if any
person.., shall assault, strike, wound, imprison, or in any othermanner infractthe law
of nations, by offering violence to the person of an ambassador or other public
minister, such person so offending, on conviction, shall be imprisoned not exceeding
three years, and fined at the discretion of the court." § 28, 1 Stat. at 118 (emphasis
added).
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Great for debt, and the demand by the Czar that the sheriff of
Middlesex and all others concerned in the arrest should be
punished with instant death." 24 Under the law of nations, "[t]he
person of a public minister is sacred and inviolable" because if "his
freedom of conduct is taken away, the business of his sovereign
cannot be transacted, and his dignity and grandeur will be tarnished." 25 Thus, it was apparently not enough for Congress to
rely upon the judiciary to decline jurisdiction in appropriate cases.
Congress took additional steps to punish and deter both public and
private actors from engaging in conduct that would interfere with
the privileges and immunities of ambassadors and public ministers. 2 6 As Justice Washington subsequently recognized, "[a]
neglect, or refusal to perform this duty might lead to retaliation
3 27
upon our own ministers abroad, and even to war."
The Crimes Act of 1790 had its intended effect: "[T]here do not
appear to have been any cases brought successfully within [the
Supreme Court's] exclusive original jurisdiction" against ambassadors or other public ministers. 21 More importantly for purposes
524 In re Baiz, 135 U.S. 403, 420 (1890); see also 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 74, at
*255 (stating that "[t]o satisfy... the clamors of the foreign ministers,... as well as
to appease the wrath of Peter," following the arrest of"an ambassador from Peter the
Great ... in London for a debt of fifty pounds which he had there contracted," "a bill
was brought into parliament, and afterwards passed into a law, to prevent and punish
such outrageous insolence for the future").
s Republica v. De Longchamps, I U.S. (1 Dal].) 111, 116-17 (1784).
5
See United States v. Ortega, 27 F. Cas. 359, 360 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1825) (No.
15,971) (Washington, J.) ("[T]he government of the United States, like that of all
civilized nations, is bound to afford redress for the violation of those privileges and
immunities which the law of nations confers upon foreign ministers, and which are
consecrated by the practice of the civilized world."), affid, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 467
(1826)
27 (Washington, J.).

Id.
S28 17 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
3

§ 4050, at

238-39 (1988). There have been, however, at least two cases prosecuted tojudgment
under the Supreme Court's original nonexclusive jurisdiction over suits in which a
consul is a party. See Casey v. Galli, 94 U.S. 673, 681 (1876) (holding an Italian viceconsul who was a stockholder in an insolvent banking association liable to pay the
sum determined by the comptroller); Jones v. Le Tombe, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 384, 385
(1798) (summarizing the Court's decision that a foreign consul was not personally
liable on a bill of exchange, drawn on the public treasury of his government); 17
WRIGHT ET AL., supra, at 240-41. Under the Judiciary Act, the Supreme Court's
jurisdiction over suits involving consuls or vice consuls was largely concurrent with
that of the lower federal courts, which were generally given "jurisdiction exclusively
of the courts of the several States, of all suits against consuls or vice-consuls." Ch. 20,
§ 9, 1 Stat. at 77 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court recognized an implied
exception to exclusive federaljurisdiction in a case in which an American citizen sued
the Vice Consul of Romania for divorce in state court. See Ohio ex rel Popovici v.
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of this Article, Congress's codification and enforcement of the
privileges and immunities of ambassadors and other public
ministers obviated the need for federal courts to undertake an
independent assessment of the law of nations, and thus undoubtedly
preempted the development of "federal common law" under this
29
head of federal jurisdiction.s
Had Congress failed to take the initiative, however, there is a
strong argument that the Constitution would have required both
federal and state courts to recognize the rights of ambassadors
under the law of nations-no less than the act of state doctrine-in
order to avoid interfering with the political branches' conduct of
foreign relations. In this century, such recognition undoubtedly
would have been characterized as an instance of "federal common
lawmaking." Such characterizations, however, would have been both
inaccurate and unnecessary because rules implementing the rights
of ambassadors under the law of nations readily could be reconceptualized under the proposed approach. The first criterion would be
satisfied because such rules directly implicate the United States's
relations with foreign nations-a matter beyond the legislative
competence of the states. The second criterion would also be met
because adherence to such rules is necessary to preserve a basic
feature of the constitutional scheme-the Constitution's separation
and allocation of powers in the field of foreign relations.
It is possible to test this hypothesis in the context of suits
against diplomats accredited by one foreign country to another
traveling through the United States. Such diplomats have never
been considered "Ambassadors, other public Ministers [or] Consuls"
within the meaning of Article III and, until 1978, were accorded no

Agler, 280 U.S. 379, 383-84 (1930) ("If when the Constitution was adopted the
common understanding was that the domestic relations of husband and wife and
parent and child were matters reserved to the States, there is no difficulty in
construing the instrument accordingly.... ."). For insightful criticism of the domestic
relations exception to federal jurisdiction generally, and Popovici specifically, see
Naomi R. Cahn, Family Law, Federalism and the FederalCourts, 79 IowA L. REV. 1073,
1094-1111 (1994).
329 In 1972, the United States became a party to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95, which codified
customary international law regarding the privileges and immunities afforded to the
diplomatic representatives of sovereign states. Congress implemented the provisions
of the Vienna Convention by enacting the Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-393, 92 Stat. 808 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 254a-254e (1994)),
which supersedes the relevant provisions of the Crimes Act of 1790.
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33 0
special privileges or immunities under positive federal law.
Accordingly, diplomats in this position were more likely to be sued,
both in federal and state court. Federal subject matter jurisdiction
rested not on the defendant's status as an "Ambassador," but on the
3 31
existence of foreign diversity.

Bergman v. De Sieyes a3 2 provides an example. The case originated when Bergman sued De Sieyes for deceit in state court and
caused De Sieyes to be "personally served with process in New York,
while on his way to the Republic of Bolivia, to which he had been
accredited as minister by the Republic of France."333 De Sieyes,
a citizen of France, removed the case to federal district court on the
basis of foreign diversity. At the trial level, he defended on the
ground that, as a diplomatic minister en route to his assigned
country, he was "immune from service of civil process in a third
334
country through which he [was] passing on the way to his post."
Because the Crimes Act of 1790 did not apply to diplomats in
transit, the district court looked to the "Law of Nations" to ascertain
"what immunities and privileges are accorded to diplomats" in De
Sieyes's position.33 ' After examining both foreign and domestic
decisions, as well as scholarly treatises on the law of nations, the
district court concluded "that a foreign minister en route, either to
or from his post in another country, is entitled to innocent passage
through a third country," including "the same immunity from the
jurisdiction of the courts of the third country that he would have if
he were resident therein."33 6 Accordingly, the court upheld De
33 7
Sieyes's defense of diplomatic immunity.
The court of appeals affirmed, although on somewhat different
grounds. Chief Judge Learned Hand began his opinion by noting
that jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship and then
addressed an issue that the district court had all but ignored-the
source of law to be applied:
[S]ince the defendant was served while the cause was in the state
court, the law of New York determines its validity, and, although

s" See supra notes 311-14 and accompanying text.
ss1 See U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2 (extending the judicial power to controversies

"between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects").
332 170 F.2d 360 (2d Cir. 1948).
333 Id. at 361.
3" Bergman v. De Sieyes, 71 F. Supp. 334, 334 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).
335
Id. at 335.
sm Id. at 341.
337

See id.
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the courts of that state look to international law as a source of
New York law, their interpretation of international law is controlling upon us, and we are to follow them so far as they have
declared themselves 5 5
Applying state law, the court concluded "that the courts of New
York would today hold that a diplomat in transitu would be entitled
to the same immunity as a diplomat in situ.""'
The Second Circuit's approach draws apparent support from the
Supreme Court's decision in Erie. On its face, Erie states that when
the matter in question-here, the rights of diplomats in transit-is
not "governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress,
the law to be applied .. . is the law of the State.""4 ° Yet, as in the
case of the act of state doctrine, there is good reason to suppose
that the Court was not contemplating diplomatic immunity rules
when it decided Erie.4 1 Unlike the matter at issue in Erie, the rights
of diplomats in transit do not fall within the legislative competence
of the states.
To be sure, the underlying cause of action in
Bergman-deceit-is a matter within the traditional scope of state
34 2
authority, but the defense-diplomatic immunity-is not.
Bergmanh itself hinted at the possibility that deferring to state
court "interpretation[s] of international law"343 might interfere
with federal authority. The court's opinion includes the following
reservation: "Whether an avowed refusal to accept a well-established doctrine of international law, or a plain misapprehension of
it, would present a federal question we need not consider, for

338 Bergman v. De Sieyes, 170 F.2d 360, 361 (2d Cir. 1948). Despite the
unqualified nature of this statement, as discussed below, the court left open the
possibility that state law might not control in all instances. See infra note 344 and
accompanying text.
339 Bergman, 170 F.2d at 363.
s Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
s See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964).
s, See infra notes 345-48 and accompanying text; cf. United States v. Ortega, 24
U.S. (11 Wheat.) 467, 474-75 n.(a) (1826) (reporter's note).
The question as to what is the law by which cases affecting ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, are to be determined in the courts of
the Union, in the absence of any legislative provisions by congress applicable
to the particular case, would lead into too wide a field of discussion to be
embraced by the present note. It is obvious, that the law of nations would,
in some instances, form the rule of decision; in others, such as civil causes
arising out of contract, and questions of property, the laws of the several
states would form the rule ....
Id.
34S Bergman, 170 F.2d at 361.
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neither is present here."34 4 Because New York courts had interpreted international law to confer immunity, the court of appeals
was content to follow their lead.
There were good reasons for the court's concern. A state's
insistence upon applying its law to foreign ambassadors in violation
of "well-established doctrine[s] of international law" would undoubtedly interfere with the United States's conduct of foreign relations.
Such violations are attributable to the United States under international law and could "lead to retaliation upon our own ministers
abroad, and even to war." 4 ' For this reason, states, acting either
through courts or legislatures, lack authority to disavow the rights
of ambassadors under the law of nations because such authority is
necessarily part of the United States's exclusive power over foreign
affairs. 4 Thus, the first of the proposed criteria-that the matter
fall beyond the legislative competence of the states-was satisfied in
Bergman.
The second criterion was also met. As in Sabbatino, the Bergman
court was required to exercise independent judgment to ascertain
and apply a rule of decision that would preserve a basic feature of
our constitutional scheme-the exclusive power of the political
branches to conduct foreign relations. On this occasion, the courts
could prevent interference with the conduct of foreign relations
simply by adopting the rule supplied by the law of nations-that
ambassadors in transit are entitled to the same immunity as that
afforded ambassadors in residence. The decision whether and how
to depart from such law is "a question rather of policy than of
law" 47 and is thus committed to the discretion of the political
branches. 48 Thus, absent contrary direction from the political
344Id.

"' United States v. Ortega, 27 F. Cas. 359, 360 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1825) (No. 15,971),

affd, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 467 (1826).
146 See supra notes 268-71 and accompanying text.
s4' Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 128 (1814); see also The
Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 146 (1812) ("[T]he
questions to which [wrongs committed by a sovereign] give birth are rather questions

of policy than of law . . ").
s..
In the context of diplomatic immunity, Congress has recognized the need for
flexibility in conducting foreign relations by creating a reservation to the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations that permits the President "on the basis of
reciprocity ... [to] specify privileges and immunities ... which result in more
favorable treatment or less favorable treatment than is provided under the Vienna
Convention." Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-393, § 4, 92 Stat. 808,
809 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 254c (1994)); cf. First Nat'l City Bank v.
Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 768 (1972) ("[W]here the Executive Branch,
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branches, the Constitution's separation of powers requires federal
courts to recognize and apply diplomatic immunities recognized by
the law of nations.
Because both of the proposed criteria are met, a federal court's
application of international law in contravention of a state court's
past "avowed refusal" to follow, or "plain misapprehension" of, such
law would not raise significant federalism of separation of powers
concerns. To the contrary, as discussed, a federal court's failure to
recognize and apply diplomatic immunity would usurp the exclusive
power of the political branches to conduct foreign affairs.
For similar reasons, a state court's "avowed refusal" to follow
well-established principles of diplomatic immunity arguably would
present a federal question subject to the Supreme Court's appellate
jurisdiction. 49
States have no authority to refuse to accord
ambassadors the privileges and immunities recognized under
international law. Such an "avowed refusal" would encroach upon
exclusive federal authority over foreign affairs.
Whether a state court's "plain misapprehension" of the rights of
ambassadors in transit presents a federal question is a more difficult
question. It is one thing to say that state courts must interpret and
apply international law in this context; it is quite another to say that
state courts must defer to the federal courts' interpretation of such
law. State courts generally have concurrentjurisdiction over federal
question cases350 and are entitled to exercise independent judgment when interpreting and applying federal law, subject to

charged as it is with primary responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs, expressly
represents to the Court that application of the act of state doctrine would not
advance the interests of American foreign policy, that doctrine should not be applied
by the courts.").
"' Under the proposed reconceptualization, a foreign ambassador's assertion of
diplomatic immunity under well-recognized principles of international law would
arguably constitute a "title, right, privilege, or immunity ... specially set up or
claimed under the Constitution" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (1994).
Although the Constitution is not itself the source of the particular rules of immunity
in question, the constitutional allocation of power over foreign affairs arguably
requires state and federal courts to apply such rules in the absence of positive federal
law. Therefore, refusal to apply such rules appears to present a federal question.
" See, e.g., Grubb v. Public Util. Comm'n, 281 U.S. 470, 476 (1930) ("[T]he state
and federal courts have concurrentjurisdiction of suits of a civil nature arisingunder
the Constitution and laws of the United States.... ."); Gerald Gunther, Congressional
Power to CurtailFederalCourtJurisdiction: An OpinionatedGuide to the OngoingDebate,
36 STAN. L. REV. 895, 920 (1984) (stating that Congress has the power to rely "on the
state courts to enforce federal rights, part of their traditional, originally contemplated
role").
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appellate review by the Supreme Court."' To the extent that state
courts also have jurisdiction over cases likely to implicate the law of
nations, it is difficult to see why such courts are not likewise entitled
to exercise independentjudgment in ascertaining and applying that
law, even if the result is a plain mistake. When such cases fall
within the jurisdictional categories set forth in Article III, Congress
has power to subject them (like federal question cases) to appellate
review by the Supreme Court 35 2 and, if necessary, to vest concurrent (or even exclusive) jurisdiction in the lower federal courts.353
In addition, as the Crimes Act of 1790 demonstrates, Congress
always has the option of enacting rules vital to foreign relations into
positive federal law. Such law would unquestionably bind the states
as the "supreme Law of the Land." 5 4 These devices generally
provide ample means to correct or prevent a state court's "plain
355
misapprehension" of relevant principles of international law.
ss' See 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (1994); 16 WRICIrr

ET AL., supra note 328,

§ 4006, at

544.
s'2 Article III provides, for example, that the Supreme Court shall have appellate
jurisdiction in controversies "between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign
States, Citizens or Subjects." See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
'' See Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 187-88 (1943) ("Congressional power to
ordain and establish inferior courts includes the power 'of investing them with
jurisdiction either limited, concurrent, or exclusive .... .'" (citations omitted)). Under
the Judiciary Act of 1789, for example, the circuit courts were given "original
cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several States, of all suits of a civil
nature at common law or in equity, where ... an alien is a party." Ch. 20, § 11, 1

Stat. 73, 78.
35 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. Congress in fact enacted legislation governing the
application of the act of state doctrine following the Supreme Court's decision in
Sabbatino. See Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-633, sec. 301(d)(4),
§ 620(e)(2), 78 Stat. 1009, 1013 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 23 70(e)(2)
(1994)) ("[N]o court in the United States shall decline on the ground of the federal
act of state doctrine to make a determination on the merits giving effect to the
principles of international law in a case in which a claim.., is asserted by any party
including a foreign state... based upon... a confiscation or other taking... by an
act of that state in violation of the principles of international law.... ."). The political
branches could also adopt treaties that would bind the states. See Missouri v.
Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920) ("No doubt the great body of private relations
usually fall within the control of the State, but a treaty may override its power.").
s" Bergman v. De Sieyes, 170 F.2d 360, 361 (1948). A state court's "plain
misapprehension" of international law is arguably less intrusive of federal authority
than is "an avowed refusal" to follow such law. On the one hand, some degree of
misinterpretation is inherent in adjudication. No court can be correct 100% of the
time. On the other hand, as Erie recognizes, a state court's departure from
traditionaljudicial doctrines is sometimes a means by which the state makes state law.
See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text. Because the states lack legislative
competence over foreign affairs, state lawmaking in the guise of misinterpretation
would be constitutionally problematic. Ascertaining the line between (mis)interpre-
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B. ControversiesBetween Two or More States
This section considers the law to be applied in suits between
states. Although, in the modern era, such law has been characterized as federal common law, application of the proposed criteria
suggests that the rules applied in these cases may often be implied
by the constitutional structure. Specifically, many such rules appear
to implement the constitutional equality of the states. After
suggesting how the proposed criteria apply in this context, this
section examines two of the more frequent types of controversies
between states-the location of interstate boundaries and the
apportionment of water from interstate streams-in light of the
proposed approach.
Article III's grant of jurisdiction over "Controversies between
two or more States" has given rise to a significant enclave of
"federal judge-made law."356 The Supreme Court has decided
countless controversies between states, involving a wide range of
issues. Such controversies most often concern the location of
interstate boundaries, 5 7 but have also dealt with such diverse
matters as water rights,3 58 interstate pollution,3 5 9 and the apportionment of public debts. 60
At the outset of every case, the Supreme Court is confronted "by
the question what rule is to be applied." 61
Historically, the
Court's opinions do not reveal a consistent answer. For example,
in an early boundary dispute, the Court simply declared its "power
to decide according to the appropriate law of the case; which
depends on the subject matter, the source and nature of the claims
of the parties, and the law which governs them." 6 ' Subsequently,

tation and lawmaking, however, would impose a difficult, if not impossible, burden
on the federal courts.
s In addition to extending thejudicial power to these controversies, U.S. CONST.
art. III, § 2, cl.1, Article III specifies that "when a State shall be a Party, the supreme
Court shall have original Jurisdiction," U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cI. 2.
s See, e.g., Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657 (1838).
s See, e.g., Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660 (1931).
...See, e.g., Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906).
s See, e.g., Virginia v. West Virginia, 220 U.S. 1 (1911).
'l New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 342 (1931).
s Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 737 (1838) (citation
omitted); see also id. ("[A controversy between states] comes to the court, to be
decided by its judgment, legal discretion, and solemn consideration of the rules of law
appropriate to its nature as ajudicial question, depending on the exercise ofjudicial
power; as it is bound to act by known and settled principles of national or municipal
jurisprudence, as the case requires.").
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the Court emphasized the quasi-sovereign nature of disputes
between states: "Sitting, as it were, as an international, as well as a
domestic tribunal, we apply Federal law, state law, and international
law, as the exigencies of the particular case may demand ....
"13
In the modern era, the Court has characterized rules of decision
that govern disputes between states as "federal common law."
In this context, however, this characterization is largely a
misnomer and serves only to cast unnecessary doubt on the
constitutional legitimacy of the governing rules of decision. For the
most part, the Supreme Court does not in fact devise rules to
resolve controversies between states according to its own standards.
Rather, the Court generally resolves such disputes "on the basis of
equality of right"3 64-a principle inferred from the constitutional
structure and borrowed from background assumptions of the law of
nations.3 65 The approach proposed in Part II goes a long way
toward reconceptualizing rules of this kind. Application of the first
criterion is relatively straightforward. Because the states generally
lack legislative competence to establish rules of decision to govern
disputes among themselves, federalism does not require the
Supreme Court to apply state law to such disputes. 66
The application of the second criterion is more complex.
Congress generally lacks unilateral power to "make compacts
between the States" or "by legislation [to] compel their separate
action."36
Thus, the judiciary's application of "federal judge-

Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125, 146-47 (1902).
ss Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 670 (1931).
5 See infra notes 393-94 and accompanying text.
s See infra notes 373-85 and accompanying text.
s Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 97 (1907). That Congress is an integral part
of one of the methods for resolving interstate disputes-adoption of interstate
compacts-strongly supports the Court's traditional view that Congress lacks power
to resolve such disputes through ordinary legislation. Border disputes-paradigmatic
interstate controversies-illustrate the point. The states can resolve such disputes by
compact or by litigation, but Congress is without power to legislate a new border
between states. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 17 (granting Congress exclusive
legislative power "over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by
Cession ofparticularStates, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the
Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places
purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for
the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings"
(emphasis added)); id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1 ("[N]o new State shall be formed or erected
within theJurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by theJunction of
two or more States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States
concerned.. . ." (emphasis added)); THE FEDERALIST No. 20, at 134-38 (James Madison
'~'

& Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("[A] sovereignty over sovereigns,
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made law" to resolve disputes between states does not threaten to
encroach upon the exclusive authority of a coordinate branch. It
does not follow, however, that the Supreme Court is free "to fashion
the governing rule of law according to [its] own standards." 68 To
the contrary, the rules applied to resolve controversies between
states are designed to further another basic feature of the constitutional structure-the constitutional equality of the states. Although
this approach may at times entail a significant degree of judicial
creativity, that is a function of the founders' decision to assign the
Supreme Court ultimate authority to resolve disputes between states
and to deny Congress and the individual states unilateral authority
to establish binding rules of decision for such disputes.3 69 In this
unique context, therefore, such judicial creativity may be a matter
of constitutional necessity.
The modern approach first appeared in Hinderliderv. La Plata
River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 3 7° an opinion by Justice Brandeis
handed down on the same day as his opinion in Erie. In Hinderlider,
the Supreme Court characterized the apportionment of water in an
interstate stream and the location of an interstate boundary as
"question[s] of 'federal common law' upon which neither the
371
statutes nor the decisions of either State can be conclusive."
Since then, courts and commentators have understood federal
common lawmaking power in these areas to be "inferred from the
jurisdictional grant over interstate controversies. "372 The modern
approach rests on two related propositions. First, state law cannot
provide the rules of decision applicable to disputes between states.
Second, such rules must be supplied by federal courts in the form
of "federal judge-made law."
The first proposition is generally unexceptional. Contrary to
modern accounts, however, this is not because "state competence is

a government over governments, a legislation for communities, as contradistinguished
from individuals, as it is a solecism in theory, so in practice it is subversive of the
order and ends of civil polity.... ."); Hill, supra note 7, at 1070 (stating that "as the
Court has recognized, there is little if anything that Congress can do about tile
historic boundaries of states" (citing Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.)
657, 726-27 (1838))).
" Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363,367 (1943). Such unbridled
judicial lawmaking, even in this unique context, would raise constitutional concerns.
See infra notes 386-92 and accompanying text.
" See supra notes 381-85 and accompanying text.
370 304 U.S. 92 (1938).
371Id. at 110 (citations omitted).
372 HART & WECHSLER, supra note 4, at 884.
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excluded by necessary implication from the constitutional grant of
jurisdiction." 373 Rather, state competence is generally excluded by
broader implications from the constitutional structure. 7 4 Because
states are coequal sovereigns under the Constitution, 7 5 neither
party to an interstate dispute has legislative power to prescribe rules
of decision binding upon the other.17 6 It is immaterial that the
states once may have possessed full rights of sovereignty as "Free
and Independent States," 77 and that, while they enjoyed that
status, controversies between them were "political, and not judicial,
as none but the sovereign [could] settle them." 7' By ratifying the
Constitution, the states ceded important portions of their sovereignty to the federal government. "The traditional methods
available to a sovereign for the settlement of such disputes were
diplomacy and war. "37' The Constitution was specifically designed
to restrict these aspects of state sovereignty. Thus, "[t]he states of
this Union cannot make war upon each other. They cannot 'grant
letters of marque and reprisal.' They cannot make reprisal on each
other by embargo. They cannot enter upon diplomatic relations
and make treaties."380
In place of these rights, the Constitution established two
alternative and exclusive means of resolving controversies between
states. First, the states themselves may voluntarily enter into an
"Agreement or Compact" to resolve their differences, but only with
"the Consent of Congress."38 ' Second, the states may seek judis Hill, supra note 7, at 1031; see also supra note 417 and accompanying text.
Cf Monaghan, supra note 7, at 14 (stating that "interstate dispute cases present
a good example of authority to create federal common law gleaned by implication
from the federal structure of the United States").
s' See infra notes 393-98 and accompanying text.
376 See Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 95 (1907) ("Neither State can legislate for
or impose its own policy upon the other."). This point is perhaps best illustrated in
the context of an interstate boundary dispute. Because a state's "legislative power"
is "co-extensive with its territory," United States v. Bevans, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 336,
387 (1818), "neither state can have any right beyond its territorial boundary," Rhode
Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 733 (1838). See also id. ("[W]hen a
place is within the boundary, it is a part of the territory of a state; title, jurisdiction
and sovereignty are inseparable incidents, and remain so, till the state makes some
cession."). Thus, until the Supreme Court ascertains the boundary, neither state has
a better claim to sovereignty over the disputed area than the other.
377 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 32 (U.S. 1776).
17' Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) at 737.
379 Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 450 (1945).
'0 Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125, 143 (1902) (citation omitted in original); see
also supra note 241 and accompanying text.
-"! U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
374
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cial resolution of their disputes by invoking the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. 8 2 Such jurisdiction "is one of the
mighty instruments which the framers of the Constitution provided so that adequate machinery might be available for the
peaceful settlement of disputes between States."3 8 3 A requirement
that the Court apply state law to controversies between states would
make little sense.384 As the Supreme Court observed, "the interstate... nature of the controversy makes it inappropriate for
state law to control."385 Thus, the Supreme Court's failure to
adhere to state law in this context raises few, if any, federalism
concerns.
The second proposition underlying the modern approach-that
"federal judge-made law" governs controversies between statesraises greater difficulties. Because both states and Congress lack
legislative competence over the transactions that generally give rise
to interstate disputes, courts and commentators are quick to assume
that the law governing these disputes must be "federal judge-made
law."3 8
The difficulty with this conception is that it casts the
Supreme Court in the role of a legislature. Although similar to
traditional separation of powers concerns, the objection is somewhat
different in this context. Given Congress's lack of general legislative
authority, this objection would be based more on limitations
inherent in the nature of an Article III court than on the judiciary's intrusion upon the constitutional authority of a coordinate
branch. 8 7

See id. art. III, § 2.
Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. at 450.
set See Monaghan, supra note 7, at 14 (noting that "it is a basic presumption of the
's

Constitution that the state courts may be too parochial to administer fairly disputes
in which important state interests are at issue"). This is especially true with respect
to the most common source of interstate disputes-the location of interstate
boundaries. Even assuming that state law governed such matters, the Supreme Court
would not be able to decide which state's law to apply without first resolving the
dispute according to some other standard.
' Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981).
386 See, e.g., HART & WECHSLER, supra note 4, at 884 ("[L]aw-making power is
inferred from thejurisdictional grant over interstate controversies andjustified by the
inappropriateness of using any one state's law.").
" Although the Supreme Court does not appear to have declined to adjudicate
any controversies between states on this ground, it is at least theoretically possible
that some potential controversies are nonjusticiable. Cf Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 751-52 (1838) (Taney, C.J., dissenting) ("[T]he powers
given to the courts of the United States by the constitution are judicial powers; and
extend to those subjects only which are judicial in their character; and not to those
which are political."). On the other hand, Article III arguably transforms nonjustici-
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Justice Holmes recognized this difficulty on behalf of the
Supreme Court in Missouri v. Illinois,"'8 an interstate dispute that
arose prior to the Court's apparent embrace of "federal common
law" in Hinderlider. In considering the nature and source of the law
to be applied, the Court stated that, in the absence of positive
federal law, "[t]he only ground on which [a] State's conduct can be
called in question is one which must be implied from the words of
the Constitution.""8 9 Although acknowledging that "[t]he Constitution extends the judicial power of the United States to controversies between two or more States,""' Justice Holmes thought that
"the words of the Constitution would be a narrow ground upon
which to construct and apply to the relations between States the
same system of municipal law in all its details which would be
3 91
applied between individuals."
Justice Holmes' reluctance to embrace open-ended judicial
lawmaking in this context draws support from both federalism and
separation of powers principles. He observed that the Supreme
Court has no power to impose its will upon the states unless the
Constitution empowers it to do so, and stressed that "the fact that
this court must decide [interstate controversies] does not mean, of
92
course, that it takes the place of a legislature."
If the Supreme Court is not at liberty simply to devise federal
common law rules according to its own standards, then how should

able political questions into legal questions by giving the Supreme Court original
jurisdiction over controversies between states. See id. at 737-38 ("The submission by
the ... states, to a court of law or equity, of a controversy between them ... gives
power to decide according to the appropriate law of the case . .. ").
200 U.S. 496, 522-26 (1906) (rejecting Missouri's attempt to restrain Illinois
from discharging sewage into an interstate river, in part, because Missouri permitted
"discharges similar to those of which it complain[ed]" and did not prove that its own
conduct was not the cause).
s9 Id. at 519.
390Id.
391

Id. at 520.

" Id. at 519. Arguablyjudicial lawmaking in this context "invade[s] rights which
... are reserved by the Constitution to the several States." Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64, 80 (1938). Although the states ceded significant portions of their
sovereignty by ad6pting the Constitution, it does not follow that the states-by merely
agreeing to permit the Supreme Court to adjudicate "controversies between states"gave the Court absolute discretion "to fashion the governing rule of law according to
[its] own standards." Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943).
Although the states retain little or no affirmative authority to adopt the governing
rules ofdecision, they arguably retain a negative right not to have their controversies
decided according to "federaljudge-made law." Cf supra notes 54-69 and accompanying text (discussing Erie's conception ofjudicial federalism).
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the Court ascertain the law to be applied to interstate disputes?
The constitutional structure suggests an answer. After achieving
their independence from Great Britain, the states declared themselves to be "Free and Independent States," with "full Power to levy
War, conclude Peace, contract Alliances, establish Commerce, and
to do all other Acts and Things which Independent States may of
right do." 3 ' Under the law of nations, such "Free and Independent States" are entitled to the "perfect equality and absolute
independence of sovereigns." 94 Although the states necessarily
compromised their "absolute independence" by uniting under the
Constitution, it does not follow that they forfeited their "absolute

equality."
To the contrary, the Constitution proceeds on the assumption
that the states are coequal sovereigns within the federal union. For
example, the Constitution guarantees the states equal representation
in the Senate,39 5 and even exempts this feature of the Constitution
In addition, the Supreme
from constitutional amendment.3 96
Court has long recognized as implicit in the constitutional structure
a requirement that new states be admitted on an "equal footing"
with existing states.397 According to the Court, "the constitutional
equality of the States is essential to the harmonious operation of the
398
scheme upon which the Republic was organized."
Reconceptualizing the federal common law of interstate
relations as rules of decision necessary to implement and maintain
the constitutional equality of the states resolves the most serious
constitutional concerns traditionally associated with federal common
law. The structural equality of the states under the Constitution
provides the Court with significant guidance. In some cases, it is
393 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 32 (U.S. 1776).
394 The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 137 (1812).
39- See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 3, cl. I ("The Senate of the United States shall be
composed of two Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof, for six
years; and each Senator shall have one vote.").
s9 See U.S. CONST. art. V (qualifying the amendment procedures with the proviso
that "no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the
Senate").
'9' See, e.g., Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 223 (1845) ("When Alabama
was admittd into the union, on an equal footing with the original states, she
succeeded to all the rights of sovereignty, jurisdiction, and eminent domain which
Georgia possessed at the date of the cession .... ."); Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens
of Equal and TerritorialStates: The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92
COLUM. L. REV. 249, 289 (1992) ("The Supreme Court has long treated the equal
footing doctrine as having constitutional significance. . .
s98Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 580 (1911).
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possible for the Court simply to borrow international law doctrines,
originally developed to implement the "absolute equality" of
sovereign nations. In others, the Court may have to exercise
equitable discretion. In either case, however, the Court's decisions
raise few constitutional difficulties to the extent that they implement the structural equality of the states and reflect the unique
role that the founders assigned to the Supreme Court in this
context.
Controversies between states concerning the location of
interstate boundaries and the apportionment of water in interstate
streams illustrate these points.
Ascertaining the location of
interstate boundaries frequently involves little more than the
interpretation of an authoritative text, such as an historic grant
from the Crown or a subsequent agreement between states.3 99 On
some occasions, however, a question arises that the relevant texts
fail to address. In such cases, the Court frequently turns to
doctrines borrowed from international law for guidance.
For example, in New Jersey v. Delaware,0 0 New Jersey initiated
an action within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to
determine the boundary between the two states in the Delaware Bay
and River. The Supreme Court applied the international law
principle of the Thalweg to resolve the controversy. "The Thalweg,
or downway, is the track taken by boats in their course down the
stream, which is that of the strongest current.""'
Thus, the
doctrine "divides the river boundaries between states by the middle
of the main channel, when there is one, and not by the geographical
40 2
center, halfway between the banks."
International law doctrines like the Thalweg do not apply to
disputes between states of their own force. 4 3 Rather, the Supreme

" See, e.g., New Jersey v. Delaware, 291 U.S. 361, 364-78 (1934) (interpreting a
deed of feoffment delivered to William Penn by the Duke of York on August 24,
1682).
4- 291 U.S. 361 (1934).
401Id. at 379.
4
o' Id. For a very recent application of the Thalweg principle to resolve a dispute
between states, see Louisiana v. Mississippi, 116 S. Ct. 290 (1995).
4' Although international law may have governed disputes between states "[w]hen
independence was achieved," NewJersey v. Delaware, 291 U.S. at 378, international
law has no application to disputes between constituent parts of a larger union. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES § 1

reporter's note 5 (1986) ("A state of the United States is not a 'state' under
international law, since by its constitutional status it does not have capacity to conduct
foreign relations." (citation omitted)). In ascertaining the location of an international
border, by contrast, "the law of nations ... remain in full force" where "[n]o
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Court's application of such doctrines is best understood as an
attempt to "achieve equality" between states.'"
Traditional
doctrines of international law implement the constitutional equality
of the states because they are founded upon the "perfect equality and absolute independence of sovereigns." 4°5 For example, the
Thalweg ensures that nations (and states) divided by bays and rivers
will have equal access to these vital "arteries of trade and travel."4"'
"If the dividing line were to be placed in the centre of
the stream rather than the centre of the channel, the whole track of
navigation might be thrown within the territory of one state to the
exclusion of the other." 407 Thus, it is not surprising that the
Court employs doctrines like the Thalweg to resolve disputes
between states, because such doctrines preserve and implement
408
the constitutional equality of the states.
Controversies between states concerning "the relative rights of
contending States in respect of the use of streams flowing through
them" 4 ' raise distinct considerations. In cases of this nature,
international law provides no ready solution."' Nonetheless, the

subsequent treaty has changed or in any shape regulated the general rights growing
out of the law of nations on this subject." The Fame, 8 F. Cas. 984, 986 (C.C.D. Me.
1822) (No. 4634) (Story,J.).
404 New Jersey v. Delaware, 291 U.S. at 383.
405 The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 137 (1812); see
also U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 1 ("The [United Nations] is based on the principle of the
sovereign equality of all its Members."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 206 (stating that under international law,
a state has "sovereignty over its territory and general authority over its nationals,"
"status as a legal person," and "capacity tojoin with other states to make international
law"); VATrEL, supra note 165, at 57-58.
" New Jersey v. Delaware, 291 U.S. at 381.
407
Id. at 380.
40 In addition to the Thalweg, the Court applies the traditional international law
doctrines of"accretion" and "avulsion" in order to ascertain the location of interstate
boundaries, "where the boundaries ... are, by prescription or treaty, found in
running water." Nebraska v. Iowa, 143 U.S. 359, 361 (1892). "Accretion" refers to
the change in the banks of a river when it "changes its course gradually by alluvial
formations," id. at 360, whereas "avulsion" refers to a "sudden and rapid change" in
the course of a stream from any cause. Id. at 361. The traditional rule of the law of
nations is that "[a]ccretion, no matter to which side it adds ground, leaves the
boundary still the centre of the channel," while "[a]vulsion has no effect on boundary,
but leaves it in the centre of the old channel." Id.
41 Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 670 (1931).
"" Nor is state law to be given controlling weight. See id. (stating that "the laws
in respect of riparian rights that happen to be effective for the time being in both
States do not necessarily constitute a dependable guide or just basis for the decision
of controversies" between states).
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Supreme Court is not without constitutional guidance. In keeping
with the structural equality of the states, the Court resolves "such
disputes ... on the basis of equality of right."4" This means that
the Court "will determine what is an equitable apportionment of the
use of such waters," "having regard to the 'equal level or plane on
which all the States stand, in point of power and right, under our
' 41 2
constitutional system."'
The Supreme Court's adoption of rules to resolve controversies
between states "on the basis of equality of right" raises fewer
constitutional concerns than does the Court's adoption of federal
common law rules according to its own standards. Doctrines
borrowed from the law of nations provide significant constraints on
the Court's "lawmaking" functions in this context.41 3 Moreover,
even when such doctrines are unavailable and the Court must, as a
matter of constitutional necessity, exercise "equitable discretion,"
such discretion is necessarily constrained by important inferences
from the constitutional structure-namely, the constitutional equality
of the states.4 14 For these reasons, the Supreme Court's resolution
of interstate disputes according to the constitutional equality of the
states furthers, rather than impedes, the constitutional structure.

Id.
Id. at 670-71 (quoting Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 465, 470 (1922));
see also NewJersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 343 (1931) (stating that "the effort is
always to secure an equitable apportionment without quibbling over formulas").
411 Cf supra notes 195-209 and accompanying text (discussing application of the
law merchant under Swift).
414 See Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 97 (1907); Monaghan, supra note 7, at 14
("[T]he authority to create federal common law [governing interstate disputes] springs
of necessity from the structure of the Constitution.... ."). The founders were well
aware that the establishment of an effective means of resolving disputes between
states was of paramount importance to the national peace and harmony. When the
Constitution was adopted, "there were existing controversies between eleven states
respecting their boundaries, which arose under their respective charters, and had
continued from the first settlement of the colonies." Rhode Island v. Massachusetts,
37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 723 (1838). The founders regarded territorial disputes as "one
of the most fertile sources of hostility" among states and established the Supreme
Court as an "umpire or commonjudge to interpose between the contending parties."
THE FEDERALIST No. 7, supra note 202, at 60-61. The founders' concerns were not
mere hyperbole. Even in this century, "armed conflicts" between states were only
"narrowly averted." Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574, 580 (1922) (stating that "the
militia of Texas had been called to support the orders of its courts, and an effort was
being made to have the militia of Oklahoma called for a like purpose").
411

41

1
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C. Cases of Admiralty and MaritimeJurisdiction
Perhaps the most extensive modern ericlave of federal common
law consists of rules governing "Cases of admiralty and maritime
Jurisdiction." 415 Today, there is a well-established "tradition of
federal common lawmaking in admiralty."4 16 Under current doctrine, the federal courts' power to formulate and apply federal
common law in such cases is said to be implicit in the jurisdictional
grants set forth in Article III.417 Except for matters governed by
positive federal law, most of the cases adjudicated in the federal
courts' admiralty and maritime jurisdiction are governed by federal
judge-made law. Although federal admiralty courts apply state law
on occasion, in the modern era such law is preempted to the extent
that it "works material prejudice to the characteristic features of the
general maritime law or interferes with the proper harmony and
uniformity of that law in its international and interstate relations." 4I" That approach is difficult to square with the constitutional text and with Erie's holding (in the context of diversity) that
mere jurisdiction to adjudicate a case under Article III does not
confer upon the courts the "power to declare substantive rules of
common law applicable in a State."4 19
Nonetheless, at least some of the federal common law rules
applied in admiralty and maritime cases can be reconceptualized
under the proposed approach. In order to assess these rules
precisely, it is useful to divide cases of admiralty and maritime
415 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2;see DAVIDW. ROBERTSON, ADMIRALTY AND FEDERALISM

140-41 (1970) ("The maritime law is distinguished from other such areas of the law
by reason of the theory that it amounts to a federal corpus oflaw which is in no sense
interstitial, but which is central and rather jealous of usurpation.").

"" American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 114 S. Ct. 981, 989 (1994); see also Yamaha
Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, 116 S. Ct. 619, 620 (1996) (characterizing "the general
maritime law" as "a species ofjudge-made federal common law").
417 See, e.g., HART & WECHSLER, supra note 4, at 883-84 ("Perhaps the most
dramatic [instance of the assumption of law-making power by the federal courts] is
the power to create federal admiralty law implied by Article III's grant of admiralty
jurisdiction .... "); MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE
ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 122 (2d ed. 1990) ("It is well accepted.., that the
provisions of Article III, section 2 of the Constitution extending the federal judicial
power to [admiralty and interstate cases] vest the federal judiciary with authority to
develop its own substantive legal principles in cases falling within these areas."); Field,
supra note 4, at 891 (noting that for admiralty cases and for interstate controversies,
"the Court has found the directive that it create this body of federal common law in
article III's grant of federal judicial power" over such cases).
418 Southern Pac. Co. v.Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 216 (1917).
4 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
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jurisdiction into two historic categories-prize cases and instance
cases. Although today we conceive of "the Constitution's admiralty
clause as a head of jurisdiction over private claims,"42 ° in 1789,
cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction encompassed a much
broader array of disputes. Admiralty was "divisible into two great
branches, one embracing captures, and questions of prize, arising
jure belli; the other embracing acts, torts, and injuries strictly of civil
cognizance, independent of belligerent operations." 421 As Justice
Johnson explained, "[i]n its ordinaryjurisdiction, the admiralty takes
cognizance of mere questions ... arising between individuals; its
extraordinary or prize jurisdiction is vested in it for the purpose of
revising the acts of the sovereign himself performed through the
agency of his officers or subjects."422
Admiralty courts were

"' William R. Casto, The Origins of Federal Admiralty Jurisdiction in an Age of
Privateers,Smugglers, and Pirates, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 117, 154 (1993).
421 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 864 (Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak eds., Carolina Academic Press 1987)
(1833). In fact, according to a report prepared by then-Attorney-General Edmund
Randolph at the request of the House of Representatives, "[c]ases of admiralty and
maritime Jurisdiction" encompassed an even broader array of disputes. These
included the "condemn[ation of] all lawful prizes in time of war," prosecutions under
the "criminal sea law," "offenses on water against the revenue laws and claims for
specific satisfaction on the body of a vessel, as for mariners' wages, &c." See H.R.
REP. 1st Cong., 3d Sess. (Dec. 31, 1790), reprintedin 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS class
10, at 21, 22 (W. Lowrie & W. Franklin eds., 1834) [hereinafter Randolph's Report].
Only the last category corresponds to modern conceptions of private admiralty
litigation. My focus in the text will be on the first and last of these categories.
Randolph's conception of admiralty and maritime cases is consistent with the
original draft of the Virginia Plan that he presented to the Constitutional Convention
in 1787. The Virginia Plan proposed, in pertinent part, to extend the federaljudicial
power to "all piracies & felonies on the high seas, captures from an enemy; [and]
cases . .. which respect the collection of the National revenue." James Madison,
Notes on the Constitutional Convention (May 29, 1787), in 1 Farrand, supra note 61,
at 22. The Convention was initially unable to agree upon a specific delineation of
federal jurisdiction and referred the matter to the Committee of Detail. See
Committee of Detail, Proceedings of the Convention (June 19-July 23, 1787), in 2
Farrand, supra note 61, at 132-33. The Committee "opted for a general admiralty
clause and rejected the drafting strategy of breaking admiralty jurisdiction into
subcategories." Casto, supra note 420, at 135. Randolph's Report indicates that the
effect of the Committee's approach was to expand federal admiralty jurisdiction
beyond the three categories of cases set forth in the Virginia Plan to encompass
"claims for specific satisfaction on the body of a vessel, as for mariners' wages, &c."
as well. Randolph's Report, supra, at 22.
"' Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 241, 282 (1808). For further discussion of
the principles and practices in prize causes, written byJustice Story, see Note-On the
Practicein Prize Causes (1816), 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 494; Additional Note on the Principles
and Practice in Prize Causes (1817), 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) app. at 1. Justice Story's
authorship of the notes is documented in G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT
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denominated "prize courts" when hearing questions of the latter
sort and "instance courts" when hearing claims of the former
4 2
description. 3
This Article considers prize and instance cases separately below.
Properly understood, the rules of decision applied in prize cases do
not constitute "federal judge-made law." Rather, because rules
governing prize cases generally satisfy the criteria proposed in Part
II, they are c6nsistent with the constitutional structure. Recasting
the rules of decision that apply to private maritime claims is more
difficult. Although some of these rules may satisfy the proposed
criteria, many such rules remain constitutionally problematic
because they govern matters within the traditional legislative
competence of the states.
1. Prize Cases
Historically, prize cases were arguably the most important cases
within the federal courts' admiralty and maritime jurisdiction
because they had the greatest potential to affect the public peace.
Under the law of nations, when two powers were at war, each had
the right to make prizes of the ships, goods, and effects of the other
acquired by capture at sea. 424 As a means of augmenting their
military forces, countries encouraged privateers to capture enemy
vessels by permitting them to "obtain title to the seized property,
ship, and cargo, through judicial condemnation carried out by an
admiralty court."4 5 Thus, prize courts played an essential role in
encouraging such captures. Facilitating captures was not the only
function of prize courts. Equally important was the prize courts'
426
power "to regulate the adventurers and to remedy their abuses."

AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815-1835, at 453-54 (1988).
42 See Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 282-83.
424

WAR:

See FRANCIS H. UPTON, THE LAW OF NATIONS AFFECTING COMMERCE DURING
WITH A REVIEW OF THE JURISDICTION, PRACTICE AND PROCEEDINGS OF PRIZE

COURTS 388 app. at 471 (2d ed. New York, John S. Voorhies 1863).
425 Casto, supra note 420, at 124; see also id. ("An effective system of prize courts
encouraged privateering by providing an efficient and lawful procedure for converting
captures into economic gain.").
421 Id. at 125. As Justice Johnson explained in Rose v. Himely:
[A]s every civilized nation pretends to the character ofjustice and moderation, and to have an interest in preserving the peace of the world, they
constitute courts with powers to inquire into the correctness of captures
made under colour of their own authority, and to give redress to those who
have been unmeritedly attacked or injured. These are denominated prize
courts, and the primary object of their institution, is to inquire whether a
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Because "a nation was responsible for the actions of its licensed
adventurers, [and because] the adventurers were not part of the
formal naval establishment and not subject to naval discipline and
chains of command,"42 7 it was essential to the public peace and
the amicable relations of nations that prize courts adhere closely to
the law of nations in performing their functions. 428 As Lord
Mansfield explained:
By the law of nations, and treaties, every nation is answerable to
the other for all injuries done, by sea or land, or in fresh waters,
or in port. Mutual convenience, eternal principles ofjustice, the
wisest regulations of policy, and the consent of nations, have
established a system of procedure, a code of law, and a Court for
the trial of prize. Every country sues in these Courts of the others,
which are all governed by one and the same law, equally known to
each.

42 91

Under the law of nations, the general rule was that "cognizance...
of all questions of prize, and their incidents, belongs exclusively to
430
"If
the courts of the country, to which the captors belong."
justice be there denied, the nation itself becomes responsible to the
parties aggrieved," and the nation to which the aggrieved parties
belong "may vindicate their rights, either by a peaceful appeal to
"4
negotiation, or by a resort to arms. 31

taking as prize, is sanctioned by the authority of their sovereign, or the
unauthorised act of an individual.
8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 282-83.
427 Casto, supra note 420, at 124.
428 See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 335 (1816) ("[T]he
admiralty jurisdiction embraces all questions of prize and salvage, in the correct
adjudication of which foreign nations are deeply interested .... ").
" Lindo v. Rodney, reprinted in LeCaux v. Eden, 99 Eng. Rep. 375, 385 n.1, 388
(K.B. 1781).
" STORY, supra note 421, § 865. The law of nations recognized an exception to
exclusive jurisdiction in the captor's courts where a neutral nation's "sovereign or
territorial rights [we]re violated." Id.; see also The Brig Alerta v. Moran, 13 U.S. (9
Cranch) 359, 365 (1815) (noting the exception based on a country's neutral status).
431 STORY, supra note 421, § 865. The general rule that "all questions of prize...
belong[] exclusively to the courts of the country, to which the captors belong," id., is
closely related to the act of state doctrine in that both doctrines derived from "the
equality of nations" under the law of nations. See Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch)
241, 283 (1808) (Johnson,J, dissenting) (stating that "the propriety of... [a seizure
which a prize court has declared to be the act of its sovereign] may correctly become
the subject of executive or diplomatic discussion; but the equality of nations forbids
that the conduct of one sovereign, or the correctness of the principles upon which
he acts, should be submitted to thejurisdiction of the courts of another");supra notes
258-71 and accompanying text.
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In view of the foregoing, federal jurisdiction over prize cases was
necessary to enable the United States to carry out its obligations
under the law of nations, 3 2 and thus was "a necessary appendage
433
to the power of war, and negotiation with foreign nations."
Without such jurisdiction, the United States "could neither restore
property upon an illegal capture; nor in many cases afford any
43 4
adequate redress for the wrong; nor punish the aggressor."
Leaving such matters to state courts was problematic. Even if state
courts generally performed these duties faithfully, "the peace of the
whole nation might be put at hazard at any time by the misconduct
435
of one of its members.
For these reasons, Article III extended the federaljudicial power
to "all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction," which
encompasses "condemn[ations of] all lawful prizes in time of
war." 43 6 Congress implemented this grant by giving the federal
courts exclusive jurisdiction over prize cases. 437 This allocation
deprived the state courts of any opportunity to affect foreign
relations through the adjudication of prize cases.

432 "The law of nations is the great source from which we derive those rules,
respecting belligerent and neutral rights, which are recognised by all civilized and
commercial states throughout Europe and America." Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar v.
Boyle, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 191, 198 (1815) (Marshall, C.J.).
433 STORY, supra note 421, § 866.
4S4
Id.
411 Id.; see also Randolph's Report, supra note 421, at 22 (stating that concurrent
jurisdiction "might either involve the confederacy in war, contrary to its will, or
subject it to a grievous reparation of some injury"); James Madison, Notes on the
Constitutional Convention (May 29, 1787), in 1 Farrand, supra note 61, at 19
(recounting Edmund Randolph's assertion that one of the principal defects of the
Articles of Confederation was "that particular states might by their conduct provoke
war without controul"); cf La Amistad de Rues, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 385,390-91 (1820)
(stating that failure of"neutral prize tribunals" to exercise theirjurisdiction according
to the law of nations would create "irritations and animosities, and very soon embark
neutral nations in all the controversies and hostilities of the conflicting parties").
4 6
Randolph's Report, supra note 421, at 22; see also Glass v. The Sloop Betsey, 3
U.S. (3 Dall.) 6, 16 (1794) ("[E]very District Court in the United States, possesses all
the powers of a court of Admiralty, whether considered as an instance, or as a prize
court.... .");Jennings v. Carson, 13 F. Cas. 540,542 (D. Pa. 1792) (No. 7281) (stating
that prize authority "is inherent in a court of admiralty; and not lost, but torpid, like
other authorities of the court, when there are no occasions for its exercise"); STORY,
supra note 421, § 863 ("The next clause [of Article III] extends the [federal] judicial
power
'to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.'").
47
1 TheJudiciary Act's "saving to suitors" clause did not disturb the district courts'
"exclusive original cognizance" of prize cases. The "savings" clause did not apply
because "the common law" was not "competent to give" "a common law remedy" in
prize cases. See infra notes 516-30 and accompanying text.
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The significance of the proper disposition of prize cases to the
peace of the Union places Hamilton's famous remarks in The
Federalist in context:
The most bigoted idolizers of State authority have not thus far
shown a disposition to deny the national judiciary the cognizances
of maritime causes. These so generally depend on the laws of
nations and so commonly affect the rights of foreigners that they
fall within the considerations which are relative to the public
48
peace.
"If Hamilton had in mind ordinary private litigation, his conclusory
statement is suspect."43 9 Frequently, such litigation does not even
implicate the rights of citizens from different states, let alone affect
the rights of foreigners. Thus, it is difficult to see how modern
admiralty litigation could ever be thought to threaten "the public
peace." If, on the other hand, Hamilton had in mind prize cases
when he wrote this passage, then his assessment is quite understand44 0
able.
Although federal courts possessed exclusive jurisdiction over
prize cases, these courts faced an important choice-of-law question
at the outset of every case-what is the source of law to govern the
case? In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the Supreme Court's answer was clear. "The court of prize is emphatically
a court of the law of nations; and it takes neither its character nor
its rules from the mere municipal regulations of any country."4 41
Because "[p]rize litigation involving privateers-the epitome of
eighteenth century admiralty jurisdiction-had lapsed into'desuetude
201, at 478. Even George Mason, "one of
the best known 'idolizers of state authority,'" admitted in the Virginia ratifying
convention that the federal courts "'ought to have judicial cognizance in all cases
affecting ambassadors, foreign ministers and consuls, as well as in cases of maritime
jurisdiction.'" Casto, supranote 420, at 137 (quoting 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note
101, at 523).
09 Casto, supra note 420, at 137.
0
438THE FEDERALIST No. 80, supra note

44 FederalistNo. 80 confirms that prize cases were foremost in Hamilton's mind.
In defending Article III's inclusion of "Cases of admiralty and maritimeJurisdiction,"
Hamilton remarked that "[t]he most important part of them are, by the present
Confederation, submitted to federaljurisdiction." THE FEDERALIST No. 80, supranote
201, at 478. The Articles of Confederation, in turn, gave the national judiciary
jurisdiction over "the trial of piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and

...appeals in all cases of captures." ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. 9, § I (U.S.
1778) (emphasis added). The Articles of Confederation made no mention of
admiraltyjurisdiction over private civil claims, which were left to adjudication by state
courts.

...
The Schooner Adeline, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 244, 284 (1815).
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by the end of the nineteenth century,"442 the Supreme Court
never had any occasion to consider whether Erie would require
federal courts to apply state law in prize cases. 4 43 Nonetheless, it
is clear that the Supreme Court did not have rules governing prize
cases in mind when it decided Erie.444 That is not because such
rules constituted "federal judge-made law." Rather, as explained
below, inferences from the constitutional structure required both
federal and state courts to apply these rules in the absence of
contrary direction by the political branches.
The first criterion necessary to reconceptualize federal common
law is satisfied in this context because the rules applicable in prize
cases governed matters beyond the legislative competence of the
states. As discussed above, proper resolution of prize cases was "a
necessary appendage to the power of war, and negotiation with
foreign nations "44 -power committed exclusively to the federal
government. 446 Were the states free to establish rules of decision
in prize cases, and the federal courts bound to apply them, the
states would possess substantial control over the conduct of foreign
relations.
The rules of decision applicable in prize cases also satisfy the
second criterion. In the absence of positive federal law, adherence
to traditional rules drawn from the law of nations in adjudicating
prize cases was necessary to preserve the exclusive authority of the
political branches over foreign affairs. 447 As Hamilton recognized,
prize cases "so generally depend on the laws of nations and so
commonly affect the rights of foreigners that they fall within the
considerations which are relative to the public peace." 448 Under
these circumstances, the decision whether to depart from the law of
442 Casto, supra note 420, at 151-52.
4' Although "[t]he United States did not use privateers after the War of 1812,"
id. at 152, a few prize cases involving captures by the regular Navy continued to be
litigated during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. See id. at 152 n.180;
see also The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900); The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635
(1862); United States v. The Europa, 80 F. Supp. 12 (S.D.N.Y. 1948); Ling v. 1689
Tons of Coal Lying Aboard S.S. Wilhelmina, 78 F. Supp. 57 (W.D. Wash. 1942);
Arinold W. Knauth, Prize Law Reconsidered, 46 COLUM. L. REV. 69, 78-79 (1946)
(identifying 11 prize cases arising during World Wars I and II).
""'Cf Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964) ("It seems
fair to assume that the Court did not have rules like the act of state doctrine in mind
when it decided Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins.").
445 STORY', supra note 421, § 866, at 615.
446 See supra notes 237-52 and accompanying text.
447 See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 427-28; supra notes 268-71 and accompanying text.
448 THE FEDERALIST No. 80, supra note 201, at 478.
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nations in prize cases is "a question[] of policy [rather] than of
law"44 that must be left to the political branches under the
structure of government established by the Constitution.45
45 1
The Supreme Court's decision in The Paquete Habana
illustrates these points. The case involved the United States's
attempt while at war with Spain to condemn "two [Spanish] fishing
vessels and their cargoes as prize of war."4" 2 The Court relied on
a "rule of international law ... that coast fishing vessels ... are
exempt from capture" 453 "to declare and adjudge that the capture
was unlawful, and without probable cause." 45 4 The Court, however, did not adequately explain why international law provided the
governing rule of decision. In a well-known portion of its opinion,
the Court simply declared:
International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained
and administered by the courts ofjustice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly
presented for their determination. For this purpose, where there
is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act of
judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of
civilized nations; and, as evidence of these, to the works ofjurists
and commentators, who by years of labor, research and experience, have made themselves455peculiarly well acquainted with the
subjects of which they treat.
Although courts and commentators have read this passage to mean
that international law is a form of federal law,4 5' application of the
criteria proposed in this Article suggests an alternative interpretation.

...
The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 146 (1812).
" For similar reasons, even if state courts had possessed concurrentjurisdiction
to adjudicate prize cases, they would have been required to apply rules derived from
the law of nations (rather than state law) in order to avoid encroaching upon
exclusive federal authority over foreign affairs. See supra notes 237-52 and
accompanying text.
451

452

175 U.S. 677 (1900).

Id. at 678.
4-3d. at 708.
41 Id. at 714. According to the Court, "[b]y an ancient usage among civilized
nations, beginning centuries ago, and gradually ripening into a rule of international
law, coast fishing vessels, pursuing their vocation of catching and bringing in fresh
fish, have been recognized as exempt, with their cargoes and crews, from capture as
prize
of war." Id. at 686.
45
.
41

Id. at 700.

See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, Federalism, State Authority, and the Preemptive Power of

InternationalLaw, 1994 SuP. CT. REv. 295, 295.
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Whether foreign fishing vessels are subject to capture as prizes
of war is surely a matter beyond the legislative competence of the
states, and thus state law has no application to cases like The Paquete
Habana. Similarly, "the structure of our government" 57 requires
courts to apply the rule that the law of nations supplies "in the absence of any treaty or other public act of their own government in
Whether to depart from a rule of this
relation to the matter."4 5
kind is a question for the political branches rather than the courts
because the decision has obvious implications for foreign affairs. As
the Court recognized in an earlier case, "[t]he rule which we apply
to the [vessels] of our enemy, will be applied by him to the [vessels]
of our citizens."459 In other words, departure from the law of nations in this context could "lead to retaliation upon our own" fishing vessels, 460 and escalate hostilities between the warring parties.
Under the constitutional scheme-which assigns exclusive power
over foreign affairs to the political branches-such consequences
should be brought about, if at all, by the conduct of the political
branches rather than by the decisions of federal or state courts. 61
Accordingly, the international law rules applied in cases like The
Paquete Habana do not constitute federal common law. Rather,
federal courts apply such rules in order to implement the exclusive
power of the political branches to conduct foreign relations.

0" Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 123 (1814).
4' The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 708; see also Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,427-28 (1964) (stating that courts must adhere to the act of
state doctrine in its traditional formulation because it reflects "the proper distribution
of functions between the judicial and political branches of the Government on
matters bearing upon foreign affairs").
459 Brown, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) at 128-29. The question in Brown was very similar
to the question in The PaqueteHabana. Brown considered whether the executive may
confiscate "enemy property[] in our country" "[w]hen war breaks out." Id. at 128.
The Court acknowledged "[t]hat war gives to the sovereign full right to take the
persons and confiscate the property of the enemy wherever found," id. at 122
(emphasis added), but held that until the "will [of the sovereign] shall be expressed,
no power of condemnation can exist in the court." Id. at 123. In reaching this
conclusion, the Court relied expressly on implications "from the structure of our
government." Id. Because the declaration of war did not specifically authorize
confiscation of enemy property, the Court concluded "that the legislature has not yet
declared its will to confiscate property which was within our territory at the
declaration of war." Id. at 129; cf. Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S.
(2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) ("[A]n act of congress ought never to be construed to
violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains . .. ").
"' United States v. Ortega, 27 F. Cas. 359, 360 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1825) (No. 15,971)
(applying law of nations to foreign ambassadors), af'd, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 467 (1826).
"' Cf Brown, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) at 129 (stating that decisions of this kind are
"proper for the consideration of the legislature, not of the executive or judiciary").
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2. Private Maritime Claims
The other "great branch" of admiralty jurisdiction consisted of
*private maritime claims or, as Justice Johnson described them in
1808, "mere questions of meum and tuum arising between individuals."4 62 In the modern era, such questions have come to dominate
the federal courts' admiralty and maritime jurisdiction to the virtual
exclusion of all others.4 63 Yet, as discussed below, the application
of federal common law in these cases is frequently more difficult to
justify.
The following discussion of private maritime claims consists of
three parts. First, this section reviews the nineteenth-century
expansion of the federal courts' admiralty and maritimejurisdiction.
The scope of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction is significant
because, under Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen,4 64 such jurisdiction
generally implies federal common lawmaking power as well.
Second, this section briefly examines the historical purposes behind
admiralty jurisdiction over private maritime claims. It concludes
that these purposes do not suffice to distinguish federal common
lawmaking in private maritime cases from federal common
lawmaking in diversity cases. Third, this section examines the
extent to which federal common law rules governing private
maritime claims can be reconceptualized to avoid constitutional
difficulties under the approach proposed in Part II.

a. The Scope ofJurisdiction over PrivateMaritime Claims
In 1789, the English admiralty courts' jurisdiction over private
claims was "confined to contracts and things exclusively made and
done upon the high seas, and to be executed upon the high
seas."4 65 Two nineteenth-century developments greatly expanded
the federal courts' jurisdiction over private maritime claims. First,
the Supreme Court abandoned the narrow common law conception
462 Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 241, 282 (1808) (Johnson, J., dissenting).

For example, the multivolume treatise Benedict on Admiralty devotes only one
chapter (out of 191) to "prize causes." See 2 BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY ch. 11 (Steven
F. Friedell ed., 6th ed. 1994); see also DavidJ. Bederman, The Feigned Demise of Prize,
9 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 31, 37 (1995) (book review) ("The evidence is, indeed, quite
strong that prize law has passed from the scene, at least in the United States."); Casto,
supra note 420, at 120 (claiming that prize law is "irrelevant to twentieth century
admiralty practice").
414 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
465

De Lovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418, 426 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No. 3776).
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of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction in favor of Justice Story's
broad reading of such jurisdiction to encompass "all maritime
contracts, torts, and injuries."4 6
Second, the Court abandoned
the traditional tidewater doctrine, which limited the exercise of
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction to matters arising on the high
46 7
seas or waters within the ebb and flow of the tide.
The modern expansion of admiralty jurisdiction began with
Justice Story's circuit court opinion in De Lovio v. Boit,4"8 in which
he declared that "whatever may in England be the binding authority
of the common law decisions upon this subject, in the United States
we are at liberty to re-examine the doctrines, and to construe the
jurisdiction of the admiralty upon enlarged and liberal principles."4 69 Discarding "the narrow and perplexed doctrines of the
common law," Justice Story "pronounce[d], that the delegation of
cognizance of 'all civil cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction'
to the courts of the United States comprehends all maritime
contracts, torts, and injuries."4 70 "The latter branch is necessarily
bounded by locality," 471 encompassing occurrences "as well in
ports within the ebb and flow of the tide, as upon the high
seas."4 72 The former branch "extends over all contracts, (whereso-

"' Id. at 444; see Insurance Co. v. Dunham, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 1, 24-29 (1870)
(rejecting the narrow view of admiralty jurisdiction in favor of Justice Story's
approach).
467 See The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 457

(1851).
" 7 F. Cas. 418 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No. 3776).
469 Id. at 441. The English common law held that the admiralty
has no jurisdiction over torts, offences or injuries, done in ports within the
bodies of counties, notwithstanding the places be within the ebb and flow
of the tide; nor over maritime contracts made within the bodies of counties
or beyond sea, although they are, in some measure, to be executed upon the
high seas; nor of contracts made upon the high seas to be executed upon
land, or touching things not in their own nature maritime, such as a
contract for payment of money.
Id. at 426.
171 Id. at 444 (quoting § 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789). The precise question
before the court was whether a policy of insurance was a maritime contract such that
a dispute arising thereunder was properly within the admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction of the federal courts. Needless to say, the court held that it was.
471Id.
47 Id. at 420. In a subsequent case, Justice Story further pronounced that a tort
claim falls within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction when "the tortious act, or
cause of damage, might be properly deemed to arise in port; but it was a continuing
act and cause of damage during the whole voyage." Plummer v. Webb, 19 F. Cas.
891, 893 (C.C.D. Me. 1827) (No. 11,233).
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ever they may be made or executed. .. 4)7which relate to the navigation, business or commerce of the sea."
In Insurance Co. v. Dunham,474 the Supreme Court embraced
Justice Story's "enlarged and liberal" construction of the admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction. 4 5 Although acknowledging the restrictive common law view, the Court agreed with the "more enlarged
view of the subject" espoused in De Lovio.41 6 According to the
Court, Justice Story's "learned and exhaustive opinion... has never
been answered, and will always stand as a monument of his great
477
erudition."
The second major development that expanded the admiralty
jurisdiction was the Supreme Court's decision to abandon the
tidewater doctrine. On this occasion, Justice Story favored the more
restrictive approach. In The Steamboat Thomas Jefferson,47 8 Justice
Story held on behalf of the Court that the federal courts could not
exercise admiralty and maritime jurisdiction over suits arising on
inland waterways beyond the "ebb and flow of the tide." Justice
Story explained,
In respect to contracts for the hire of seamen, the admiralty never
pretended to claim, nor could it rightfully exercise any jurisdiction, except in cases where the service was substantially performed,
or to be performed, upon the sea, or upon waters within the ebb
and flow of the tide. This is the prescribed limit, which it was not
479
at liberty to transcend.
47

De Lovio, 7 F. Cas. at 444. In 1827,Justice Johnson-a well-known opponent
ofJustice Story's efforts to expand the admiraltyjurisdiction-stated that he thought
"it high time to check this silent and stealing progress of the admiralty, in acquiring
jurisdiction to which it has no pretensions." Ramsay v. Allegre, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.)
611, 614 (1827).
474 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 1 (1870).
4 75
De Lovio, 7 F. Cas. at 441.

476 Dunham, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) at 24, 25.
4

77 Id. at 35.

478 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 428 (1825).
479

Id. at 429. It has been suggested that Story's adherence to the tidewater
doctrine was inconsistent with his broad view of admiraltyjurisdiction. See Note, From
Judicial Grant to Legislative Power: The Admiralty Clause in the Nineteenth Century, 67
HARV. L. REV. 1214, 1217 (1954) ("The [ThomasJefferson] case stands virtually alone,
a curious landmark of admiralty abnegation in ajudicial career marked otherwise by
determined support of a broadened scope for the American maritime courts."). Even
Justice Story's opinion in De Lovio, however, acknowledged limitations tied to "the
ebb and flow of the tide." See De Lovio, 7 F. Cas. at 419, 420, 430, 440, 443.
Moreover, Justice Story's embrace of the tidewater doctrine was apparently well
considered and long held. See The Steamboat Orleans v. Phoebus, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.)
175, 183 (1837) (denying jurisdiction because the Orleans was not "substantially
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The Court's decision was consistent with English precedent. 80
The tidewater doctrine, however, was short lived.
In The
Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh,4 81 the Supreme Court overruled
The Thomas Jefferson and held that all "public navigable water,
including lakes and rivers in which there is no tide ....
are within
the grant of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction in the Constitution
of the United States." 482 The Court reasoned that although the
tidewater limitation was appropriate when the Constitution was
adopted, the subsequent expansion of the United States coupled
with "the discovery of steamboats"justified an expanded conception
of the admiralty jurisdiction.4 ' The impact of the Court's decision was enormous.
Commerce and navigation on the inland
waterways were already of "great importance" 484 and were rapidly
expanding. The effect of The Genesee Chief was to permit federal
courts to exercise admiralty and maritime jurisdiction over all
maritime torts and contracts relating to all navigable waterways
within the United States, even those wholly within the territory of
485
the states.
Together, Dunham and The Genesee Chief worked a vast expansion of the federal courts' admiralty and maritimejurisdiction. That
jurisdiction now encompassed numerous cases that were previously
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the state courts. For example,

engaged" in navigation on tidewaters); Thomas v. Lane, 23 F. Cas. 957, 960 (C.C.D.
Me. 1813) (No. 13,902) ("The admiralty has not, and never (I believe) deliberately
claimed to have anyjurisdiction over torts, except such as are maritime torts, that is,
such as are committed on the high seas, or on waters within the ebb and flow of the
tide.").
" As Blackstone explained:
[T]he courts maritime, or admiralty courts... have jurisdiction and power
to try and determine all maritime causes, or such injuries, which, though
they are in their nature of common law cognizance, yet being committed on
the high seas, out of the reach of our ordinary courts of justice, and
therefore to be remedied in a peculiar court of their own. All admiralty
causes must be therefore causes arising wholly upon the sea, and not within
the precincts of any county.
3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 74, at *106 (footnote omitted).
481 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851).
42 Id. at 457.
483 See id. at 455.
4
8 Id. at 456.
48 See ROBERTSON, supra note 415, at 115 ("[S]ubsequent decisions gradually
established The Genesee Chief as the basis for the exercise of federal admiralty
jurisdiction over all waters, salt or fresh, tidal or not, navigable in fact in interstate
or foreign commerce.").
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admiralty jurisdiction extended to all maritime torts occurring not
only on the high seas and the tidewaters, but also on all navigable
waters, wherever located.48
Admiralty jurisdiction also encompassed all maritime contracts regardless of where they were made,
and regardless of whether they related to transactions beyond the
high seas and the tidewaters." 7 The scope of federal admiralty
jurisdiction "was an issue of genuine importance because, under De
Lovio, parties of nondiverse citizenship could bring into the federal
admiralty forum claims that would otherwise have been confined to
48 8
state forums because of lack of diversity."
Although the federal courts might exercise questionable
jurisdiction over a number of cases that otherwise would be left to
the state courts, the Supreme Court's decisions expanding admiralty
jurisdiction raised only limited federalism concerns. At the time,
federal courts acknowledged that the mere existence ofjurisdiction
in such cases did not dictate the source of law to be applied. For
example, as Justice Story explained in an early circuit case, once the
admiralty's jurisdiction "rightfully attaches on the subject matter, it
will exercise it conformably with the law of nations, or the lex loci
contractus, as the case may require." 89 As Justice Story remarked
4

See Insurance Co. v. Dunham, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 1, 25 (1870). In 1948,
Congress further expanded the scope of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction by extending it to "include all cases of damage or injury, to person or property, caused by
a vessel on navigable water, notwithstanding that such damage or injury be done or
consummated on land." Extension of AdmiraltyJurisdiction Act, Pub. L. No. 80-695,
62 Stat. 496 (1948) (codified at 46 U.S.C. app. § 740 (1988)). Perhaps influenced by
Seventh Amendment concerns, the Supreme Court has read the statute narrowly to
confer jurisdiction "only if'the wrong' had 'a significant connection with traditional
maritime activity.'" Grubart v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 115 S. Ct. 1043,
1048
(1995) (quoting Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 674 (1982)).
4 7
1 Dunham, 78 U.S. at 26.
" Fletcher, supra note 160, at 1552. Although the state courts retained some
degree of concurrent jurisdiction over these matters under the "saving to suitors"
clause, such jurisdiction was limited to suits seeking in personam relief under the
Court's restrictive construction of the clause. See infra notes 516-19 and accompanying text.
...The Jerusalem, 13 F. Cas. 559, 563 (C.C.D. Mass. 1814) (No. 7293). For
example, although admiraltyjurisdiction as interpreted in De Lovio encompassed "all
contracts (wheresoever they may be made or executed ... ) which relate to the
navigation, business or commerce of the sea," 7 F. Cas. at 444, the substantive law to
be applied to such contracts remained "the law of the place where they are made, or
to be executed." TheJerusalem, 13 F. Cas. at 562; see also Hammond v. Essex Fire &
Marine Ins. Co., 11 F. Cas. 387, 389 (C.C.D. Mass. 1826) (No. 6001) ("The cases cited
at the bar fully support [the American] doctrine; and what is more material, it has
been recognized by the supreme court of Massachusetts, to which state these parties
belong.").
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in an analogous context, it is difficult to "perceive the hardship of
compelling a party to perform his engagements according to the
construction, which the courts of his own [state] would put upon
49 0
them."
Moreover, in the early to mid-nineteenth century, the distinction
between general and local law made little difference because in most
cases "American courts resorted to [general maritime] law to
provide the rules of decision in particular cases without insisting
that the law be attached to any particular sovereign." 491 In addition, although "the law generated in the various state and federal
courts was fairly uniform," 492 state courts remained free to exercise independentjudgment in ascertaining and applying the general
493
law maritime in cases coming before them.
The federalism concerns associated with expansive admiralty
jurisdiction are primarily attributable to the Supreme Court's
controversial decision in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen.4 9 4 There,
the Court held that "in the absence of some controlling statute the
general maritime law as accepted by the federal courts constitutes
part of our national law applicable to matters within the admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction." 495
State law is preempted to the
extent that it "works material prejudice to the characteristic features
of the general maritime law or interferes with the proper harmony
and uniformity of that law in its international and interstate rela40 TheJerusalem, 13 F. Cas. at 562. In the original quote, the bracketed word is
.country."
49' Fletcher, supra note 160, at 1517. In the early part of the nineteenth century,
"the state courts considered themselves, other state courts, and the federal courts to
be engaged in precisely the same enterprise: deciding cases under, and developing
a system of, general common law." Id. at 1575; cf. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.)
1, 19 (1842) (stating that on questions "of general commercial law, ... the state
tribunals are called upon to perform the like functions as ourselves, that is, to
ascertain, upon general reasoning and legal analogies, ... what is the just rule
furnished by the principles of commercial law to govern the case");supra notes 184-88
and accompanying text (discussing Swift). Like the law merchant, the general
maritime law was derived from the law of nations. "The maritime law," however, "was
an even more comprehensive and eclectic general law than the law merchant."
Fletcher, supra note 160, at 1517. For example, "in almost all civilized countries,
[maritime contracts were] in general substantially governed by the same rules." The
Jerusalem, 13 F. Cas. at 562.
4 Fletcher, supra note 160, at 1569.
g "[S]tate courts were under no legal compulsion to follow the decisions of the
United States Supreme Court," id. at 1574, but deviations were nonetheless rare, see
id. at 1515.
494 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
495 Id. at 215.
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tions."496 In other words, underJensen, jurisdiction over admiralty
and maritime cases confers upon federal courts authority not merely
to adjudicate such cases, but to impose its own conceptions of
497
uniform maritime law as a matter of federal law.
b. The HistoricalPurpose ofJurisdictionover Private Maritime Claims
The Supreme Court's modem "tradition of federal common
4 99
498
is difficult to reconcile with Erie.
lawmaking in admiralty"
Like Swift,Jensen permitsfederal courts to disregard rules of decision
adopted by state courts in favor of so-called "general" law, a practice
that Erie held to invade rights "reserved by the Constitution to the
several States.""'
Indeed, Jensen appears to raise even greater
federalism concerns than Swift because it also generally requires
state courts to follow general common law rules adopted by federal
courts, notwithstanding contrary state law. The general common
law at issue in Swift, by contrast, applied only in federal courts.5 1
AsJustice Pitney observed, "the effect will be to deprive the several
States of their police power over navigable waters lying wholly
within their respective limits, and of their authority to regulate their
intrastate commerce so far as it is carried upon navigable wa5 02
ters."
The combined effect of Jensen and Erie is that "the grant of
jurisdiction to the federal courts in 'Cases of admiralty and
maritime Jurisdiction' gives the federal courts power to evolve and
apply a national substantive law, [while] the grant of jurisdiction
over 'Controversies ... between Citizens of different States' does

96 Id. at 216.
""The Court continues to adhere to Jensen's determination that Article III's
jurisdictional grant authorizes federal common lawmaking in admiralty and maritime
cases. See Northwest Airlines v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 95-96 (1981)
("We consistently have interpreted the grant of general admiraltyjurisdiction to the
federal courts as a proper basis for the development ofjudge-made rules of maritime

law.").
"' American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 114 S. Ct. 981, 989 (1994).
4

Jensen was decided 20 years before Erie, but the Supreme Court does not

appear to have subsequently made any serious attempt to reconcile the former with

the latter.
0 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 80 (1938).
501See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
"02Jensen,244 U.S. at 253 (Pitney,J., dissenting). Justice Pitney's dissent characterized Jensen as "novel and far-reaching," id. at 225, stressing that it had never
previously "been held that the jurisdictional grant required state courts to conform
their decisions to those of the United States courts," id. at 248.
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not."50 The constitutional basis for this dichotomy is not obvious.
According to Professor Currie:
The answer lies, to the extent that there is an answer, in the
historical purposes that have been attributed to the two jurisdictional grants. Although in the present day the interests appear
largely indistinguishable in both classes of cases, a uniform law was
apparently one reason for the establishment of the admiralty
jurisdiction in 1789, while the diversity jurisdiction is generally
regarded as intended only to insure unbiased protection against
the provincialism of state courts in the administration of their own
laws in cases involving citizens of other states.05 4

Professor Currie's skepticism is well-founded.
Although these
historical purposes have indeed been "attributed to the two
jurisdictional grants," neither is entirely accurate. 055
"[P]rotection against the provincialism of state courts in the
administration of their own laws"506 does not appear to have been
the founders' exclusive, or even primary, motivation in giving the
federal courts jurisdiction over suits between citizens of different
states. The founders anticipated (correctly) that many suits brought
within the diversity jurisdiction would involve matters of a commercial nature.10 7 At the time, these matters were governed, not by
David P. Currie, Federalismand the Admiralty: "The Devil's Own Mess", 1960 Sup.
CT. REV. 158, 162-63. For example, if two boats piloted by Michigan residents collide
on Lake Erie, then federal courts have admiralty jurisdiction and general maritime
law governs the matter to the exclusion of state law. If, however, these same vessels
collide while being transported on'the shore, then federal courts probably lack
jurisdiction and "the law to be applied.., is the law of the state." Erie, 304 U.S. at
78.
"' Currie, supra note 503, at 163 (footnotes omitted).
505 Id.
506
Id.
17 According to Professor Frank:
The real key to the diversity clause lies in the optimism of the founders
.... [The members of the Convention] anticipated manufacture and trade
within the United States on an unknown but vast scale. One of the principal
objects of the Convention was to open a path for that expansion.... If the
Founding Fathers could anticipate the industrial and commercial revolution,
already beginning, they could anticipate some of the obstacles to the success
of the concomitant business enterprise. The diversity clauses were based on
that dual anticipation more largely than on experience.
John P. Frank, Historical Bases of the Federal Judicial System, 13 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBs. 3, 27 (1948). The founders appear to have correctly anticipated the type of
litigation that would be brought in federal court, at least during the nation's early
history. "At the beginning of the period [1790-1815], the principal economic groups
involved in litigation, quantitatively at least, were the shipping industry, the holders
of bills and notes, and those who dealt in land." Id. at 17. "Tort cases in diversity
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the states' "own laws," but by the law merchant, which (like the law
maritime) was thought to be neither federal nor state law. 5 s
Thus, at the time, uniformity appears to have been considered as
important in commercial cases as it was in private maritime
50 9
cases.
Similarly, although the need for "a uniform law" was certainly
"one reason for the establishment of the admiralty jurisdiction in
1789, " "'° the founders did not consider all admiralty and maritime
cases to be equal in this regard. The founders regarded prize cases
and felonies committed on the high seas as "[t]he most important
51
part" of the federal courts' admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. '
Neither the Virginia Plan nor its primary rival, the NewJersey Plan,
originally made any provision for federal jurisdiction over private
maritime claims.512 Rather, both plans would have limited jurisdiction to "all cases of captures from an enemy, . . all cases of
piracies [and] felonies on the high seas ... [and] the collection of
the federal Revenue." 1 3 Private maritime claims appear to have

were almost nonexistent...." Id. at 18; see also 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 101,
at 583 (Madison) (arguing in favor of diversityjurisdiction, in part, to counteract the
prejudices of local courts that have "prevented many wealthy gentlemen from trading
or residing among us").
' See Thompson v. The Catharina, 23 F. Cas. 1028, 1030 n.7 (D. Pa. 1795) (No.
13,949) (noting with respect to tile law of England that "[hier law merchant, and that
part of it relating to assurances particularly, as well as maritime law,.. . are founded
on usages and established customs, as well [as] of her own, as of all countries
possessing respectable codes or principles of maritime law"); supra notes 167-73 and
accompanying text (discussing the role of the law merchant in early American history
as a system of commercial customs to which most civilized nations adhered).
' See Thurston v. Koch, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 348, 352 (1800) ("To be respectable
abroad, and to facilitate and simplify mercantile business at home, we should have a
national, uniform and generally received law-merchant. The custom or practice of
one state, differing, perhaps, from that of another, must yield to general and
established principles."); supra notes 174-78 and accompanying text (describing the
political and economic benefits of adhering to a uniform law merchant).
510 Currie, supra note 503, at 163.
51 THE FEDERALIST No. 80, supra note 201, at 478; see also supra note 440.
"12 SeeJames Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (May 29, 1787),
in 1 Farrand, supra note 61, at 22 [hereinafter Madison, Virginia Plan]; James
Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (June 15,1787), in I Farrand, supra
note 61, at 244 [hereinafter Madison, New Jersey Plan]. Only the Pinckney Plan,
which appears to have been presented but never discussed, would have authorized
Congress to create federal admiralty courts "'for hearing and determining' all
'maritime Causes.'" Pinckney Plan, in 3 Farrand, supra note 61, at 608.
"' Madison, New Jersey Plan, at 244. The Virginia Plan was essentially similar.
It would have encompassed "all piracies & felonies on the high seas," "captures from
an enemy," and 'cases ... which respect the collection of the National revenue."
Madison, Virginia Plan, at 22.
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been included in Article III only because the Committee of Detail
"opted for a general admiralty clause and rejected the drafting
14
strategy of breaking admiralty jurisdiction into subcategories."
The founders' broad grant of "admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction" does not establish that the historical purpose of the grant was
to establish "a uniform law" to govern all cases contemplated by
such jurisdiction. To the contrary, the Judiciary Act of 1789 reveals
that the founders took steps to ensure the development of "a
uniform law" to govern cases involving questions of prize, enforcement of criminal sea laws, and collection of federal revenue, but
took no similar action to ensure uniformity in the context of private
maritime claims. Specifically, as discussed below, the Act conferred
exclusive jurisdiction upon the federal courts to adjudicate cases of
the former description, but permitted federal and state courts to
exercise concurrent jurisdiction over private maritime claims under
51 5
the famous "saving to suitors" clause.
Section 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 gave the federal courts
"exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction, including all seizures under laws of impost,
navigation or trade ...

; saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of a

16
common law remedy, where the common law is competent to give it."1
The provision appears to grant the federal courts exclusive
jurisdiction over all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, subject only to the operation of the "saving to suitors"
clause. 517 The difficulty, of course, has been to decipher the
meaning of the "savings" clause. In The Moses Taylor,5"' the Supreme Court adopted the modern interpretation of the clause under
which federal admiralty courts exercise exclusive jurisdiction over
civil admiralty proceedings in rem, while state courts retain concurrent jurisdiction over cases brought in personam. This procedural
dichotomy rests on a seemingly straightforward interpretation of the
"savings" clause: "It is not a remedy in the common-law courts

514 Casto,

supra note 420, at 135.

"' This dichotomy reflects the founders' belief that it was not essential to the
national interest that private maritime claims be "appropriated to the admiralty."
Randolph's Report, supra note 421, at 22.
516Ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 77 (emphasis added).
517 In a separate portion of the Act, Congress gave the lower federal courts
exclusive "cognizance of all crimes and offences that shall be cognizable under the
authority of the United States, committed within their respective districts, or upon
the high seas . . . ." § 9, 1 Stat. at 76-77. The famous "saving to suitors" clause did
not apply to these cases.
58 71 U.S. (1 Wall.) 411 (1866).
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which is saved, but a common-law remedy. A proceeding in rem, as
used in the admiralty courts, is not a remedy afforded by the
common law; it is a proceeding under the civil law."5 19
Professor Casto has persuasively argued, however, that although
520
the Court's "procedural distinction fits the language of the Act,"
it does not appear "to have occurred to any member of the
521
Founding Generation":
Jacob's[Law Dictionary]... defined Remedy as "the Action or means

given by law, for the Recovery of a Right." Following this
eighteenth century definition, concurrent admiralty jurisdiction
under the Act could extend to all disputes in which the common
law is competent to give a cause of action.
In other words, the Jacob'sdefinition suggests that concurrent
jurisdiction could be keyed to the legislative jurisdiction of the
common law courts rather than those courts' coincidental use of
in personam process.

522

The treatment of in personam cases within the admiralty's
"extraordinary or prize jurisdiction" 523 strongly supports Professor
Casto's interpretation.5 24 It was well established in 1789 that "[iun
cases of prize . .. the courts of admiralty have an undisturbed and
exclusive jurisdiction to determine the same according to the law of
nations."525 Even if a suit involving a question of prize were
brought in personam, the "courts of common law [were] bound to
abstain from any decision of questions of this sort. "526
Properly understood, the Judiciary Act maintained this traditional division. The Act gave the federal courts "exclusive original
cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction," which indisputably encompassed prize cases. 527 The "say519

Id. at 431.
Casto, supra note 420, at 141.
521 Id. at 143.
5
1 Id. at 146 (citing G. JACOB, A NEW LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1750)).
According to Professor Casto, Oliver Ellsworth may have been influenced byJacob's
Law Dictionaty in drafting the Judiciary Act because this volume "was one of the
primary legal texts in his legal education." Id. (citing WILLIAM G. BROWN, THE LIFE
OF OLIVER ELLSWORTH 22 (Da Capo Press 1970) (1905)).
-23 Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 241, 282 (1808) (Johnson, J., dissenting).
" See Casto, supra note 420, at 143-45.
525 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 74, at *108.
526 Story, supra note 421, § 865; see also Maisonnaire v. Keating, 16 F. Cas. 513,
519 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No. 8978) ("[I]f the decision of prize or no prize be
involved, it exclusively belongs to the admiralty.").
527 Prize cases were regarded as "civil causes of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction" and, as such, fell within the federal courts' "exclusive original
520
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ings" clause was inapplicable to cases within the admiralty's
"extraordinary or prize jurisdiction, " 28 not because such cases
were invariably brought in rem, 29 but because "the common law"
simply was not "competent to give" "a common law remedy"-that
30
is, a cause of action-in prize cases.
Under this interpretation, private civil claims within the
admiralty's "ordinary jurisdiction " 531 presented a very different
case. Although such claims fell within the federal courts' "exclusive
original cognizance of all causes of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction," they were subjected to concurrent state court
jurisdiction by virtue of the "savings" clause. As Justice Story
acknowledged, "by the usage and decisions of ages," the common
law courts possessed "concurrentjurisdiction over all causes, except
of prize, within the cognizance of the admiralty."51 2 In other
words, in all such cases, "the common law [was] competent to give"
a common law remedy.-3 ' This meant that suitors were free to file

cognizance" under the Act. Jennings v. Carson, 13 F. Cas. 540, 542-43 (D. Pa. 1792)
(No. 7281).
529 Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 241, 282 (1808) (Johnson, J., dissenting).
2'9 The question of "prize or no prize" could readily arise in an in personam action
as well. For example, in cases of captures by belligerents, "no action for damages
could be maintained at common law, even if the capture had been tortious; for it was
a taking as prize. Admitting that trespass will lie, at common law, for a maritime tort
on the high seas .. . , it is otherwise, if the supposed trespass be a seizure as prize."
Keating, 16 F. Cas. at 519.
5.0 See Casto, supra note 420, at 143-46.
'" Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 282.
5.2 De Lovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418, 426 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No. 3776). As Lord
Mansfield explained: "A thing being done upon the high sea, [does not] exclude the
jurisdiction of the Courts of Common Law. For, seizing, stopping, or taking, a ship,
upon the high sea, not as prize, an action will lie; but for taking, as prize, no action will
lie. The nature of the question excludes, not the locality." Lindo v. Rodney, reprinted
in LeCaux v. Eden, 99 Eng. Rep. 375, 385 n.1, 386 (K.B. 1781) (emphasis added).
'" De Lovio, 7 F. Cas. at 426. The "saving to suitors" clause appears to have been
inapplicable not only to prize cases, but to revenue cases as well, because the common
law did not possess jurisdiction over such cases. In England, revenue cases appear
to have been brought in the court of exchequer in its capacity as a court of equity.
See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 74, at *43-44. In the colonies, actions "to enforce
imperial revenue laws concerning smuggling and illicit trading" were brought in the
vice-admiralty courts. Casto, supra note 420, at 125. The colonists resented the lack
of"a common law remedy" in such cases because it deprived them of ajury trial. Cf
Frank, supra note 507, at 6-7 ("Experience in the colonies proved that juries would
not convict their fellow colonials in trade cases, and [eventually] the admiralty courts
were reorganized to utilize their non-jury procedures."). Even after the states
declared their independence, however, state admiralty courts continued "the common
course of proceeding against a ship for breach of revenue laws." Casto, supra note
420, at 126-27 (internal quotations omitted).
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private maritime claims in the common law courts of any state that
afforded them an appropriate cause of action. 53 4 Thus, the
traditional distinction between prize cases and private maritime
claims strongly suggests that Congress "was motivated by substantive
rather than procedural distinctions when [it adopted] the Judiciary
535
Act's admiralty clause with its 'saving to suitors' clause."
Given the Act's dichotomy, the "historical purpose" of admiralty
jurisdiction does not appear to have been the establishment of "a
uniform law" to govern private maritime claims. As in diversity
cases, federal and state courts exercising concurrent jurisdiction
over private maritime claims jointly administered the general law
applicable to the case.536 Although each expressed respect for the
other's interpretation of such law, both considered themselves free
3 7
to exercise independent judgment."
Thus, there was no assurance of uniformity in either context. Under these circumstances,
there is little reason to believe that uniformity played a greater role
in the founders' establishment ofjurisdiction over private maritime
claims than it did in the establishment of diversity jurisdiction.
In the end, there appears to be little historical basis for
distinguishing Jensen from Erie. At least one member of the
Supreme Court has recently recognized the apparent inconsistency
between these cases. Writing separately in American Dredging Co. v.
Miller,5"' Justice Stevens declared that "Jensen and its progeny
represent an unwarranted assertion of judicial authority to strike
down or confine state legislation ... without any firm grounding in
constitutional text or principle."5" 9 As discussed below, Justice
Stevens's assessment has much force, especially as applied to the
federal courts' imposition of general maritime rules that govern
matters within the legislative competence of the states.

-" Suitors were also free to file an action on the "law" side of the federal courts,
provided that they could establish an independent basis for subject matter
jurisdiction, such as diversity of citizenship. See Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 247
U.S. 372, 379 (1918) (asserting that, barringjurisdictional problems, "the [claim] must
be the same in every court, maritime or common law").
5 Casto, supra note 420, at 145.
"s See Fletcher, supra note 160, at 1521 (observing that throughout the first half
of the nineteenth century 'there had always been, and still remained, a substantial
core of uniform law that was administered by the federal and state courts as a general
American common law").
537 See id. at 1515, 1574.
5389114 S. Ct. 981 (1994).
.. Id. at 991 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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c. Reconceptualizing Federal Common Law Rules Governing Private
Maritime Claims
It may be possible to reconceptualize at least a portion of the
federal common law rules applied to private maritime claims using
the criteria set forth in Part II. It is necessary at the outset to
distinguish rules that govern matters within the legislative competence of the states from those that govern matters beyond such
competence. The legislative competence of the states remains
largely territorial. With important exceptions, states generally
possess legislative competence over matters that occur within their
borders and lack authority over events that take place outside their
territory."'
In the admiralty context, this means that states
generally possess authority over matters that take place within their
territorial waters, 54 ' and generally lack competence over events
54 2
that occur on the high seas.
The exceptions to the states' general legislative competence over
matters that occur within their territory stem from the constitutional division of authority between the federal government and the
states. Thus, in areas over which the Constitution grants the federal
government exclusive power-such as the conduct of foreign
540Cf Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 410 (1930) (holding that due process

precludes Texas from "abrogat[ing] the rights of parties beyond its borders [in
Mexico] having no relation to anything done or to be done within them"). We are
not here concerned with the distinct due process considerations that govern domestic
(as opposed to international) choice of law. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472
U.S. 797, 821-22 (1985) (discussing the "permissible constitutional limits on choice
of substantive law"); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308-13 (1981) ("[FIor
a State's substantive law to be selected in a constitutionally permissible manner, that
state must have a significant contact creating state interests .... ").
41 The Supreme Court has recognized various exceptions to the territorial
sovereignty of the states when the matter in question directly implicates the conduct
of foreign relations. See, e.g., Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432-34 (1968)
(invalidating an Oregon probate statute requiring inquiry "into the type of
governments that obtain in particular foreign nations" as "an intrusion by the State
into the field of foreign affairs which the Constitution entrusts to the President and
the Congress"); cf. Bergman v. De Sieyes, 170 F.2d 360,363 (2d Cir. 1948) (extending
diplomatic immunity from service of process to foreign persons in transit to their
place of diplomatic service, despite the countervailing interest of allowing a state's
citizens the opportunity to sue upon their claims in their home state").
12 The Supreme Court recognizes an exception to this principle that permits
states to regulate the conduct of its own citizens even when such conduct occurs
outside the territorial waters of the state. See Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 77
(1941) ("[W]e see no reason why the State of Florida may not... govern the conduct
of its citizens upon the high seas with respect to matters in which the State has a
legitimate interest and where there is no conflict with acts of Congress.").
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affairs-the application of state law could impair this authority. In
these circumstances, state law is arguably preempted.
Before turning to consider the potential- constitutional preemption of state authority, this section first reviews the areas over which

the states appear to retain constitutional authority.

Even with

respect to bays and harbors within the ebb and flow of the tide,

states retain general legislative competence.

United States v.

Bevans543 illustrates the point. Bevans arose under section 8 of the

Crimes Act of 1790, which defined piracy to include murder
committed "upon the high seas, or in any river, haven, basin or bay,
out of the jurisdiction of any particularstate."544 Bevans was indicted
for committing murder on board "the United States ship of war
Independence" while the ship was "lying at anchor, in the main
channel of Boston harbour[]."5 45 The question before the Court
was whether the statute encompassed this offense.

The United States argued that the Constitution's extension of
the judicial power to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction

excluded Massachusetts from exercising jurisdiction over the
offense. ChiefJustice Marshall framed the inquiry as follows: "Can
the cession of all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction be
construed into a cession of the waters on which those cases may
arise?" 4 6 The Court's answer anticipated Erie's embrace of
judicial federalism in important respects, and thus warrants
extended quotation:
This is a question on which the court is incapable of feeling a
doubt. The article which describes the judicial power of the
United States is not intended for the cession of territory or of
general jurisdiction. It is obviously designed for other purposes.
It is in the 8th section of the 2d article, we are to look for cessions

16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 336 (1818).
Ch. 9, § 8, 1 Stat. 112, 113 (emphasis added).
"5Bevans, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) at 337-38.
546
Id. at 388. The Court made clear at the outset that, under the statute, "[i]t is
not the offence committed, but the bay in which it is committed, which must be out
of the jurisdiction of the state." Id. at 387-88. The Court also assumed that the
offense "committed [was] a case of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction" within the
meaning of Article III. Id. at 387. This assumption appears to have been well
founded. The murder occurred on a ship "lying at anchor in the main channel of
Boston harbours in waters of a sufficient depth at all times of tide for ships of the
largest class and burden, and to which there is at all times a free and unobstructed
passage to the open sea or ocean." Id. at 338. The admiralty's jurisdiction over
crimes was based on locality rather than subject matter. See STORY, supra note 421,
§ 871; 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 74, at *265.
"
544
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of territory and of exclusive jurisdiction. Congress has power to
exercise exclusive jurisdiction over this district, and over all places
purchased by the consent of the legislature of the state in which
the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals,
dock yards, and other needful buildings.
It is observable, that the power of exclusive legislation (which
is jurisdiction) is united with cession of territory, which is to be
the free act of the states. It is difficult to compare the two
sections together, without feeling a conviction, not to be strengthened by any commentary on them, that, in describing the judicial
power, the framers of our constitution had not in view any cession
of territory, or, which is essentially the same, of general jurisdiction.
It is not questioned, that whatever may be necessary to the full
and unlimited exercise of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, is
in the government of the union. Congress may pass all laws which
are necessary and proper for giving the most complete effect to
this power. Still, the general jurisdiction over the place, subject to
this grant of power, adheres to the territory, as a portion of
sovereignty not yet given away. The residuary powers of legisla547
tion are still in Massachusetts.
Accordingly, the Court concluded that "the bay in which this
murder was committed, is not out of the jurisdiction of a state," and
that Bevans's offense could not be punished under the Act. 4
The location of events within a state's territory is a necessary but
not a sufficient condition to establish state legislative competence
over the events in question. Even with respect to conduct that takes
place within its territory, a state may or may not possess legislative
competence, depending upon the nature of the transaction at issue
and its effect on matters committed to exclusive federal control.
For example, as Bevans observed, "if two citizens of Massachusetts
step into shallow water when the tide flows, and fight a duel, are
they not within the jurisdiction, and punishable by the laws, of
Massachusetts?"5 4 1 "As the powers of the respective governments
50
now stand," this question "must be answered in the affirmative"
because the state's regulation of such events does not unduly
interfere with the exercise of authority committed by the Con547 Bevans, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) at 388-89.
548

Id. at 389.
Id.
550 Id.
49

5
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stitution to the federal government-such as the foreign affairs
power.

55 1

Conversely, the states arguably lack legislative competence over
events that occur within their territory if regulation would interfere
with the conduct of foreign relations. 5 2 To take a stark example
posed by Professor Hill, suppose a state attempted to seize "a
Russian nuclear submarine" under "a state statute provid[ing] that
the property of a foreign government found within the jurisdiction,
not excluding naval vessels, shall be subject to execution and sale
under local process, in satisfaction of local judgments returned
against foreign governments."5 53 Professor Hill is surely correct
in concluding that actions of this kind "affect our relations .

.

. so

intimately and sensitively that they must be deemed to be within the
554
exclusive competence of the federal government."
Although each case must be evaluated in light of its peculiar
facts and circumstances, the constitutional structure suggests that
states generally lack legislative competence to prescribe binding
rules of decision in situations in which federal courts would
interpret a federal statute narrowly to avoid violations of international law.555 Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A. 55 6 provides
a real-life example. In that case, the Supreme Court construed the
Labor Management Relations Act narrowly not to apply to a dispute
between a foreign ship and a foreign crew that arose while the ship
was in Portland harbor for repairs.5 57 The Court's rationale was
.5.
Under Executive Jet Aviation v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 268 (1972),
and its progeny, however, the Court upholds admiraltyjurisdiction (and thus federal
common lawmaking authority) over all torts that have the potential to disrupt
maritime commerce and navigation. See, e.g., Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358,367 (1990)
(holding that federal admiralty court has jurisdiction over tort claims arising when a
fire, caused by a defective washer/dryer aboard a pleasure boat docked at a marina,
burned the boat, other boats docked nearby, and the marina).
552 See, e.g., Japan Line v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 453 (1979)
(holding that California lacks legislative competence to tax the instrumentalities of
foreign commerce found within its territory because a state, "by its unilateral act,
cannot be permitted to place.., impediments before this Nation's conduct of its
foreign relations and its foreign trade").
...
Hill, supra note 7, at 1047.
" Id. at 1048; ef. The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116,
117 (1812) (rejecting a federal admiralty court's attempt to libel a French warship),
discussed supra notes 283-308 and accompanying text.
...
See Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804)
("[A]n act of congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any
other possible construction remains ...
5- 353 U.S. 138 (1957).
WSee id. at 146-47.
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based on the relative institutional competence of the judicial and
the political branches in the field of foreign relations:
For us to run interference in such a delicate field of international
relations there must be present the affirmative intention of the
Congress clearly expressed. It alone has the facilities necessary to
make fairly such an important policy decision where the possibilities of international discord are so evident and retaliative action
558
so certain.
Generally speaking, under the constitutional structure, states have
no greater warrant than federal courts to "run interference" in the
"delicate field of international relations."
For example, the constitutional structure counsels strongly
against the application of Oregon law to a dispute like the one in
the Benz case, even if the case arose in state court. There is little
reason to suppose that the application of state law rather than
federal law would render "the possibilities of international discord"
less "evident," or "retaliative action" less "certain."5 59 To the
contrary, the founders were well aware that "[t]he Union will
undoubtedly be answerable to foreign powers for the conduct of its
members."" ° Under these circumstances, the states appear to lack
legislative competence over the transaction in question for much the
same reason that the federal courts must apply foreign law in the
absence of clear positive federal law to the contrary. In matters so
intimately related to foreign affairs, the constitutional structure
suggests that the political branches of the federal government-rather than the states or the judiciary--should make the "the
61
important policy decision" to depart from international custom.
Thus, in cases like Benz, "courts of this and other commercial
nations have generally deferred to a non-national or international
maritime law of impressive maturity and universality," 562 not
5

s Id. at 147.

559 id.
560 THE FEDERALIST No. 80, supranote 201, at 476; see also Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345

U.S. 571, 582 (1953) ("[A]ny contact which we hold sufficient to warrant application
of our law to a foreign transaction will logically be as strong a warrant for a foreign
country to apply its law to an American transaction."); cf.Japan Line v. County of Los
Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 450 (1979) ("If a novel state tax creates an asymmetry in the
international tax structure, foreign nations disadvantaged by the levy may retaliate
against American-owned instrumentalities present in their jurisdictions. Such
retaliation of necessity would be directed at American transportation equipment in
general, not just that of the taxing State, so that the Nation as a whole would
suffer.").
"l Benz, 353 U.S. at 147.

562 Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 581.

Such law "has the force of law, not from
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because such law constitutes federal common law, but because
departure from such law would adversely affect foreign relations.
"International or maritime law in such matters as this does not seek
uniformity ....
[Rather,] it aims at stability and order through
usages which considerations of comity, reciprocity and long-range
interest have developed to define the domain which each nation will
claim as its own."5 63 In other words, unless the political branches
clearly establish a federal rule of decision to govern the case, courts
should apply principles of international law and comity that either
supply a rule of decision or call for the application of the local or
municipal
64 law of the country to which the foreign ship and crew
belong.'
In the modern era, rules derived from traditional principles of
the law maritime might be characterized as "federal judge-made
law." As discussed above, however, this characterization is unnecessary and, in fact, misleading. Rules of this nature apply in both
federal and state court, not because they constitute federal common
law, but because they sometimes govern matters beyond the
legislative competence of the states and implement the Constitution's allocation of powers over foreign relations.
In other cases, however, the Supreme Court's application of
"federal common law" to resolve private maritime claims cannot be

extraterritorial reach of national laws, nor from abdication of its sovereign powers by
any nation, but from acceptance by common consent of civilized communities of rules
designed to foster amicable and workable commercial relations." Id. at 581-82.
m3 Id. at 582.
'r For example, in Thompson v. The Catharina, 23 F. Cas. 1028 (D. Pa. 1795)
(No. 13,949), a "case of a foreign ship, which came before the court on a claim for
wages by her seamen," the court was confronted with the question, "'What laws or
rules shall direct or govern the decisions of maritime courts here, in points on which
we have no regulations established by our own national legislature?'" Id. at 1028.
The court answered as follows:
There are, in most nations concerned in commerce, municipal and local
laws relative to contracts with mariners, and other maritime covenants and
agreements; though the great leading principles, or outlines, are in all nearly
the same. On this account among others, I have avoided taking cognizance,
as much as possible, of disputes in which foreign ships and seamen, are
concerned. I have in general, left them to settle their differences before
their own tribunals.... But where the voyage of a foreign ship ended here,
or was broken up, and no treaty or compact designated the mode of
proceeding, I have permitted suits to be prosecuted. In such cases, I have
determined according to the laws of the country to which the ship belonged,
if there existed any peculiar variance or difference from those generally
prevailing.

1360

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW [Vol. 144: 1245

so easily reconciled with federalism and separation of powers
concerns because neither of the criteria proposed in this Article is
satisfied. Under the expanded scope of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction recognized in Dunham and The Genessee Chief, a
substantial proportion of the cases governed by federal common law
concern matters within the traditional legislative competence of the
states. Whatever the precise scope of such competence, it seems
safe to say that the states generally possess authority over transactions that involve United States citizens and that take place within
their territory.56 5 Thus, Jensen's command that federal and state
courts apply general maritime law to such transactions appears to
contradict the principles of judicial federalism established in
Erie.566 Congress undoubtedly has authority to establish rules of
decision to govern most, if not all, maritime transactions relating to
navigable waters within the United States.567
Until it does so,
however, thejudiciary's imposition of "general maritime law" under
Jensen arguably intrudes upon the constitutional authority of
Congress and the states no less than the federal courts' application
of "general commercial law" under Swift. To paraphrase Justice
Stevens, Jensen appears to be just as untrustworthy a guide in an
admiralty case today as Swift v.. Tyson would be in a diversity
5 68
case.

' It is not obvious why the fact that state law governing such transactions affects
"maritime commerce" should have any greater constitutional significance in cases of
admiralty and maritimejurisdiction than does the fact that state products liability law
affects "interstate commerce" in cases brought within the federal courts' diversity
jurisdiction. In either case, the states appear to possess legislative competence unless
preempted by positive federal law, or perhaps, the negative implication of the
dormant commerce clause. Cf supra note 53 (discussing the dormant Commerce
Clause).
'" See supra notes 54-69 and accompanying text. Perhaps for this reason, the
Supreme Court has resisted requests to establish "a solitary federal scheme" to govern
private maritime claims. Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, 116 S. Ct. 619, 621 (1996)
(upholding "the application of state statutes to deaths within territorial waters").
' See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 151-52 (1971) (upholding a federal
statute criminalizing loan-sharking because even if such activity "'be local and though
it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by
Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce'" (quoting
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942))); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294,
302 (1964) (stating that "our investigation is at an end" "where we find that the
[congressional] legislators, in light of the facts and testimony before them, have a
rational basis for finding a chosen regulatory scheme necessary to the protection of
commerce"). But see United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1634 (1995) (holding
that the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 exceeded Congress's Commerce Clause
authority because "possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense an
economic activity that might... substantially affect any sort of interstate commerce").
's' See American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 114 S. Ct. 981, 990 (1994) (Stevens, J.,
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D. Cases Affecting the Rights and Obligations
of the United States
This section offers some tentative thoughts concerning the final
enclave of "federal common law" identified by the Supreme Courtrules governing cases that involve "the rights and obligations of the
United States."56
In particular, this section briefly examines
several of the Court's leading decisions in light of the criteria
proposed. Although, application of the proposed approach does
not resolve all of the constitutional difficulties associated with these
cases, it provides a useful analytical framework for assessing these
decisions. As discussed below, the federal courts' displacement of
state law generally does not raise significant federalism concerns
because the states arguably lack legislative competence to prescribe
binding rules of decision in this context. The federal courts'
adoption of federal common law rules, however, does raise
separation of powers concerns to the extent that rules of this kind
are difficult to derive from the Constitution, even using "the
method of inference from the structures and relationships created
by the constitution. " "'
1. Adoption of Federal Common Law Rules
Favoring the United States
The first set of cases involves attempts by the United States, as
plaintiff, to use federal common law as a sword-that is, to impose
liability on private parties even though neither state law nor positive
federal law authorizes such liability. Prominent examples include
Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States,57 ' and, most recently, O'Melveny
& Myers v. FDIC.5 72 The federal common law rules sought by the

concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("In my view, Jenson is just as
untrustworthy a guide in an admiralty case today as Lochner v. New York would be in
a case under the Due Process Clause." (citation omitted)).
' Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981). This field is
intrinsically complex because each case requires a careful assessment of competing
federal and state interests. The purpose of this section is not to provide a
comprehensive analysis of the problems inherent in the field, but merely to
demonstrate that the approach proposed in this article may provide a useful starting
point for future analysis.
570 BLACK, supra note 19, at 7.
571 318 U.S. 363, 366 (1943) (adopting a federal common law rule to govern the
"rights and duties of the United States on commercial paper which it issues").
57 114 S. Ct. 2048, 2052, 2056 (1994) (rejecting the FDIC's request for "judicial
creation of a federal rule of decision" to determine whether the knowledge of
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United States in these cases do not satisfy the proposed criteria.
Although it is unclear whether the states possess legislative
competence over the matters at issue, the "federal common law"
rules advocated by the United States do not appear to have been
necessary to implement any particular aspect of the constitutional
scheme. Thus, at a minimum, adoption of federal common law in
cases like these would raise separation of powers concerns.
a. Application of the First Criterion
Whether these cases satisfy the first criterion is unclear. In
Clearfield Trust, for example, the United States sought reimbursement from Clearfield Trust (on the basis of Clearfield's express
guaranty of prior endorsements) for the amount of a check that the
government had issued and paid, but that had been fraudulently
cashed.'" Clearfield defended on the ground that the United
States unreasonably delayed in giving it notice of the forgery and
that the government was therefore barred from recovery under
Pennsylvania law. 74 The Supreme Court held that the "rule of
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins does not apply to this action," 7 5 and that
"federal rather than local law" governs both "[t]he rights and duties
5 76
of the United States on commercial paper which it issues."
The Court found that state law was inapplicable to the transactions in question, reasoning essentially that federal law occupied the
field:
When the United States disburses its funds or pays its debts, it is
exercising a constitutional function or power. This check was
issued for services performed under the Federal Emergency Relief
Act of 1935. The authority to issue the check had its origin in the
Constitution and the statutes of the United States and was in no
way dependent on the laws of Pennsylvania or of any other state.
The duties imposed upon the United States and the rights
acquired by it as a result of the issuance find their roots in the
same federal sources. 77

corporate officers acting against the corporation's interest "will be imputed to the
FDIC when it sues as receiver of the corporation"). Although the O'Melveny Court
initially observed that "the FDIC is not the United States," id. at 2053, the Court
chose not to rest its decision on this ground and proceeded to evaluate the FDIC's
arguments in favor of a federal common law rule.
'73 See Clearfield Trust Co., 318 U.S. at 364-65.
574 See id. at 366.
Id. (citation omitted).
57 6
Id.

" Id. (citations omitted). The Court reached a similar conclusion regarding the
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If the Court is correct that "the Constitution and statutes of the
United States" preempt state authority in this context,57 then this
finding satisfies the first criterion and alleviates judicial federalism
579
concerns.
More recently, however, in O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC,5"' the
Supreme Court appeared to employ a stricter approach to "federal
preemption" of state authority. On this occasion, the Court made
no suggestion that federal law occupied the field. Rather, the Court
asserted that displacement of state law is "limited to situations
where there is a 'significant conflict between some federal policy or
interest and the use of state law.'" 5 8' The Court found no such

absence of state legislative competence in United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S.
301 (1947). In this case, the United States sued Standard Oil after a soldier was hit
by a truck owned and operated by Standard Oil. The United States sought to
establish liability under a novel federal common law cause of action for negligent
interference with the government-soldier relationship and to recover the costs of the
soldier's hospitalization and wages during his disability. Although the Court
ultimately refused to recognize a federal common law cause of action for separation
of powers reasons, the Court agreed with the United States that "the creation or
negation of such a liability is not a matter to be determined by state law," id. at 305,
because "the Federal Government has the exclusive power to establish and define the
[government-soldier] relationship by virtue of its military and other powers,... [and]
has power in execution of the same functions to protect the relation once formed
from harms inflicted by others," id. at 306 (footnote omitted).
" Although the validity of the Court's determination turns largely upon questions
of constitutional and statutory construction beyond the scope of this Article, seesupra
note 7, "[t]he rights and duties of the United States on commercial paper which it
issues," Clearfield Trust, 318 U.S. at 366, arguably preempt state law as a matter of
intergovernmental immunity. The problem of defining the rights and duties of the
United States under these circumstances "is not dissimilar to that of determining the
amenability of a federal instrumentality to state taxation. The broad basis on which
the latter issue was dealt with in M'CulIoch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 42536 (1819), lends support to the conception of a constitutional preemption in the
entire area under discussion." Hill, supra note 7, at 1040 n.103 (discussing the
analogous "problem of defining the defenses of a federal official sued for defamation"); ef. Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U.S. 51, 55 (1920) (relying on McCulloch to
reverse the conviction of a postal employee for driving a truck without a state
license). Of course, the precise scope of displacement of state law is not always clear,
and the Court appears to have adopted a much stricter approach to federal
preemption in subsequent cases. See infra notes 580-81 and accompanying text.
579Cf THE FEDERALIST No. 32, supra note 249, at 198 (stating that the Constitution confers exclusive federal power and alienates state sovereignty "where it grant[s]
an authority to the Union to which a similar authority in the States would be
absolutely and totally contradictoiyand repugnant");THE FEDERAUST No. 82, supranote
1, at 492 (observing that "where an authority is granted to the Union with which a
similar authority in the States would be utterly incompatible," such authority is
"exclusively delegated to the federal head").
o114 S. Ct. 2048 (1994), discussed infra notes 594-602 and accompanying text.
..Id. at 2055 (quoting Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68
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conflict to exist in this case because there was "not even at stake
that most generic (and lightly invoked) of alleged federal interests,
the interest in uniformity."5 82 Accordingly, the Court concluded
that federal courts should apply state law.
Significantly, the Supreme Court left open the question
"whether the basis for [application of state law] is California's own
sovereign
power
or
federal
adoption
of California's
disposition."585 Although the Court regarded the question to be
"of only theoretical interest," the distinction is crucial under the
first criterion. If state law applies of its own force, then the
principles of judicial federalism recognized in Erie are relevant to
cases like this. If not, then displacement of state law raises few, if
any, federalism concerns. 584 Resolution of this complex preemp(1966)).
"2Id. The Court stressed that "[t]he rules of decision at issue here do not govern
the primary conduct of the United States or any of its agents or contractors, but
affect only the FDIC's rights and liabilities, as receiver, with respect to primary
conduct on the part of private actors that has already occurred." Id.; cf. infra notes
611-21 and accompanying text (discussing potential preemption of state law at issue
in Boyle v. United Technologies, Inc., 487 U.S. 500 (1988)).
58 O'Melveny, 114 S. Ct. at 2053-54.
' United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580 (1973), provides an
apparent example of constitutional preemption of state authority. In that case, the
United States had acquired title to two parcels of land in Louisiana, one by purchase
in 1937 and the other by judgment of condemnation in 1939. See id. at 582. The
documents granting title to the United States reserved various mineral rights to Little
Lake Misere for an initial period of 10 years and then for so long as the company
continued to conduct mining activities at the site. See id. at 582-83. The parties
stipulated that the company conducted no mining activities after the initial period
expired. "Thus, under the terms of the instruments, fee title in the United States
ripened as of 1947 and 1949, respectively .... " Id. at 583. Nonetheless, the
company continued to claim the mineral rights associated with the property, see id.
at 584, and the United States brought suit in federal court to quiet title. See id. at 582
& n.1. The company defended on the basis of a 1940 Louisiana statute that
purported to render "'imprescriptible'" certain mineral rights reserved "'[w]hen land
is acquired by... the United States.'" Id. at 584 (quoting the Louisiana Act 315 of
1940).
Although the Supreme Court unanimously agreed that the Louisiana statute "has
no application to the mineral reservations agreed to by the United States," id. at 604,
the Court split as to the precise rationale. The majority opinion considered the
possibility of "formulating an independent federal 'common law' rule." Id. Justice
Rehnquist, however, thought that "the central question presented by this case is
whether Louisiana has the constitutional power to make Act 315 applicable to this
transaction, and not whether a judicially created rule of decision, labeled federal
common law, should displace state law." Id. at 606-07 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in
thejudgment). Justice Rehnquist concluded that Louisiana lacks such power because
"[t]he doctrine of intergovernmental immunity.., requires at least that the United
States be immune from discriminatory treatment by a State which in some manner
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tion question, however, is beyond the scope of this Article, and, in
any event, is unnecessary because the application of federal
common law in these cases does not appear to satisfy the second
criterion.
b. Application of the Second Criterion
The question under the second criterion is whether application
of a "federal common law" rule is necessary to implement some
feature of the constitutional structure. The answer in this context
appears to be no, because the rules advocated by the United States
serve only to further a particular policy choice rather than any fixed
aspect of the constitutional scheme.
Clearfield Trust is again
illustrative. After concluding that "[t]he rights and duties of the
United States on commercial paper which it issues are governed by
federal rather than local law,"585 the Court stated that in the
"absence of an applicable Act of Congress it is for the federal courts
to fashion the governing rule of law according to their own
standards."5 8 Application of such federal judge-made law in this
context raises substantial separation of powers concerns. 87 Certainly, the precise rule fashioned by the Court in this case-that the
United States's failure to give prompt notice is a valid defense only
if the defendant can show damage from the delay-is difficult to
derive from the constitutional structure.

interferes with the execution of federal laws." Id. at 608.
Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366 (1943).
" Id. at 367. In performing this function, the Court looked to the general law
merchant "developed for about a century under the regime of Swift v. Tyson... as
a convenient source of reference for fashioning federal rules applicable to these
federal questions," id., and adopted the rule that failure to give prompt notice is a
defense only if the defendant can establish that it was damaged by the delay, see id.
at 369.
" See supra notes 108-18 and accompanying text. Alternatively, Clearfield Trust
might be thought to involve the application of a state law cause of action, combined
with the preemption of a state law defense. The difficulty with this characterization,
however, is that it assumes that the cause of action and the defense are severable
under state law. See O'Melveny &Myers, 114 S. Ct. at 2056 (Stevens, J., concurring)
("Because state law provides the basis for respondent's claim, that law also governs
both the elements of the cause of action and its defenses."). Because state courts
must give effect to both claims and defenses, application of the former without the
latter would appear to be inconsistent with the intent of the relevant sovereign. Cf.
Alaska Airlines v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 685 (1987) ("The more relevant inquiry in
evaluating severability is whether the statute will function in a mannerconsistent with
the intent of Congress."). If the state cause of action was not severable from the
defense, then the resulting cause of action was necessarily federal in nature.
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Rather, whether the rights and duties of the United States with
respect to its commercial paper are "subject to the vagaries of the
58 9
"
laws of the several states '88 or governed by "a uniform rule"
is essentially a question of policy. It may be that application of state
law "would subject the rights and duties of the United States to
exceptional uncertainty,"5 9 but the desirability of a uniform rule
is hardly "plain."59 1 Firms may be reluctant to accept commercial
paper issued by the United States if they know that the parties'
rights and duties are subject to revision after the fact by the federal
courts "according to their own standards." 9 2 Whatever the merits
of the competing policy considerations, the constitutional separation
of powers at least suggests thatjudgments of this kind should be left
to Congress rather than the courts.59 3
The Supreme Court was much more sensitive to separation of
powers concerns in O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC.59 4 There, the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), in its capacity as
receiver of a federally insured savings and loan (S&L), brought suit

58 Clearfield Trust, 318 U.S. at 367.
589 Id.
590 Id.
"91Id.; see also Monaghan, supra note 7, at 13 n.70 ("Why... is it necessary for the
negotiable paper of the United States to be governed by a uniform law . . . when
General Motors and IBM are remitted to the laws of the several states?").
59 Clearfield Trust, 318 U.S. at 367; cf. United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431
U.S. 1, 61 (1977) (Brennan,J., dissenting) (suggesting that vigorous application of the
Contracts Clause is unnecessary because the states' need for "credibility in the credit
market" will prevent them from blithely repudiating their financial obligations);
United States v. National Exch. Bank, 270 U.S. 527, 534 (1926) ("The United States
does business on business terms.").
...Cf United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 313 (1947) (declining the
opportunity to create a federal common law cause of action permitting the United
States to recover for negligent interference with the government-soldier relationship).
The Standard Oil Court declined "the tendered opportunity" to establish a federal
common law rule in light of the constitutional separation of powers. Id. at 314. The
Court considered the issue to rest upon "a question of federal fiscal policy," whose
"conversion into law is a proper subject for congressional action, not for any creative
power of ours." Id.; see also id. ("Congress, not this Court or the other federal courts,
is the custodian of the national purse.").
This is not to say that state law necessarily applies of its own force in cases like

Clearfield Trust. As discussed, state power to govern the transactions in question may
be ousted by constitutional preemption. Nonetheless, federal courts frequently apply
state law in the "absence of an applicable Act of Congress," Clearfield Trust, 318 U.S.
at 367, because they are uncomfortable making the policy judgments required to
fashion federal rules of decision. Cf Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395
(1946) (stating that when Congress fails to put "a limit upon the time for enforcing
a right which it created," federal courts generally borrow state statutes of limitation).
594 114 S. Ct. 2048 (1994).
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in federal court against O'Melveny & Myers, a law firm that had
represented the S&L in connection with two real estate transactions.
The FDIC's complaint alleged professional negligence and breach
5 95
of fiduciary duty, "causes of action created by California law."
The firm defended, inter alia, on the ground "that knowledge of the
conduct of [the S&L's] controlling officers must be imputed to the
S&L, and hence to [the FDIC], which, as receiver, stood in the shoes
of the S&L."596 The principal question before the Supreme Court
was whether federal common law or state law determines whether
the knowledge of corporate officers acting against the corporation's
interest "will be imputed to the FDIC when it sues as receiver of the
corporation.

" 597

The Supreme Court unanimously rejected "judicial creation of
a federal rule of decision."5 98 The Court's analysis proceeded in
two steps that roughly correspond to the criteria proposed in this
Article. First, as previously discussed, the Court found insufficient
evidence of "federal preemption" to preclude the application of
state law in the context of this case.59 9 Second, the Court held
that the absence of "a genuinely identifiable (as opposed to
judicially constructed) federal policy""' precluded the adoption
of a "federal common law" rule. The Court's refusal to engage in
judicial lawmaking rested on the constitutional separation of
powers:
What sort of tort liability to impose on lawyers and accountants in
general, and on lawyers and accountants who provide services to
federally insured financial institutions in particular, "'involves a
host of considerations that must be weighed and appraised'"including, for example, the creation of incentives for careful work,
provision of fair treatment to third parties, assurance of adequate
recovery by the federal deposit insurance fund, and enablement of
reasonably priced services. Within the federal system, at least, we
have decided that that function of weighing and appraising "'is
more appropriately for those who write the laws, rather than for
61
those who interpret them.'"

-95

Id. at 2052.

596 Id.
597

Id.
5 Id. at 2056.
5
See id. at 2053; supra notes 580-82 and accompanying text.
o O'Melveny & Myers, 114 S. Ct. at 2055.
60 Id. at 2055-56 (citations omitted) (quoting Northwest Airlines v. Transport
Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 98 n.41 (1981) (quoting United States v. Gilman, 347
U.S. 507, 512-13 (1954))); cf supra notes 108-20 and accompanying text (discussing
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Accordingly, the constitutional structure not only fails to require,
but also affirmatively forecloses, adoption of a "federal common
law" cause of action in cases of this kind.
The Supreme Court's unanimous decision in O'Melveny & Myers
may signal heightened sensitivity to the constitutional concerns
raised by federal common law. The Court characterized "cases in
which the creation of a federal rule of decision is warranted" as
"extraordinary."0 2 Given its decision in O'Melveny &. Myers, the
Court seems prepared to impose a "federal common law" rule only
when state power over the matter in question is clearly lacking and
when adoption of a "federal common law" rule does not require
federal courts to engage in the "weighing and appraising" of
competing policy considerations more appropriately left to the
legislative and executive branches.
2. Preemption of State Law Rules Disfavoring
the United States
This section addresses attempts by the United States-or, more
precisely, its surrogates-to use "federal common law" rules as a
shield to prevent the application of state law rules that adversely
affect the interests of the United States. As discussed below, these
rules may be easier to reconceptualize under the proposed approach
than those discussed in the previous section. To the extent that the
rules under consideration simply involve preemption of state law
rather than affirmative judicial lawmaking, such rules are easier to
reconcile with the constitutional structure.
Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.6" 3 provides an example. In
that case, a marine was killed when his helicopter crashed into the
ocean and he was unable to escape." 4 The marine's father filed
a state law wrongful death action against the manufacturer of the
helicopter, alleging, inter alia, that the manufacturer had defectively

the disparity between the lawmaking powers of federal and state courts). Justice
Stevens's concurrence in O'Melveny &Myers,joined byJustices Blackmun, O'Connor,
and Souter, placed even greater emphasis on the "important difference between
federal courts and state courts." Id. at 2056 (Stevens,J., concurring). Justice Stevens
stressed that federal courts "'unlike their state counterparts, are courts of limited
jurisdiction that have not been vested with open-ended lawmaking powers.'" Id.
(quoting Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 95).
M O'Melveny &Myers, 144 S. Ct. at 2056.
603 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
60 See id. at 502.

FEDERAL COMMON LAW

1996]

1369

designed the helicopter because "the escape hatch opened out
instead of in (and was therefore ineffective in a submerged craft
because of water pressure)." 6 5" The jury returned a verdict against
the manufacturer, but the court of appeals held that the manufacturer could not be held liable for the alleged design defect because
it satisfied the "military contractor defense," a federal defense
recognized by the court of appeals the same day in another
case. 6 06 The Supreme Court described the defense as follows:
Liability for design defects in military equipment cannot be
imposed, pursuant to state law, when (1) the United States
approved reasonably precise specifications; (2) the equipment
conformed to those specifications; and (3) the supplier warned the
that
United States about the dangers in the use of the equipment
607
were known to the supplier but not to the United States.
The question before the Court in Boyle was the validity of this
defense.
A closely divided Supreme Court adopted the Fourth Circuit's
formulation of the "military contractor defense" in its entirety as a
matter of "federal common law." 60 ' The majority reasoned that
"the liability of independent contractors performing work for the
Federal Government ... is an area of uniquely federal interest, "609
and that such areas "are so committed by the Constitution and laws
of the United States to federal control that state law is pre-empted
and replaced, where necessary, by federal law of a content prescribed (absent explicit statutory directive) by the courts-so-called
'federal common law.' 6 10 As discussed below, the federal contractor defense appears to satisfy the criteria proposed in this Article
and thus does not in fact constitute "federal judge-made law."
The requirements of the federal contractor defense recognized
in Boyle arguably serve to define the scope of federal preemption of
state tort law as applied to federal military contractors acting within
the scope of their contractual duties. These requirements arguably
satisfy the first criterion because the design of military equipment
appears to be a matter committed to exclusive federal control, and

605 Id. at 503.

0 See Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403, 414-15 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 487
U.S. 1233 (1988).
Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512.
o See id. at 514 (5-4 decision).
at 505 n.1.
Id. at 504.

6o9
61
0 Id.
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thus beyond the legislative competence of the states. The Constitution grants Congress plenary power to establish and equip the army
and navy,6 ' while generally prohibiting the states from "keep[ing]
Troops, or Ships of War ... , or engag[ing] in War." 612

As the

Court noted in Boyle, "the selection of the appropriate design for
military equipment to be used by our Armed Forces" 613 rests upon
delicate policy considerations.
"It often involves not merely
engineering analysis but judgment as to the balancing of many
technical, military, and even social considerations, including
specifically the trade-off between greater safety and greater combat
effectiveness."6 14 Given the constitutional allocation of power
with respect to national defense, the task of balancing these
considerations should be performed by federal, rather than state,
615
officials.
That Boyle involved a suit against a military contractor rather
than one against the United States or its employees does not affect
the constitutional preemption of state authority in this context. In
exercising its power to equip the armed forces, the United States
may proceed either by directing federal employees to design and
manufacture military equipment or by contracting with private firms
to do so. When the United States chooses the former course, it is
well established that the constitutional structure immunizes federal
611The Constitution gives Congress power "[t]o raise and support Armies," U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12, and "[tlo provide and maintain a Navy," id. cl. 13, and
makes the President "Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United
States," id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.

612 Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. The Constitution provides that "No State shall, without
the Consent of Congress.... keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace,. . . or
engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit
of delay." Id. It is worth noting in this context that the Constitution recognizes a
distinction between the army and navy, on the one hand, and the militia, on the
other. Whereas Congress appears to have plenary authority over the army and navy,
Congress's power over the militia is qualified. The Constitution gives Congress tile
power "[t]o provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for
governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States,
reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of Officers, and the Authority
of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress .... " Id.
§ 8, cl. 16. The Constitution reserves no similar authority to the states over the army
and navy.
613Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511.
614Id.

"' See id. (asserting that "the character of the jet engines the Government orders
for its fighter planes cannot be regulated by state tort law"); cf. id. at 512 (stating that
state law "must be displaced" because "state law which holds Government contractors
liable for design defects in military equipment... present[s] a 'significant conflict'
with federal policy").
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officials acting within the scope of their authority from state tort
liability. 616 The traditional justification for such immunity is that
it is necessary to protect federal officials from unwarranted state
interference while they are carrying out legitimate federal functions.6 17
When the United States pursues the alternative course of
contracting out the manufacture of military equipment according to
federal specifications, the same concern for state interference with
federal functions arguably implies an analogous immunity for
federal contractors.61 1 In Boyle, for example, "the state-imposed
duty of care that is the asserted basis of the contractor's liability
(specifically, the duty to equip helicopters with the sort of escapehatch mechanism petitioner claims was necessary) [was] precisely
contrary to the duty imposed by [the specifications contained in] the
Government contract."6
The imposition of such conflicting
duties under state law would necessarily impede the accomplish616As ChiefJustice Marshall explained in an early case examining the scope of
immunity enjoyed by federal officials:
It is no unusual thing for an act of congress to imply, without expressing,
... [an] exemption from State control .... It has never been doubted that
all who are employed in [institutions which are public in their nature] are
protected while in the line of duty; and yet this protection is not expressed
in any act of congress. It is incidental to, and is implied in, the several acts
by which these institutions are created, and is secured to the individuals
employed in them by the judicial power alone ....
Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 865-866 (1824). Such
implied immunity for federal officials is distinct from the sovereign immunity
retained by the United States under the "discretionary function" exception to the
Federal Tort Claims Act. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1994); see Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511-12
(discussing the "discretionary function" exception). Because such immunity is
arguably implied by the constitutional structure, it does not appear to constitute
"federal judge-made law." But see Martha A. Field, The Legitimacy of FederalCommon
Law, 12 PACE L. REv. 303, 310 (1992) (stating that the "use of federal common law
has enabled courts to find broad immunities from suits-especially suits for
damages-although no enacted language suggests any such immunities").
617 See, e.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478,489 (1978) ("The immunity of federal
executive officials began as a means of protecting them in the execution of their
federal statutory duties from criminal or civil actions based on state law.").
61.Consider ChiefJustice Marshall's early observations on this point in Osborn:
Can a contractor for supplying a military post with provisions, be restrained
from making purchases within any State, or from transporting the
provisions to the place at which the troops were stationed? or could he be
fined or taxed for doing so? We have not yet heard these questions
answered in the affirmative.
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 867.
619 487 U.S. at 509.
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ment of legitimate federal functions, whether carried out by federal
officials or by independent contractors. 20
In both cases, the
constitutional structure suggests that the states lack authority to
interfere with the means chosen by the United States to accomplish
legitimate federal ends, either directly (through regulatory imperatives) or indirectly (through the imposition of tort liability on the
manufacturer). 2 '
The requirements of the military contractor defense appear
merely to define and implement the constitutional preemption of
state authority in this context. Historically, "a federal official was
protected for action tortious under state law only if his acts were
authorized by controlling federal law."6 22 A limitation of this kind
is necessary to ensure that federal immunity is no broader than
necessary to accomplish legitimate federal objectives. The first two
requirements of the military contractor defense adopted in Boyle
arguably perform a similar function.
The first requirement-that "the United States [have] approved
reasonably precise specifications"62-ensures that the contractor's
action is, in fact, necessary to further the United States's exercise of
exclusive federal authority. State regulation of military equipment
sold "off the rack" does not pose as great a threat to federal
functions.6 24 Although such regulation may incidentally affect the
cost, or perhaps even the design, of the equipment in question, the
620 The suggestion that the imposition of state tort liability would merely raise the
price that contractors must charge the government does not adequately distinguish
contractors from employees. The imposition of state tort liability on federal officials
might similarly raise the cost of their services to the government, but the constitutional structure nonetheless implies immunity in their favor. Cf. id. at 507 ("The
imposition of liability on Government contractors will directly affect the terms of
Government contracts: either the contractor will decline to manufacture the design
specified by the Government, or it will raise its price.").
621 Cf International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 209
(1991) (suggesting that Title VII may preempt state tort liability that "punish[es]
employers for complying with Title VII's clear command" (emphasis omitted));
Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525, 535 (1959) (stating that
a federal statute prohibiting broadcasters from censoring speeches by political
candidates precludes states from imposing liability on broadcasters for libel).
622 Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 490 (1978); see also id. at 489-90 ("A federal
official who acted outside of his federal statutory authority would be held strictly
liable for his trespassory acts.").
622Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512.
64 See id. at 509 ("If, for example, a federal procurement officer orders, by model
number, a quantity of stock helicopters that happen to be equipped with escape
hatches that open outward, it is impossible to say that the Government has a
significant interest in that particular feature.").
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constitutional scheme appears to leave the states substantially free
to undertake regulation of this kind.625 The second requirementthat "the equipment [have] conformed to [reasonably precise]
specifications [approved by the United States]" 626 --is analogous to
the limitation inherent in the immunity for federal officials, and
ensures that the contractor acted within the scope of its engagement. Broader immunity is unnecessary to further, and indeed
might frustrate, the federal objectives reflected in the specifications.
Although a closer case, the third requirement-that the supplier
have "warned the United States about the dangers in the use of the
equipment that were known to the supplier but not to the United
States" 627--also appears necessary to implement the constitutional
preemption of state authority in this sphere. When the first two
requirements of the military contractor defense have been met and
a contractor has disclosed all relevant dangers, the imposition of
state tort liability on federal contractors for performing their
contracts would interfere with the accomplishment of federal
functions. Indeed, the imposition of liability on federal contractors
under these circumstances appears to threaten federal functions to
the same extent as imposition of liability on federal officials who act
in good faith.6 21 In both cases, implications from the constitutional
structure appear to preclude the application of state law.
On the other hand, when a supplier fails to disclose relevant
dangers to the United States, it is far less clear that the application
of state tort law to the supplier would significantly interfere with the
performance of federal functions. 629 In general, the Supreme

" AsJustice Holmes emphasized in reversing the conviction of a postal employee
for driving a truck without a state license, "an employee of the United States does not
secure a general immunity from state law while acting in the course of his employment." Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U.S. 51, 56 (1920). To the contrary, it "very well
may be that, when the United States has not spoken, the subjection to local law would
extend to general rules that might affect incidentally the mode of carrying out the
employment-as, for instance, a statute or ordinance regulating the mode of turning
at the corners of streets." Id.
626 Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512.
627

d.

See Kendall v. Stokes, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 87, 98-99 (1845) (holding that the
Postmaster General would not be liable in damages for mistakenly exercising the
discretion of his office if he "acted from a sense of public duty and without malice");
cf. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (stating that qualified or "good
faith" immunity generally shields "government officials performing discretionary
functions... from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known").
62 Similarly, the imposition of liability for civil damages on federal officials whose
628
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Court's "cases have followed a 'functional' approach to immunity
law," extending protection "no further than its justification would
warrant." 6 0 In the case of contractors who fail to disclose relevant dangers, the application of state law does not appear to
threaten federal interests. To the contrary, the imposition of
liability in such cases would encourage full disclosure of the dangers
associated with the military equipment under consideration, and
thus could actually facilitate rather than impede the exercise of
federal power. Full knowledge of the dangers inherent in the
equipment would enable federal officials to make a more accurate
assessment of the costs and benefits associated with various design
alternatives, and thus to exercise federal power more effectively.
Viewed from this perspective, the military contractor defense
appears to satisfy the proposed criteria. The first criterion is
satisfied because the various elements of the defense themselves
supply the means of determining when a military contractor's
actions fall within the legislative competence of the states. To be
sure, a federal court's failure to apply state law when the requirements of the defense are not met would raise judicial federalism
concerns.
On the other hand, when these requirements are
satisfied, the states simply lack constitutional authority to regulate
the contractor's actions. Thus, by hypothesis, the federal courts'
recognition of immunity based on the military contractor defense
cannot be said to invade the autonomy and independence of the
states.
Similarly, the defense appears to satisfy the second criterion.
Restricting federal immunity to contractors who satisfy the various
requirements of the defense does not constitute improper judicial
Rather, these requirements appear necessary to
lawmaking.
implement an essential feature of the constitutional scheme
-namely, the division of authority between the federal government
and the states over military procurement matters. As discussed
above, federal courts do not apply the federal contractor defense in
order to implement their vision of sound federal policy. Rather,
they employ the defense to protect federal functions from unwarranted state interference. Thus, the federal contractor defense is
not, in fact, "federal judge-made law," but serves merely to define

actions are objectively unreasonable does not entail "excessive disruption of
government." Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
630 Id. at 810-11.
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and implement the constitutional preemption of state authority in
this context.
From this perspective, there is little substance to Justice
Brennan's charge that the Supreme Court "unabashedly stepped
into the breach to legislate a rule" of decision in Boyle.631 It is
true, as the dissent stressed, that "Congress has not decided to
supersede state law,"632 despite "a sustained campaign by Government contractors" in favor of such legislation.63 3 But this fact
does not preclude the Court from recognizing and implementing
the constitutional preemption of state authority in this context. For
example, had Congress unsuccessfully attempted to adopt the act of
state doctrine as a matter of positive federal law prior to the
Supreme Court's decision in Sabbatino, few would argue that the
Court would have been required to apply state law to the controversy. 634 To the contrary, the constitutional structure would have
rendered application of state law improper.6 35 In the end, the
dissenting Justices appear simply to have overlooked the possibility
of constitutional preemption in Boyle.
CONCLUSION
Current conceptions of federal common law are problematic
because they raise federalism and separation of powers concerns.
Reconceptualizing federal common law rules using the criteria
proposed in this Article alleviates these concerns. Many of these
rules can be justified in terms of the constitutional structure
because they govern matters beyond the legislative competence of
the states and implement various aspects of the constitutional

scheme. Recognizing the structural foundations of various rules
currently thought to be "federaljudge-made law" suggests that many
of these rules have been essentially mischaracterized. Recasting
federal common law rules by reference to the constitutional
Boyle, 487 U.S. at 515-16 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 518.
6s3 Id. at 515.
6"4 This is true, moreover, even though an act of state case may be "simply a suit
between two private parties." Id. at 519.
635 See supra note 273 and accompanying text. Of course, Congress remains free
to adopt positive federal law to govern controversies of this kind-as it did following
Sabbatino,seesupranote 279 and accompanying text-or even to incorporate state law
by reference. Until Congress takes such steps, however, federal courts need not apply
state law to matters beyond the legislative competence of the states simply because
Congress has not acted.
631

632
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structure places them on a firmer constitutional footing and dispels
the suggestion that judicial application of such rules either usurps
the constitutional authority of the states or invades the province of
the political branches.

